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Introduction
Whether rights to trade ought to be made in any way conditional on
the promotion of labor standards is an issue that currently engenders a
great deal of heated disagreement.
This essay presents a proposal for linking trade and labor standards.1
We develop a proposal for linking rights to participate in international
1. Other such proposals have been made, all of which share some of the features of
the proposal sketched below. E.g., Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-
GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163, 168 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond
eds., 1996); Int'l Confederation of Trade Unions, Building Workers' Human Rights into
the Global Trading System 66 (1999), http://www.icftu.org/www/english/els/escl99
BWRGTS.pdf [hereinafter ICFTU (1999)]; Pharis J. Harvey et al., Developing Effective
Mechanisms for Implementing Labor Rights in the Global Economy, Workers in the Global
Economy § II(A), www.laborrights.org/projects/globalecon/ilrf/index.html (last visited
Dec. 13, 2006).
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trade with the promotion of basic labor standards. 2 We argue that imple-
menting our proposal would improve working conditions and living stan-
dards in poor countries without imposing undue burdens, and would
therefore be one means of advancing valued ends, and in particular the
ends of justice.3 We identify the arguments that have been offered (or
could plausibly be offered) against linkage in order to show that, although
these arguments articulate legitimate concerns, they rest on unwarranted
assumptions concerning the practicability, likely effects, and appropriate
framework for evaluating linkage. 4
Our argument consists of five steps. First, we identify a proposition
that proponents of linkage accept, and its opponents reject, as well as an
objective that both groups seek to promote. Second, we identify the argu-
ments that can be offered against linkage, thus defined. Third, we show
why proposals for linkage that do not possess certain features should be
rejected on the basis of these arguments. Fourth, we identify additional
features of a proposal for linkage that would suffice in order for it to be
immune to these arguments. This process enables us to identify a class of
proposals for linkage that withstand all of the standard objections. We
argue that such proposals are superior to non-linkage proposals in promot-
ing a common objective of the groups on both sides of the linkage debate.
Fifth, to provide a concrete starting point for discussion, we describe one
such proposal.
Although we will take as our premise that gains from trade can exist,
nothing in our argument relies on a specific view regarding the trade policy
that maximizes these gains.5
I. What is Linkage?
Proposals to promote labor standards can be divided into two types:
those that involve linkage and those that do not. Further, all proposals to
promote labor standards, whether or not involving linkage, can be charac-
terized according to how they answer the following two questions:
(Q1) What are the labor standards to be promoted?
(Q2) How should labor standards be promoted?
2. It is possible that other valued objectives, such as promoting environmental qual-
ity or respect for human rights norms more broadly may also be promoted through
linkage. We take no stand on these issues here.
3. We are assuming that global institutional reforms that promote better working
conditions and living standards for less advantaged persons in the world without plac-
ing significant burdens on more advantaged persons advance the ends of justice.
Widely varying conceptions of justice would affirm this view.
4. A number of preferential trading agreements, e.g. NAFTA, CAFTA, United
States-Cambodia trade agreement, United States-Jordan trade agreement, U.S.-Chile
trade agreement, contain provisions regarding labor standards. See also Tobias Buck, EU
to Offer Rewards to 'Good' Poor Countries, Financial Times, Oct. 20, 2004.
5. Specifically, we do not assume that free trade is always the policy that maximizes
the gains from trade.
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Disagreements between opponents and proponents of linkage either
concern the objectives that should be promoted or the means of promoting
them. Both opponents and proponents of linkage seem to affirm the fol-
lowing proposition:6
Proposition 0: A very important factor in determining whether an insti-
tutional arrangement for the governance of the global economy should be
viewed as superior to another is whether it improves the level of advantage of
less advantaged persons in the world to a greater extent.
Those who affirm this proposition are committed to the view that
improving the level of advantage of less advantaged persons in the world is
a very important objective, which we therefore refer to henceforth as "the
objective." Advantage can be understood in various ways. 7 We leave it
unspecified other than presuming that for members of the labor force
advantage is generally enhanced by higher employment, higher real wages
and improved working conditions. We define "labor standards" as the level
of real wages and the quality of working conditions. Together with higher
employment, the improvement of labor standards is an important way of
increasing the level of advantage of less advantaged persons.
We understand basic labor standards to refer to a specified level of
attainment of labor standards that is deemed minimally adequate. If it is
desired, in order to fix ideas, the basic labor standards may be conceived in
terms of the "core" labor standards promoted by the ILO. The ILO's core
labor standards consist of "freedom of association and the effective recog-
nition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation."'8
Although we leave the exact content of these basic labor standards deliber-
ately unspecified (since the argument that we present below does not
depend on any highly specific conception of them), we think it implausible
that an account of basic labor standards would not include some reference
to standards of each of these kinds. We think that any plausible account of
basic labor standards will also additionally make reference to a level of real
wages that may be deemed minimally adequate in each context, although
6. We deliberately formulate this proposition abstractly to accommodate the broad
range of views that are present in the literature.
7. Although the way in which individual advantage is conceived will undoubtedly
influence the specific policies and institutional arrangements that are deemed desirable,
the arguments for and against linkage discussed in this essay are largely independent of
the choice of a particular conception, within reasonable bounds of variation. See, e.g.,
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); QUALITY OF
LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF Jus-
TICE (1971) [hereinafter RAwLs (1971)], for a discussion of different conceptions of indi-
vidual advantage.
8. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAl PRINCIPLES
AND RIGHTs AT WORK § 2(a)-(d) (June 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
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we do not take a position here as to what that level should be. 9
Similarly, our argument assumes the value of the objective identified
without relying on any specific interpretation of it (within some reasonable
range of variation). We understand an institutional arrangement to be a
set of norms or rules (whether formal or informal) that govern the interac-
tion of the participants of a social system (e.g., countries engaged in inter-
national trade). Proponents of linkage adhere to the following proposition,
and opponents of linkage reject it (in relation to the organization of the
international economy):
Proposition L: It is desirable to bring about an institutional arrangement
in which rights to trade are made conditional upon the promotion of labor
standards, and there is reason to believe that such an arrangement can be
brought about and sustained.
Proponents of linkage must answer Q2 (at least) in a manner that reflects
their adherence to proposition L.10 Opponents of linkage must claim either
that it is undesirable to bring about an institutional arrangement in which
rights to trade are made conditional upon the promotion of labor stan-
dards, or that the institutional arrangements of this kind which would be
desirable are infeasible.
It is often presumed in discussions of linkage that linkage proponents
necessarily favor the application of trade sanctions to countries that fail
adequately to promote labor standards. In fact, this is in no way entailed by
9. It may be helpful to contrast proposals to further the achievement of basic labor
standards with proposals to further the achievement of labor standards as such.
Whereas the former are concerned with minimally adequate labor standards (however
defined), the latter may seek the attainment of still higher labor standards regardless of
the levels already attained. Proposals of the latter kind are not our focus here.
10. Many recent critics of linkage have characterized the idea of linkage much more
narrowly than we have. Arvind Panagariya, for example, has claimed that "[tihe trade-
labor link effectively requires countries to raise standards to the level desired by import-
ing countries or face trade sanctions by the latter. It is argued that a country that
adheres to higher labor standards within its national boundaries has the moral right to
suspend trade with another country that does not adhere to equally high labor stan-
dards." ARVIND PANAGARIYA, LABOR STANDARDS AND TRADE SANCTIONS: RIGHT END WRONG
MEANS 5 (Jan. 15-16, 2001), available at http://www.columbia.edu/-ap2231/Policy%20
Papers/Hawaii3-AP.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Panagariya (2001)].
Clearly it is possible to oppose linkage as Panagariya has characterized it without oppos-
ing linkage as we understand it. Indeed, few (if any) linkage proponents would endorse
linkage as Panagariya understands it, and in what follows we express full agreement
with the criticisms that have been advanced by Panagariya and others of this type of
linkage. Similarly, Srinivasan frames disagreement about linkage in terms of differing
views regarding whether diversity in labor standards among nations is legitimate. T.N.
SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT
TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE (2d ed. 2000). This is misleading, since many
linkage proposals (such as the one sketched below) not only allow that diversity of labor
standards amongst nations is legitimate, but insist that attempting to "harmonize" them
under present conditions would be illegitimate. See ICFTU (1999), supra note 1, at 31;
Pharis J. Harvey et al., Developing Effective Mechanisms for Implementing Labor Rights in
the Global Economy, WORKERS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY § II(D).
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Proposition L, since a system that offers1" countries additional trading
opportunities if they promote labor standards adequately, without sanc-
tioning them when they do not, is a form of linkage as defined by Proposi-
tion L. 1 2 Indeed, we argue below that extending additional opportunities
to countries that adequately further labor standards will play an important
role in a feasible and effective system of linkage.
II. Step One: What Linkage Proponents Must Show
What is linkage and what are the conditions under which it is desira-
ble to "link" things? At least three distinct types of linkage can be relevant
in designing institutional arrangements.
A first type of linkage is that which arises as a result of the interdepen-
dence of different attainments (in health, education, security, and so on) in
the process of evaluation. The assessment of an outcome may depend on
the extent to which distinct objectives are each attained. When attain-
ments of more than one kind necessarily enter jointly into the evaluative
process, we may refer to this as "evaluation linkage." Evaluation linkage
influences the design of institutions, since the desirability of each outcome
depends on the extent of all of the attainments that define that outcome.
Each institutional arrangement may give rise to different combinations of
desirable and undesirable attainments. It may moreover sometimes be
impossible to assess the desirability of specific attainments without taking
due account of other attainments. The choice among different institutional
arrangements must be made on the basis of the extent to which the combi-
nations of attainments to which they give rise contribute to some "master-
goal."13
A second type of linkage is that in which the promotion of distinct
attainments is taken to be the objective of some agent. 14 For example, it
might be required that a government agency discharge more than one func-
tion, such as the prevention and the curing of illness, or the health and
11. The distinction between sanctioning and offering additional opportunities
depends on having specified a baseline. Such a baseline can be identified on the basis of
various (empirical and normative) criteria. A common misunderstanding is that it can
only be defined on the basis of empirical considerations, such as whether a measure
restricts or expands the opportunities possessed ex ante by the parties.
12. A system that provides a country with additional permissions (e.g., to impose
tariffs on foreign products) if it adequately promotes labor standards is also a form of
linkage as defined by Proposition L since the rights to trade that it accords to other
countries are made conditional on the promotion of labor standards. We do not focus
on linkage of this kind below but note that proposition L accommodates it.
13. We borrowed the term "master-goal" from Thomas Pogge, On the Site of Distribu-
tive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 137, 155 (2000).
Formally, individual attainments a,, a2, . . . a. contribute to the attainment of a master-
goal defined by an objective function U(al, a2,... an). It does not necessarily follow that
this objective function is additively separable. As a result, it is often impossible to evalu-
ate the marginal contribution of each attainment to the master-goal, and thus of the
optimal combination of attainments to be pursued, without determining the extent of
other attainments.
14. This agent could be individual or "collective," i.e., a group or an organization.
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educational achievements of young children. We may refer to this type of
linkage, in which distinct ends are assigned to single agents, as "agency
linkage."
A third type of linkage is that in which the rights of agents are made
conditional on their conducting themselves in a specific way. For example,
the right to receive certain social benefits may be made conditional on hav-
ing paid (or on having promised to pay) taxes. Let us refer to this type of
linkage as "rights linkage."1
5
Those who affirm and deny Proposition L disagree about whether
there ought to be rights-linkage between trade and labor standards. They
need not disagree about either evaluation-linkage or agency-linkage as
defined above. In particular, both proponents and opponents of proposi-
tion L appear to accept evaluation-linkage between trade and labor stan-
dards. However, they disagree about rights-linkage between these domains
since they differ over whether rights to trade ought to be made conditional
on adequately promoting some labor standards.
It is important to note that opponents of rights-linkage (in which
rights to trade are made conditional upon the promotion of labor stan-
dards) need not oppose agency linkage (in which single agents 16 are
charged with the goals of promoting trade and promoting labor standards).
They may find it desirable that some agency aim both to promote trade and
the observance of basic labor standards, while opposing the conferral on
any agency of the power to limit agents' rights to trade on the basis of
whether or not they have adequately promoted basic labor standards. On
the other hand, those who affirm rights linkage must affirm some kind of
agency linkage, as they must affirm that some agent(s) ought to be charged
with making authoritative determinations regarding whether or not other
agents have or have not adequately promoted basic labor standards, and
how their conduct in this area should affect their rights to participate fully
in international trade.
What reasons might there be to affirm or reject evaluation, agency, or
rights linkage as defined above? Reasons to affirm or reject evaluation
linkage seem perhaps most obvious. Attainments of more than one kind
ought necessarily to enter jointly into the evaluative process whenever each
type of attainment is deemed important in evaluating outcomes. For exam-
ple, health and educational achievements ought to be "evaluation-linked,"
for social institutions, because both are important in assessing the out-
comes generated by such institutions.
15. Rights-linkage as we understand it is linkage between the possession of rights
and the undertaking of certain conduct (the exercise of their rights in a specific way)
and is distinct from another type of linkage that might also deserve the term rights-
linkage: that in which an agent's possession of one right is made conditional on his or
her possession of some other right.
16. Possibly more than one: agency-linkage requires that at least some agents be
charged with promoting distinct ends, but it does not require that each end be promoted
by only one agent.
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Whether different attainments should be agency-linked depends
largely on how effectively alternative assignments of aims to agents would
promote the desired ends. In some contexts, charging a single agent with
promoting more than one attainment may be an effective way to promote
the attainments that are desired, whereas in other contexts they may be
better promoted by a more functionally differentiated system in which dis-
tinct agents are charged with promoting distinct attainments. The judg-
ment as to whether such functional differentiation is desirable will depend
heavily on empirical considerations.
Whether rights-linkage is desirable depends on considerations of two
kinds. The first consideration, effectiveness, is empirical. Whether rights-
linkage is effective depends on whether two or more attainments (such as
enhanced levels of trade and the attainment of basic labor standards) are
achieved more or less by linking rights to participate in trade with the pro-
motion of basic labor standards? The second consideration, appropriate-
ness, concerns additional moral considerations that may be relevant to
justifying rights-linkage. For example, while some may argue that making
the right to vote conditional on not having been found guilty of serious
criminal offences is morally appropriate (whether or not such conditional-
ity contributes to desired ends such as voter participation or reductions in
crime) others may deny this. Rights confer benefits on agents, and it may
or may not be held that an agent should be conferred such benefits if they
have failed to abide by specific normative standards. Throughout the rest of
this paper, when we refer to proponents and opponents of "linkage" we mean
proponents and opponents of Proposition L, and therefore of rights-linkage
only.
It is possible to favor only specific linkage proposals (and then only
under specific conditions). For example, certain linkage proponents argue
that linking trade and labor standards through the WTO is undesirable
because the WTO by its very nature is hostile to labor standards. However,
such persons may endorse linkage under an alternative institutional order
of world trade. Similarly, those who object to a form of linkage that allows
developed countries unilaterally to bring trade sanctions against those
countries they deem to have violated labor standards may not object to a
form of linkage that precludes potentially opportunistic misuse of this
kind. Furthermore, those who reject the idea that the rights of countries to
trade internationally may be made conditional on the extent to which they
adequately promote basic labor standards can endorse the idea that those
countries that make marked improvements in their promotion of such stan-
dards ought to acquire further rights to trade. Our goal in this paper is not
merely to defend Proposition L but to develop criteria for distinguishing
plausible from implausible linkage proposals.
We shall argue that any system for guaranteeing mutual access to mar-
kets (a rule-based system of international trade) can potentially be
enhanced by making rights to trade conditional on the promotion of those
standards in an appropriate way (i.e., through linkage). In doing so, we do
not presuppose that the system for guaranteeing mutual market access (in
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relation to which linkage is being considered) is the WTO, although, for
simplicity, we shall often assume in our discussion here that the trading
system that we are considering is the WTO. The case that we make here for
linkage, therefore, potentially applies to all multilateral trading agreements.
Proponents of linkage hold that there exists at least one proposal for
linkage that, all things considered, is desirable to bring about in current
conditions. Opponents of linkage contend that there is not even one propo-
sal for linkage that, all things considered, is desirable to bring about (at
least in current conditions). To reject this view, it would be sufficient for
advocates of linkage to show that there is at least one proposal for linkage
that, all things considered, is desirable to bring about (in current condi-
tions). The central task of this paper is to demonstrate this. We do so by
showing that there is a class of proposals for linkage that meets all of the
objections that are commonly advanced (and widely held to be plausible)
against proposals for linkage and that, moreover, linkage proposals which
belong to this class would perform better than non-linkage proposals in
promoting the objective (as defined in Proposition 0 above) that we pre-
sume is shared by both proponents and opponents of linkage. In doing so,
we meet a much stronger test than is strictly necessary in order to sustain
Proposition L, which depends -on the existence of a proposal for linkage
that it is desirable to bring about, all things considered. 17
III. What Linkage Opponents Must Show
Principles that are commonly espoused with respect to the organiza-
tion of the domestic economy can be invoked in favor of linkage. Regula-
tions protecting labor standards in the domestic economy effectively
condition the right to produce and trade goods and services on adherence
to some standards. Failure to abide by labor regulations protecting basic
labor standards breaks fundamental rules governing membership in a
cooperative economic union whose members are provided certain eco-
nomic privileges (e.g., to produce and to trade with one another) as a con-
dition of their full membership in the union. People who reject Proposition
L in the context of international trade' 8 must provide a compelling account
of why the provision of economic privileges (in particular trade) should be
made conditional on adherence to labor standards-related requirements in
the domestic context but not in the international context.19
17. We are referring here to what is needed to demonstrate Proposition L to those
who accept Proposition 0. Different arguments may be necessary to persuade those who
reject Proposition 0 to accept Proposition L.
18. See, e.g., CONSUMER UNITY & TRUST Soc'y, THIRD WORLD INTELLECTUALS AND
NGOs' STATEMENT AGAINST LINKAGE cJ 1, 3 (Sept. 6, 1999), http://cuts-international.
org/twin-sal.htm [hereinafter TWIN-SAL].
19. Some individuals have been hostile to such conditionality in both the domestic
and international contexts, e.g., libertarians such as Robert Nozick, and consequential-
ists who have favored the "unfettered" free market such as Milton Friedman, but this is
distinctly the view of a minority. Dani Rodrik notes a useful point that is related to, but
distinct from, that which we raise above: trade may be viewed (in the abstract) as a
technology that allows inputs to be transformed into outputs. Dani Rodrik, Labor Stan-
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One reason why some may reject Proposition L with respect to inter-
national trade is that they believe that international cooperation in this
area will be unsuccessful, even though it is in principle desirable. Those
who believe this, however, must explain why international cooperation
with respect to the promotion of labor standards should be expected to be
less successful than international cooperation to promote other goals. In
particular, the WTO, which is favored by many fierce opponents of linkage,
is itself a system of international cooperation intended to promote a goal
(greater world trade and its potentially resulting benefits). Although
existing forms of international cooperation in diverse areas may be flawed,
they are widely thought to improve upon alternatives in which there is no
such cooperation. Indeed, the WTO system is itself often cited by oppo-
nents of linkage as being a cooperative system for the governance of inter-
national trade which significantly improves upon its predecessors by
offering countries more reliable access to one another's markets and a
fairer system of resolving trade disputes that may arise amongst its mem-
bers. Those who reject linkage as a means of achieving its stated aims
must explain why international cooperation is likely to be much less suc-
cessful in this area than in other areas in which they affirm that interna-
tional cooperation has been successful.
The arguments we offer below will be especially relevant to those who
believe linkage to be appropriate in the domestic economy but inappropri-
ate in the international economy, and who accept that multilateral institu-
tions enabling international cooperation can be effective in at least some
contexts. We do not attempt to address all of the arguments of those who
object in principle to all labor market interventions, or to all multilateral
institutions. Few prominent critics of linkage hold either view. If they did,
they would be critics of labor market interventions, or of multilateral insti-
tutions more generally, rather than of linkage as such.20
dards in International Trade, in EMERGING AGENDA FOR GLOBAL TRADE 35, 41(Robert Z.
Lawrence et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Rodrik (1996)]. It is widely agreed that produc-
tion technologies may not be employed in the domestic economy without regard to
whether or not they violate minimal labor standards. Those who advocate some restric-
tions on the production "technologies" that may be used in the domestic economy but
reject such restrictions in the global economy must, Rodrik argues, make clear why these
two spheres should not be treated in a like manner. Id. at 42. It may, however, be argued
that this comparison obscures the potentially morally relevant distinction between pro-
duction at home and production abroad. Some moral conceptions may disvalue viola-
tions of minimal labor standards that affect workers within a country to a greater extent
than they disvalue such violations abroad.
20. Although it is certainly true, as Richard Freeman has argued, that the debate
about trade and labor standards is often simply" 'one of a set of running battles between
those who believe the unfettered market can do no wrong and those who believe govern-
mental regulations can make things better,"' Rodrik (1996), supra note 19, at 37 (quot-
ing Richard Freeman, A Hard-Headed Look at Labor Standards, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 80 (Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell
eds., 1994)), it nevertheless does seem that many linkage critics heartily affirm the role
of various domestic regulations of labor and product markets.
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IV. Step Two: Arguments against Linkage
We identify below five partially overlapping objections to linkage. We
believe that this classification of arguments is exhaustive of the arguments
that can plausibly be advanced against linkage.
A. Standard Objection One: Linkage is self-defeating or inconsequential
This type of argument claims that linkage will either be inconsequen-
tial or that it will backfire and have the opposite of its intended effect on
the objective of improving the level of advantage of less advantaged persons
in the world. It is therefore often claimed that, while perhaps well inten-
tioned, linkage will 'hurt those it is meant to help.'
It is widely alleged that countries will opportunistically misuse the
possibilities for restricting imports that are provided by linkage in order to
protect their domestic producers and harm those elsewhere. 2 1 The oppor-
tunities to trade available to poor countries will diminish. The world trad-
ing system will gradually become subordinated to powerful interests, and
gains from trade will contract.2 2 Linkage will be used as an excuse to limit
the access of developing country exporters to developed country markets
through the imposition of tariffs or quotas, or will impose cost-raising
improvements to labor standards on developing countries that will dimin-
ish the income of developing countries, since it will reduce their gains from
trade by interfering with the basis of those gains-the reallocation of pro-
duction according to comparative advantage.2 3
21. In particular, it is argued that influential interests (such as labor unions and
employers in some industries) in developed countries would benefit from reduced com-
petition from countries with low-cost labor and therefore press for such opportunistic
misuse. See, e.g., GOTE HANSSON, SOCIAL CLAUSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 34-38
(1983); Jagdish Bhagwati, Policy Perspectives and Future Directions, in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 57, 60 (Gregory K. Schoepfle &
Kenneth A. Swinnerton eds., 1994); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION
122-34 (2004) [hereinafter Bhagwati (2004)]; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUN-
DRED DAYS 274 (2000) [hereinafter Bhagwati (2000)]; Drussila K. Brown, Labor Stan-
dards: Where do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?, 15 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES
89, 102-03 (2001) [hereinafter Brown (2001)]; T.N. Srinivasan, International Trade and
Labor Standards from an Economic Perspective, CHALLENGES TO THE NEw WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 219, 239 (1996); Panagariya (2001), supra note 10 at 9; Kaushik Basu,
Child Labor, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1083, 1092 (1999) [hereinafter Basu (1999)];
GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 27-28 (2001); Jose M. Salazar-
Xirinachs, The Trade-Labor Nexus, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 377, 380-81 (2000); Martin Khor,
Director of Third World Network, Rethinking Liberalisation and Reforming the WTO
§ 5 (Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/davos2-cn.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2006); MUCHKUND DUBEY, SOCIAL CLAUSE: THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE
METHOD, available at http://www.aidc.org.za/?q=book/view/71&PHPSESSID=4be77ce
78ffc2de752f57c783c9c1145 (last visited Dec. 13, 2006); Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-
Green Blues, 24 FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 608, 621 n.44 (2000).
22. See, e.g., TWIN-SAL, supra note 18, at 5; Bhagwati (2000), supra note 21, at 320;
Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade and Labor (2001), http://www.columbia.edu/-jb38/ftjlab.
pdf [hereinafter Bhagwati (2001)].
23. See Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, Two Cheers for Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 24, 2000, at 70; Vivek H. Dehejia & Yiagadessen Samy, Trade and Labour
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Moreover, it is argued that linkage will have a negligible or perverse
effect on the living standards and working conditions of most workers
because of its limited reach. First, it is contended that linkage will only
affect export-producing sectors, which may account for only a small frac-
tion of the labor force in most developing countries. 24 Second, it is held
that linkage is likely to have a negligible or perverse effect on the working
conditions, employment, and wages even of many workers in export pro-
duction. 25 It will thus allegedly most likely drive bad practices in export-
oriented production out of sight rather than out of existence. By raising
the cost of hiring workers, the imposition of labor standards will therefore
cause a reduction of employment. 26 The living conditions of displaced
workers may even worsen, since they will either become unemployed or
will be employed in sectors with employment conditions that are no better
(and possibly worse) than those they formerly enjoyed. Third, linkage will
increase relative inequalities in working conditions or in command over
resources, creating a "labor aristocracy. ' 27 This may be undesirable under
certain interpretations of the objective. 28
Finally, it has been argued that introducing labor standards through
linkage reduces the advantages of individuals by impeding them from
entering into contracts through which they expect to enhance their well-
being. For example, TN Srinivasan argued that "parents would allow their
children to be employed in their own economic enterprise or as wage work-
ers only if, given their market and non-market constraints, family welfare is
enhanced by the use of children's time in such employment rather than in
other activities (including being in school). Thus proscription of such
labor, if strictly enforced without compensation, would lower family wel-
fare of those who are already desperately poor."29
Standards- Theory, New Empirical Evidence, and Policy Implications 20-25 (CESifo, Work-
ing Paper No. 830, 2002).
24. See, e.g., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, BREAKING THE LABOR-
TRADE DEADLOCK 3 (Carnegie Endowment, Working Paper No. 17, 2001).
25. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 33-35 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 1817, 1997), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=44605 (last visited Dec. 13, 2006); Brown (2001),
supra note 21, at 100.
26. See LYN SQUIRE & SETHAPUT SUTHIWART-NARUEPUT, THE IMPACT OF LABOUR MARKET
REGULATIONS 7-11 (World Bank Pol'y Dept., Working Paper No. 1418, 1995); Panagariya
(2001), supra note 10, § 2.5; Carnegie Endowment, supra note 24, at 3; Pranab Bardhan,
Some Up, Some Down, 26 BOSTON REVIEW (Feb./Mar. 2001); PRANAB BARDHAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13 (2000).
27. See, e.g., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT, supra note 24, at 3; Bhagwati (2000), supra note
21, at 143-44.
28. In particular, it will be undesirable according to those views which hold that the
level of advantage is directly or indirectly influenced by the extent of inequalities (for
example, in working conditions or command over resources).
29. T.N. Srinivasan, International Labor Standards Once Again!, in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 34, 37 (1994) [hereinafter
Srinivasan (1994)]; see also Basu (1999), supra note 21, at 1093; MASKUS, supra note 25,
at 22.
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B. Standard Objection Two: Linkage is an inferior means of promoting
the goals it is intended to promote
It is sometimes argued that there are superior means of achieving the
goals of linkage.30 Such arguments do not entail a denial that linkage may
achieve its objectives but rather involve an insistence that there are other,
better means of achieving them.3 1 In particular, opponents of linkage claim
that alternative approaches perform at least as well as linkage at promoting
the ultimate ends of improved labor standards and improved levels of
advantage for the globally less advantaged. Examples of alternative
approaches include moral suasion to bring about voluntary compliance
with ILO standards,3 2 market pressure facilitated by social labeling (e.g.
"ratcheting" 33 labor standards, "rugmark" 34 style social product labels),
and international and intra-national resource transfers, perhaps condi-
tioned on adequately promoting basic labor standards.3 5 It could be
argued with respect to international resource transfers, for example, that
linkage is unnecessary as a means of promoting labor standards improve-
ments in poorer countries because the incentives that could be provided to
these countries by a linkage scheme could equally well, or indeed better, be
provided by such transfers. Additional resource transfers could be offered
to those countries that undertake specified measures to improve labor stan-
dards. Since trade preferences granted to specific countries are likely to
lead to distortions in the pattern of trade (i.e., shifts in production away
from their lowest cost locations), global income will be higher when such
preferences are not present. It can be argued that (so long as there are
30. We deal in this section with the outcomes that are expected to arise as a result of
alternative institutional arrangements. We are concerned here with "comparative static"
comparisons of distinct outcomes. Comparisons of the cost of transition from the status
quo to distinct institutional arrangements are dealt with below, under the heading of
feasibility.
31. Note that the set of "superior means" (SM) arguments and the set of "inconse-
quential/self-defeating" (I/S) arguments overlap, and it is not necessarily the case that
one is contained in the other. Any argument that recognizes linkage as being at least
partially effective in attaining its goals, though less effective than the alternatives, is an
SM argument and not an I/S argument. Any argument that views linkage as unable to
achieve its aims, but also views all other feasible policy interventions as being unable to
achieve those aims, is an I/S argument and not an SM argument. The "tragic sense of
life" underlying this perspective is one that does not appear to be prevalent in the debate
on linkage. Most I/S arguments are also SM arguments.
32. E.g. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and "Fair Trade" Demands, 18 WORLD
ECONOMY 745, 757 (1995); Bhagwati (2000), supra note 24, at 160-62; Bhagwati (2001),
supra note 22, at 5 ("[A] good tongue-lashing . . . can unleash shame."); Jagdish
Bhagwati, Free Trade: Why AFL-CIO, the Sierra Club and Congressman Gephard Should
Like It, 43 AMERICAN ECONOMIST 3, 11 (1999) [hereinafter Bhagwati (1999)]; see also
MASKUS, supra note 25, at 67; Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, Labor Standards and the "Race to
the Bottom", 20 OXFORD R. OF EcON. POL'Y 85, 102 (2004).
33. Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards, in CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEAT-
SHOPS? 3, 4-5 (Archon Fung et al. eds., 2001).
34. See, e.g., Rodrik (1996), supra note 19, at 60; KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT & RICHARD B.
FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 27-48 (2003); Pana-
gariya (2001), supra note 10, § 3.2; MASKUS, supra note 25, at 21.
35. Srinivasan (1994), supra note 29, at 35.
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efficient international tax and transfer instruments available with which to
redistribute the higher global income in the manner desired) a system pro-
viding financial incentives alone for the promotion of labor standards is
always superior to one that includes trade incentives. Indeed, it may be
held that even unconditional financial transfers to poorer countries could
have the effect of leading to improvements in labor standards, if they influ-
ence the interest in, and capacity of countries to enhance labor standards
(e.g., because labor standards are a "luxury good").
Linkage is also often deemed to be inferior to non-linkage alternatives
because it is said to be in contravention of the conclusions that may be
drawn from economic theory concerning sound institutional design.
There are two primary versions of this claim. The first is that linkage alleg-
edly violates a principle which is sometimes referred to as the "two birds"
principle, according to which it is always best to employ as many instru-
ments as there are objectives. Employing fewer instruments than there are
objectives is said generally to lead to an inferior attainment of the objec-
tives.36 The principle is interpreted by the critics of linkage as implying
that at least as many independent institutions are required as there are
objectives, and that entrusting the promotion of two or more objectives to
one institution will lead to an inferior attainment of each. 37 Critics of
linkage claim that they and linkage opponents are concerned to promote
two distinct objectives -maximizing the gains from trade and reducing dis-
advantage (by promoting improved labor standards and higher employ-
ment), and that the best approach for achieving these goals would be to
dedicate an independent institution to achieving each. They argue that the
two-birds principle implies that, at the international level, the concerns of
workers are best served by promoting them through an independent
agency, such as the ILO, rather than by confusing the mandate of the
existing institution (the WTO) that is presently charged with fostering the
growth of world output through trade by charging it additionally with pro-
moting labor standards. 38
The second version of the claim is that a well-known theorem of inter-
national trade (which demands that 'domestic distortions' be 'corrected at
the source' in order for a first-best optimum to be attained) demonstrates
that linkage is inferior to other means of obtaining its goals. The content
36. Bhagwati (1999), supra note 32, at 10; Bhagwati (2000), supra note 24, at 277-
78.
37. Professor Jagdish Bhagwati writes, "[Linkage] wind[s] up harming both trade
liberalization (which is the true objective of the WTO) and advancement of the social
and moral agendas .... The underlying reason for such an unsatisfactory outcome is
that you are trying to kill two birds with one stone. Generally, you cannot .... [By]
trying to implement two objectives, the freeing of trade and the advancing of social and
moral agendas, through one policy instrument such as WTO, you will undermine both.
You will miss both birds." Bhagwati (2000), supra note 24, at 277-78. See also T.N.
SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter Srinivasan (2000)].
38. Bhagwati (2001), supra note 22, at 4; Bhagwati (1999), supra note 32, at 10-11;
Bhagwati (2000), supra note 24, at 278. See also Srinivasan (2000), supra note 37, at 72-
73.
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of the theorem and the attempt to apply it to the analysis of linkage will be
discussed further below.
The third version of the claim is that linkage is not needed to achieve
its aims, since an appropriate system of international trading rules can be
designed that does not incorporate linkage and which leaves countries free
to choose the level of labor standards appropriate to them, while fully reap-
ing the gains from international trade. 39 Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger
offer an ingenious economic argument to suggest that linkage is not neces-
sary in order to achieve its aims. In particular, they propose the addition of
a new rule to the multilateral trading system (which will be defined and
discussed further below).40 The authors presume that there is a social
value to be attached to higher labor standards, and an economic value
which derives from greater gains from trade, and that these are to be added
(or more generally aggregated) in defining the maximand (which they refer
to as "the domestic surplus") that is pursued by the government in each
country. They point out (see their observation two) that "international
negotiations over tariffs alone will lead to a globally inefficient outcome
described by partial tariff liberalization and a weakening of labor stan-
dards in import competing industries." In other words, the outcome that
results from an international trading system designed without considera-
tion for labor standards will be one in which both the degree of tariff liber-
alization and the extent of labor standards will be suboptimal, in the sense
that the domestic surplus objective will not be met to the maximum extent
feasible in all countries. The underlying reason for this has to do with (a)
the fact that lowering labor standards in import-competing industries is a
means of strengthening the market access of domestic, import-competing
industries and diminishing that of foreign industries producing the
imported good, and (b) if labor standards are set independently by each
country without regard to the "external effect" that this decision has on the
gains from trade experienced by other countries, then labor standards and
tariffs will be jointly set at levels that are not optimal.
They also point out (see their observation three) that this problem can
be overcome in one of at least three ways. The first proposed method is for
labor standards to be introduced directly into trade negotiations as objects
of interest. This amounts to a form of linkage, since the failure of a coun-
try to meet its labor standards commitments under such agreements would
presumably entail consequences in the form of the failure by other coun-
tries to meet their commitments (whether regarding trade or labor stan-
dards), thereby leading the system to satisfy Proposition L. The second
and the third proposed methods incorporate a rule which can in principle
eliminate the incentive of individual countries to use labor standards as a
39. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The Simple Economics of Labor Standards
and the GATT, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY 195, 197 (Alan V. Deardorff &
Robert M. Stern eds., 2000). See generally Srinivasan (2000).
40. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 39; see also Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger,
The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights, 15 J. EcON. PERSPEC-
TIVES 69 (2001).
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means of increasing market access, and thereby permit the optimal level of
labor standards as well as trade liberalization to arise. The rule requires
countries to engage in "Kemp-Wan adjustments." Adjustments of this kind
demand that if a country raises (or lowers) its labor standards, then it must
correspondingly raise (or lower) its import tariffs so as to maintain the
foreign export price (i.e., the price received by foreign producers which
export their goods to the country) at an unchanged level.4 1 Rule systems
for international trade which demand such adjustments eliminate the
incentive to lower labor standards in order to enhance the market access of
domestic producers. Such rule systems enable countries to put in place
labor standards at the level that they deem "optimal" as long as they under-
take to revise their import tariffs so as to maintain an unchanged level of
market access for foreign producers. This general approach is advertised
by the authors as enabling national sovereignty to be respected while help-
ing to protect labor standards attainments.
Along the same lines, it has also been argued that a linkage scheme is
likely to reflect the preconceptions and priorities of external actors (per-
haps arising from their greater wealth or cultural specificity) and thus to
demand that developing countries put in place labor standards that are
inappropriately high. The present level of labor standards in poorer coun-
tries may be inadequate, and action on the part of domestic actors to
increase this level may indeed improve the condition of the least
advantaged. A linkage scheme, however, may require that the level of labor
standards demanded be so high that it leads to outcomes which are inferior
to those which would have been achieved through domestic activism (and
perhaps even relative to the status quo).
C. Standard Objection Three: Linkage creates an unfair distribution of
burdens
First, as noted above it is argued that loss of jobs caused by the imposi-
tion of labor standards is likely to harm most those persons who are most
in need, such as poor children, women, and men.4 2 It is perverse that less
advantaged persons throughout the world-those that linkage is intended
to help-will disproportionately bear the burdens imposed by linkage. 43
The imposition of labor standards is likely to create a loss of livelihood
(and perhaps even of lives, it is claimed) in developing countries, while
consumers in developed countries will likely experience only a relatively
small increase in prices.
41. In principle, there is a corresponding rule involving export items and export
subsidies, which the authors do not discuss.
42. See, e.g., Kristof & WuDunn, supra note 23. Kristof and WuDunn's article is
cited at length approvingly in Bhagwati (2004), supra note 21, at 175. See also Basu
(1999), supra note 21, at 1114.
43. For examples of critics who have made that argument, see Maskus, supra note
25, at 49; Brown (2001), supra note 21, at 105-06; Arvind Panagariya, Trade-Labour Link:
A Post-Seattle Analysis, in GLOBALIZATION UNDER THREAT 101, 110 (Zdenek Drabek ed.,
2001) [hereinafter Panagariya (2001b)].
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Second, it is argued that linkage arbitrarily and unfairly targets only
some of the sectors and firms in developing countries that practice poor
labor standards. In particular, only export producing firms belonging to
the formal sector (and therefore effectively subject to state regulation) will
be directly targeted, despite others being equally or more guilty of seri-
ously objectionable labor practices.4 4
Third, it is argued that so-called "violations of labor standards" may
occur for morally justified reasons, in which case penalizing violators of
labor standards is unfair. In particular, employers who "violate labor stan-
dards" are in fact offering "exploited" workers the opportunity to improve
their life circumstances. 45 Given the difficult background conditions faced
by these workers, it is alleged that employers act well by offering them
work, and deserve credit rather than punishment.46 It has been suggested
in this vein that labor standards violations may be morally justified
because such violations may enable some agent to fulfill moral obligations
to other agents or that it may help her further other ends which she has
reason to value. For example, by being inattentive to labor standards an
employer may be able to hire more employees than otherwise, or realize
profits which ultimately generate benefits for poorer persons (by enabling
voluntary transfers to such persons to be increased or by augmenting the
demand for domestic goods and services produced by employing such per-
sons). Disregard for labor standards can enable an employer to increase
the amount of good that she does. Finally, she may be able to pursue other
ends that she has reason to value, such as providing her children with a
sound education. It may be argued that an employer can plead some justi-
fication for her indifference to labor standards if the good that is produced
by that indifference is significant. In practice, the regrettable necessity to
"do bad in order to do good" may arise due to competitive pressures. A
factory owner in a developing country, for example, may be compelled to
disregard labor standards in order to compete effectively with other firms
that do the same. Moral dilemmas of this kind are prevalent in the contem-
porary world, and frequently unavoidable.
Fourth, it is argued that linkage makes the citizens of one country
bear the costs of satisfying the preferences of citizens of another country.4 7
If a country chooses to outlaw child labor in its own territory, the costs of
this sovereign choice are borne in the first instance by the citizens of that
country. It is argued that this is as it should be. People ought not to
impose the costs of achieving the values that they hold dear on others who
may not attach the same priorities to these values, at least in their present
circumstances. In contrast, linkage requires that the countries (e.g., those
in the developing world) that bear the cost (in particular, the direct cost of
44. See, e.g., Singh & Zammit, supra note 32, at 95-96.
45. Kristof & WuDunn, supra note 23; Bhagwati (2004), supra note 21, at 175; see
also Carnegie Endowment, supra note 24, at 3.
46. See Bhagwati (2004), supra note 21, at 172-73 (citing the hypothesis that U.S.-
run factories provide higher wages because they have higher productivity).
47. Panagariya (2001), supra note 10, §2.1.
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achieving labor standards and the indirect cost of lost output) are different
from those that gain the benefit (e.g., the satisfaction of the preferences of
many in developed countries that certain labor standards be attained).
Fifth, it is argued that linkage represents an illegitimate abridgement of
fundamental freedoms. 48 To use Robert Nozick's memorable phrase,
linkage prohibits "capitalist acts between consenting adults."'4 9 It is fre-
quently argued, moreover, that if restricting rights to trade are unavoidable,
then fundamental fairness requires that such restrictions should apply to
products of particular kinds rather than ones produced in particular places
or by particular processes, unless a compelling reason (such as maintaining
national security) can be provided to depart from this principle. The
extension of 'most favored nation' trading status (which requires that each
country be treated no worse than others) to a wider range of countries has
made the world trading system fairer. This is a major achievement that
must be protected.5 0
48. A recent Cato Institute publication puts this point rather gushingly as follows:
The threat of using trade restrictions to advance human rights is fraught with
danger. Free trade is itself a human right and rests on an individual's rights to
life, liberty, and property-rights the U.S. Founding Fathers regarded as inalien-
able and self-evident. When the federal government closes U.S. markets to
countries with governments that deny their citizens certain civil liberties, it robs
those citizens of one more freedom and undermines the market dynamic that in
the end is the best instrument for creating wealth and preserving freedom....
Free Trade Is a Human Right: The proper function of government is to cultivate a
framework for freedom by protecting liberty and property, including freedom of
contract (which includes free international trade)-not to use the power of gov-
ernment to undermine one freedom in an attempt to secure others. The right to
trade is an inherent part of our property rights and a civil right that should be
protected as a fundamental human right. The supposed dichotomy between the
right to trade and human rights is a false one. Market exchange rests on private
property, which is a natural right. As moral agents, individuals necessarily
claim the right to liberty and property in order to live fully and to pursue their
interests in a responsible manner. The freedom to act without interference, pro-
vided one respects the equal rights of others, is the core principle of a market
economy and the essence of human rights. Without private property and free-
dom of contract, other rights-such as free speech and religious freedom-
would have little meaning, because individuals would be at the mercy of the
state. The human-rights fabric is not made stronger by unraveling economic
liberties in the hope of enhancing other liberties. Protectionism violates human
rights. It is an act of plunder that deprives individuals of their autonomy-an
autonomy that precedes any government and is the primary function of just
governments to protect .... The danger of buying into the argument that restrict-
ing trade with China will increase human rights is that such an argument dimin-
ishes the significance of the moral case for free trade, politicizes economic life,
and weakens the market-liberal vision-a vision that needs to be strengthened in
order to protect civil society and human liberty.
James A. Dorn, Trade and Human Rights: The Case of China, 16 CATOJ. (1996), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjl6nl-5.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
49. ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 163 (1974).
50. Personal conversation with Kamal Malhotra.
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D. Standard Objection Four: Linkage is context-blind and politically
imperialistic
There are two senses in which it is widely argued that linkage is con-
text-blind. First, linkage ostensibly prevents a country from choosing poli-
cies that appropriately reflect its level of development. The urgency of
improving the living standards of people in poor countries requires that
priority be given to rapid development, even though this may lead to the
violation of labor standards. 5 1 Although regrettable, such violations must
be viewed as a necessary evil. There are two distinct reasons that may be
offered for prioritizing development over promotion of labor standards.
First, the premature imposition of labor standards can act as an obstacle to
the development process. It may even be that development can only take
place through the 'violation' of 'labor standards.' The fact that even so-called
'basic' labor standards were widely violated in factories during the Euro-
pean industrial revolution is well known. Second, the importance that is
attached by the citizens of a country to labor standards may change as
their country develops.5 2 Fulfillment of labor standards may be a "luxury
good," for which the intensity of the preference increases with income.5 3 It
is asserted that to fail to respect the preferences that individuals have for
themselves is to act paternalistically, imposing the preferences of the cur-
rently rich on those who are currently poor.
It is claimed that endorsing universal human rights is wholly compati-
ble with insisting that the weight attached to the improvement of labor
standards relative to other goals (such as the fulfillment of other rights, or
the improvement of aggregate welfare) should vary with context. Such crit-
ics claim that whereas opponents of linkage are context-sensitive propo-
nents of human rights, proponents of linkage are (at best) context-
insensitive proponents of human rights and (at worst) context-insensitive
proponents of satisfying the preferences of the rich. 54
A second sense in which linkage is said to be context-insensitive is that
it is a form of cultural imperialism. It is alleged to unfairly impose a moral
vision that is specific to a single cultural sphere. It is asserted that even
when stated at a high level of generality, any set of purportedly "basic"
labor standards (such as the 'core' labor standards defined by the ILO) is
culturally specific. This objection challenges the very idea that there is a
universally binding set of standards, since by definition such standards are
not culturally specific.
51. The narrower objective of promoting basic labor standards of those who are
employed will in this case allegedly conflict with the broader objective of improving the
level of advantage of less advantaged persons more generally. The implicit premise of
the argument is that the gain in attaining the latter objective justifies the loss in attaining
the former.
52. Srinivasan (2000), supra note 37.
53. This assumption is common in the literature. See, e.g., Basu (1999), supra note
21, at 1100, 1103-04.
54. See, e.g., Bhagwati (2000), supra note 24, at 163; Paul Krugman, One in the Eye
with an American Pie, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 17, 2000; Shaffer, supra note 21, at 624-25;
Srinivasan (2000), supra note 37.
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It is argued that these standards are influential merely because great
importance is attached to them in the developed countries, many of which
happen to share a specific cultural tradition. Such critics claim that there
is no universally acceptable rationale that can be provided for any given set
of basic labor standards, nor is it possible to develop an "overlapping con-
sensus" among different parties (who might be imagined to have distinct
rationales for accepting these standards) in favor of accepting such stan-
dards. 5 5 Even if it is agreed that there are some basic standards (stated in
an adequately general way) that are universally relevant, these must be
defined further in order to be practically applied.56 But this further step
cannot be taken, it is therefore maintained, without appealing to the
preconceptions and priorities of a specific culture. Detailed interpreta-
tions of standards are thus likely to conflict. Indeed, it is sometimes
asserted that the practices that constitute so-called "violations of labor
standards" are in fact sometimes an integral part of traditional family and
work life in certain societies. It is suggested, for example, that "child labor"
can offer a humane and effective form of teaching and apprenticeship. 5 7
The imposition of 'basic labor standards' in such a situation is alleged
therefore to amount to nothing less than cultural imperialism.
Lastly, it is argued that linkage is a form of political imperialism. State
sovereignty guarantees the right of the citizens of a country to choose their
domestic institutions and policies, including the organization of work and
production. It is argued that linkage significantly limits such rights and is
therefore a violation of state sovereignty.
E. Standard Objection Five: Linkage is infeasible
Critics of linkage often claim that it is infeasible. What do they mean
by this? One sense in which a proposal may be deemed infeasible is that it
is judged impossible to bring about or maintain. Another sense in which a
proposal may be deemed infeasible is that it is believed that efforts to bring
it about and maintain it are "likely to fail," where this phrase refers to some
threshold of likelihood (call it P) that is deemed relevant to the choice of
policies (in the sense that any proposal that is unlikely to succeed with
likelihood P is not worth pursuing for this reason). It might thus be argued
that a morally legitimate system of linkage will be exceedingly difficult or
indeed impossible to implement and maintain (i.e., that it will fail with
likelihood of at least P). Many empirical claims are presented in support of
the idea that linkage is infeasible. It is sometimes objected, for example,
that a linkage scheme would be infeasible because it would violate the
existing rules of the international trading system. In particular, it is
claimed that the rules of the WTO system preclude linkage. For example, it
is suggested that a central principle undergirding the WTO (and previous
to it the GATT) is the 'most favored nation principle,' which requires that
55. Srinivasan (2000), supra note 37, at 73-77. The literature on "Asian values" is
replete with such claims.
56. See, e.g., Brown (2001), supra note 21, at 91.
57. See, e.g., Basu (1999), supra note 21, at 1089.
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all exporting countries' goods be treated identically by an importing coun-
try, and that this principle precludes linkage since linkage potentially
requires discrimination amongst countries. Many empirical claims are
presented in support of the idea that linkage is infeasible. It is alleged, for
instance, that developing countries will "simply not accept" the incorpora-
tion of labor standards into the discussion of trade issues.58 If linkage is
established, it is said, it will be because it is imposed by powerful and rich
countries, in which case it will be unduly coercive and therefore morally
illegitimate. There are also groups in developed countries, such as users of
imported intermediate inputs and consumption goods, which will be
implacably opposed to linkage. Those who are in favor of linkage, on the
other hand, are numerous and disorganized, and are very likely to remain
so. Furthermore, there is little agreement among proponents of linkage
regarding the appropriate form and content of the linkage proposal. For all
these reasons, it is argued, the 'political will' to establish linkage does not
exist.59
One reason that the 'political will' to establish linkage allegedly does
not exist is that all countries are vulnerable to charges of having violated
basic labor standards.60 It is argued that, recognizing their own vulnerabil-
ity, states will tend to forego opportunities to establish linkage, or if it is
established, they will fail to bring charges against other countries, in which
case the system of linkage will fail to emerge. It is also sometimes sug-
gested that the informational requirements of implementing and sustaining
a system of linkage are daunting. Linkage requires that authorities be able
to monitor millions of small firms, many of which are in the informal sec-
tor, in every region of the world. This requires the cooperation of govern-
ments, which may believe that linkage will only diminish their gains from
trade and thus be reluctant to provide such cooperation. It is argued by
critics of linkage that it is highly unlikely that these difficulties can be
overcome.
6 1
V. Step Three: Ruling Out Linkage Proposals
To justify Proposition L, we will identify a class of linkage proposals
that withstands the five standard objections raised by linkage critics identi-
fied in Section V. Some linkage systems very obviously fail to do so,
because they straightforwardly fail to meet a number of the objections. In
this section we argue that those institutions that fail to be rule-based and
58. See, e.g., Carnegie Endowment, supra note 24, at 4; Jagdish Bhagwati, The Ques-
tion of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 128, 131 (2002).
59. See, e.g., Theodore H. Moran, Trade Agreements and Labor Standards 6 (Brookings
Institution Policy Brief No. 133, 2004), available at http://www.southern.org/content/
sc/sc.asp?editiondate=062204.txt (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
60. Bhagwati has often cited a Human Rights Watch report on the United States'
violation of the right to organize in connection with this claim. See, e.g., Bhagwati
(2004), supra note 21, at 177, 192, 247, 251.
61. See, e.g., Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking, in ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT
AN END TO SWEATSHops? 54, 54 (2001).
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impartial, to arise through a process of fair negotiation, or to incorporate
adequate burden sharing between countries will not meet some of these
objections.
First, note that systems of linkage can be of two types, those that are
imposed on one or more of the parties and those that are not imposed on
any of the parties. The latter type of scheme can be called an unimposed
scheme. An important class of unimposed schemes are those arising
through a process of fair negotiation. We understand a process of fair
negotiation as one in which the conclusion of the negotiation is defined by
agreement of all of the parties to the negotiation, and in which the proce-
dures leading to a conclusion of the negotiation are equitable and
uncoercive. It may be seen from this definition that a process of fair negoti-
ation minimally involves the absence of imposition, although it involves
other features as well. We take as our premise that a morally legitimate
system of linkage must be unimposed.6 2 We further note that those which
originate in a process of fair negotiation are especially attractive from a
normative standpoint. Because all systems that arise from a process of fair
negotiation are unimposed, it is sufficient (although not necessary) to
assume that a linkage scheme originates in such a process in order to safe-
guard it from the objections applicable to an imposed scheme. We choose
therefore to focus on linkage schemes which arise from a process of fair
negotiation in what follows.
An imposed system would be more likely to harm developing coun-
tries and unfairly distribute the burdens of adequately promoting labor
standards, and would therefore be perceived as (and would indeed be)
morally illegitimate. Moreover, a scheme that is widely perceived to be
morally illegitimate is much less likely to be successful in securing compli-
ance. 6 3 For both of these reasons, imposed systems of linkage should be
rejected.6 4
Second, as noted above, a potential risk of linking trade and labor
standards is that rich countries may opportunistically use linkage as a
means of unfairly protecting their markets from low cost developing coun-
try exports. If linkage can easily be used as a disguised instrument of pro-
tectionism, it may well be self-defeating because it will reduce income and
employment in developing countries. Allowing countries unilaterally to
determine whether the requirements to adequately promote labor stan-
dards have been met, and what actions should be taken when they have not
62. We are not committing ourselves to the view that no imposed institution could
under any conditions be legitimate. However, it is our judgment that under present
conditions it is highly unlikely that an imposed system of linkage would be legitimate.
63. This idea is associated with the work of Hans Kelsen. Cf. RAWLs (1971), supra
note 7, at 567.
64. See Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 71, 73-83 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Dia-
mond eds., 1996) for an interesting discussion of the reasons to reject the system of
linkage imposed by the United States through its General System of Preferences (GSP).
Vol. 39
2006 International Trade and Labor Standards
been met, clearly invites misuse.6 5 The importance of establishing a trans-
parent and rule-based system that protects against such misuse is therefore
evident. For a system of linkage to promote labor standards effectively, an
adequate number of countries must find it in their interest to participate.
It will otherwise have to be imposed, in which case it will be illegitimate. A
system that is open to opportunistic misuse is indeed likely to eliminate
incentives for uncoerced participation on the part of developing countries.
Third, forms of linkage that lack adequate burden sharing should be
rejected. Any form of linkage is likely to impose costs on certain groups.
We refer to these direct and indirect costs as the 'burdens' generated by
linkage. 66 A scheme for burden sharing is one that changes the distribu-
tion of these costs by reducing the burdens of those who would otherwise
bear them and increasing the burdens of those who would otherwise not.
For example, it is often supposed that establishing basic labor standards in
poor countries will cause a decrease in employment. If this does indeed
occur, burden sharing might reduce these costs through various domestic
policy instruments (such as social insurance, credit, employment genera-
tion, and job retraining programs), which reduce the costs of adjustment
suffered by individuals, as well as through various international policy
instruments (such as resource transfers from North to South) that reduce
the costs of adjustment suffered by countries (and in particular the cost of
their implementing domestic policies such as those mentioned above). 67
Alternatively, the feared reduction in employment may be averted in a dif-
ferent way, such as by offering the countries that undertake such reforms
more favorable access to markets for their exports through additional trade
liberalization. 68
65. See id. ("[Tihe United States is ... imposing its own, conveniently flexible and
even elastic, standards upon other states."); see also Terry Collingsworth, International
Worker Rights Enforcement, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
227, 229-33 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) for a discussion of
some of the abuses by the United States of the GSP.
66. The baseline against which these costs can be measured can, of course, be speci-
fied in different ways, such as the status quo ex ante or an appropriate counterfactual,
for example, what would have occurred pursuant to the previous rules, or some other
morally appropriate benchmark.
67. The Kyoto Protocol has a burden-sharing component (Article 11), as did the
framework convention on climate change agreed to at the Rio conference in 1992. As
Srinivasan describes this later convention, "[It] set explicit goals under which several
rich nations agree to emission-level-reduction targets (i.e., to return, more or less, to
1990 levels), whereas the commitments of the poor countries were contingent on the
rich nations' footing the bill." Srinivasan (2000), supra note 37. Technical cooperation
and financial aid are provided to countries so that they can comply with WTO rules.
Bilateral trade agreements, such as the US and Cambodia textile and apparel agreement
(Article 10 (E)) also offer examples of this kind. The burden sharing that took place
with respect to reforming the labor practices of the Bangladeshi garment sector is dis-
cussed in Elliot & Freeman (2003), supra note 34, at 113. The linkage proposals devel-
oped by the ICFTU (1999) and the ILRF (2001) both demand burden sharing.
68. Unlike Srinivasan, who seems to view international burden sharing through
income transfers and linkage as alternative and mutually exclusive means of promoting
labor standards, we view such transfers as essential to any plausible linkage proposal.
Srinivasan (2000), supra note 37, at 74. We argue below that there are reasons why a
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Our concern in this paper is to explore possible institutions governing
international trade that would not merely be feasible but also morally legit-
imate. For an institutional reform to be morally legitimate it must not only
serve morally valuable objectives. The costs of implementing the reform
must be distributed fairly. For example, it is widely held that the costs
engendered by an institutional reform should be allocated in a way that is
sensitive to the capacity of agents to bear them.6 9 Indeed, many critics of
linkage not only accept this view, but also criticize linkage by pointing to
it, arguing that the burdens imposed by linkage will be unfair because they
will be borne by those who are least able to bear them, i.e. poor persons in
poor countries. There are other principles that are relevant to determining
the appropriate distribution of burdens. The fact that some agent has or is
contributing to the problems that an institutional reform is meant to
address, for example, is widely held to strengthen that agent's responsibil-
ity to bear the burdens of implementing it. 70 Although it is difficult to
determine with great precision whether and to what extents different
agents have contributed to shortfalls in basic labor standards, it seems
likely that agents in both the North and South have made substantial con-
tributions to such shortfalls. Indeed, in cases in which there is evidential
uncertainty concerning whether an agent has contributed to deprivations,
the agent may nevertheless be plausibly viewed as having compelling rea-
sons to help alleviate the deprivations in order to avoid the possibility that
they have failed to remedy deprivations to which they had in fact contrib-
uted. 7 1 A linkage system that does not include adequate burden sharing
should therefore be rejected.
A system that imposes burdens on poor countries but does not require
rich countries to share these burdens will also be infeasible. It will not
provide adequate incentives for developing countries to join it without hav-
ing been coerced, since they will bear the preponderance of costs generated
scheme that employs income transfers alone as a means of promoting labor standards
will likely be inferior to one that combines these with trade incentives, and that a plausi-
ble linkage scheme will combine trade and non-trade incentives. For a discussion of the
kinds of complementary policies that may be necessary to combat objectionable forms
of child labor, see Drusilla K. Brown et al., Child Labor: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, in
INTERATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 195, 225-37 (Kaushik Basu et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Brown (2003)].
69. Cf. ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE 186 (1985); Peter Singer,
Famine, Affluence, and Morality, WORLD HUNGER AND MORALrrY 26, 26-27 (William Aiken
& Hugh LaFollette eds., 2d ed. 1996); PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE 62-72
(1996). Even those who reject this claim may have reason to be sensitive to the distribu-
tional consequences of proposed institutional reforms if they believe that the present
unequal distribution of advantages has emerged from a historical process in which
rights that they wish to see respected have been violated. See, e.g., Hillel Steiner, An
Essay on Rights 266 ("Redress transfers are redistributions which, very broadly, undo
the unjust redistributions imposed by encroachments on rights: they restore just distri-
butions."); THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2002).
70. See, e.g., Christian Barry, Applying the Contribution Principle, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY
210, 211-13 (2005). For examples of other principles, see Goodin, supra note 69, and
David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453 (2001).
71. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 70, at 213-14.
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by the linkage system in the absence of burden-sharing. 72 The alternative,
an imposed system of linkage, would be illegitimate.
7 3
A negotiated system will be feasible only if countries judge that a trad-
ing system that involves linkage will further their interests in comparison
with the status quo (in which they may trade even without complying with
labor standards). Without such incentives the transition to a negotiated
linkage system will be infeasible. The willingness of countries to comply
will be influenced by the incentives that are offered to them. Without
assurance that the costs that a linkage system imposes will be diminished,
countries are unlikely to participate or fully comply with its demands. An
important determinant of whether a country's participation and compli-
ance with linkage can be made feasible will be the domestic pressures
faced by its government. An adequate coalition of agents (individuals,
firms, and interest-groups) within countries must find it in their interest to
endorse the participation of their country in a linkage system, and the
country's compliance with the rules of such a system, if it is to be effective.
Whether or not they possess such an interest will be influenced by the size
of the burdens and benefits they expect to experience as a result of
linkage. 74 Without assurance that the costs that linkage imposes on indi-
vidual and groups will be diminished or eliminated, they are unlikely to
have such an interest. 75 Moreover, agents in developing countries will be
more likely to support linkage if they believe that burdens are being shared
fairly across and within countries. The perception that the system of
linkage is fair is likely to be important in determining whether it is feasible
to implement and sustain. 76 Moreover, the extent to which producers find
72. This concern is not unique to a system for promoting labor standards, as men-
tioned earlier. Similar issues arise in other areas of international cooperation such as
the promotion of environmental standards, as is ably discussed in Raghbendra Jha &
John Whalley, Migration and Pollution (2003), available at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/eco-
nomics/publish/papers/wp2003/wp-econ-2003-07.pdf. In discussing the conditions
under which India might be willing to agree to a system of linkage, Rob Jenkins empha-
sizes the importance of developed countries sharing substantially in the burdens of
linkage (as well as making greater progress in fulfilling their commitments under the
Uruguay Round Agreements). Rob Jenkins, India and the Trade-and-Labour-Standards
Controversy, 4-7 (2001), available at http://www.gapresearch.org/governance/The%20
Politics%20of% 20Trade%20in%20India.pdf. A similar point is made in reference to
other developing countries by Kevin Kolben in The New Politics of Linkage: India's Oppo-
sition to the Workers' Rights Clause, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225-259 (2006).
73. The level and nature of burden sharing required to make a linkage scheme feasi-
ble may be different from that required to make it morally legitimate. The level of bur-
den sharing that is adequate will have to be determined in light of both considerations.
74. This is borne out by studies of attitudes toward linkage among trade unions in
the South, which show that they possess much greater receptivity to linkage proposals
than is widely believed. See the results of the remarkable survey of developing country
trade unions reported in Gerard Griffin et al., Trade Unions and the Social Clause: A North
South Union Divide? 8-11 (Nat'l Key Ctr. in Indus. Relations, Working Paper No. 81,
2002) (finding that 95% of union members in the global South favored international
trade agreements that protect core labor standards), and the sources cited therein,
reporting similar conclusions.
75. See Jenkins, supra note 72, at 3; see also Srinivasan supra note 10, at 70.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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that there is profit in evading labor standards will influence the extent to
which a country can readily comply with them. Incentives to comply with
these standards are required. Financial resources may be required in order
to provide such incentives. Countries are unlikely to have an interest in
establishing incentives for producers to enhance labor standards, and may
even lack the ability to do so, if they are not themselves offered incentives
to adopt the desired policies, and the necessary means to do so.
It has been argued that plausible systems of linkage must at a minimum
be unimposed, transparent and rule-based, and involve adequate burden shar-
ing. In addition to these three central characteristics, it may be necessary
that linkage systems have additional features, as we shall see below, if they
are to withstand all of the standard objections.
VI. Step Four: Identifying Linkage Proposals that Meet the Standard
Objections - A Constructive Procedure
Proponents of linkage must identify an institutional arrangement that
is both feasible and desirable to bring about. Such an arrangement must
possess the three features identified above, and perhaps more. At a mini-
mum, they must be transparent and rule-based, incorporate adequate inter-
national burden sharing, and arise through a process of fair negotiation
among states. In this section, we will attempt to show that it is possible to
identify such institutional arrangements. Throughout the section, we
employ what we refer to as a "constructive procedure" to clarify and
emphasize the role that the requirements already identified play in making
a linkage proposal immune to the standard objections, as well as to identify
additional requirements of a proposal for linkage which, when combined
with those requirements already identified, will permit the proposal to
withstand the standard objections. 77
The constructive procedure that we employ takes the following form.
We consider the first of the standard objections, and identify whether addi-
tional conditions are required to enable the proposal to withstand this
objection. We then consider the second of the standard objections, and
similarly identify whether still more conditions will be required to enable
the proposal to rebut this objection. We continue this procedure, adding
additional requirements that are necessary to overcome the standard objec-
tions cumulatively considered to that point, until we have exhausted them.
As the standard objections identify reasons that proposals for linkage are
ostensibly inferior to non-linkage proposals, we will thus have identified a
class of proposals for linkage which may not be deemed inferior to non-
linkage proposals on the basis of these particular objections, and which
may indeed improve upon such non-linkage proposals. Addressing the
standard objections in this way serves also to further clarify the content of
the requirements already identified above.
77. For our argument to succeed, it is sufficient to identify one class of proposals for
linkage that satisfies the standard objections. It is therefore no embarrassment to fail to
identify all the classes of proposals that satisfy the standard objections.
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It is important to note, however, that even if no linkage proposals with-
stand all the standard objections, it would not follow that Proposition L
cannot be sustained. Showing this would require a demonstration that
some non-linkage proposal was superior on balance to all linkage propos-
als. Our constructive procedure for identifying a desirable class of linkage
proposals requires that members of this class satisfy all of the standard
objections. However, this is not required for some linkage proposals to be
superior on balance to all non-linkage proposals, even if they perform
worse than non-linkage proposals in one or another respect. We therefore
set a more stringent task for ourselves than is required to justify Proposi-
tion L.
If Proposition L is true, then there exists a specific institutional
arrangement for which it is true. We assume that any such institutional
arrangement will have the following features.
(1) A Complaints Function that is defined by who (e.g., countries, per-
sons, non-governmental organizations, public institutions) can make a
complaint about labor standards non-compliance, how they can register
their complaint, against whom such complaints can be lodged (e.g., coun-
tries or firms), and under what conditions (e.g., failure to adhere to or
adequately promote labor standards on the territory of a country or by
firms owned, managed, or registered in a country).
(2) A Fact-Finding Function that is defined by who (international orga-
nizations, governments, non-governmental organizations, individuals, etc.)
is charged with determining whether there has been compliance with a
standard, and the procedures that must be followed in investigating com-
plaints-for instance, rules of evidence-gathering and presentation (as may
be found in a domestic court or existing dispute resolution bodies of inter-
national organizations).
(3) An Adjudication Function that is defined by how the validity of the
complaint is to be determined on the basis of the evidence provided
(including the rules of adjudication, etc.) and by the steps to be taken in
the event of failure to adhere to labor standards.
(4) A Promotion Function that is defined by how compliance with labor
standards is to be brought about, including the actions that should be
undertaken to promote compliance with labor standards and by whom.
These actions might take the form of resource transfers, technical assis-
tance, the withdrawal of enhanced trading rights offered to countries under
the linkage system, or the further limitation of rights to trade in the case of
repeated failure to abide by the requirements of the linkage system. Such
actions may or may not be triggered by a formal complaint.
The four functions can be combined in a single institution, or distrib-
uted across different agents and institutions. 78
78. Different models can both be observed in the world and in the proposals that
have been advanced about how best to promote labor standards. See, e.g., Ehrenberg,
supra note 1; G.B. Nath, Linking International Labour Standards with Trade: Implications
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The sine qua non of a system of linkage is that it must include at least
some incentives related to trade amongst the incentives that it offers to
agents to foster improved labor standards. Incentive schemes related to
trade, whether or not related to labor standards, may vary in three ways.
First, they may vary in terms of the subjects (e.g., countries or firms)
whose rights to trade are broadened or limited; the deciders (e.g., a duly
authorized adjudicative body or individual countries); and the executors
(e.g., sets of countries or firms), which are required to enforce such broad-
ened or limited rights to trade. Second, they may vary in terms of the cir-
cumstances under which they allow or demand that an agent's rights to
trade be broadened or limited. Third, they may vary in terms of the man-
ner in which an agent's rights to trade may themselves be broadened or
limited. For example, the existing Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO
can be characterized in these terms as follows. First, the subjects of the
system are individual countries, the decider is the Dispute Settlement Body
itself, and the executors are the complainants who come before the Dispute
Settlement Body. Second, a country's rights to trade may be limited by the
Dispute Settlement Body only if it has judged that the country has violated
its existing obligations under the WTO. Third, a limitation on a country's
right to trade under the system takes the form of tariffs which the Dispute
Settlement Body authorizes the complaining countries to introduce against
the country that has been found to be in violation.
Proponents of Proposition L favor an institutional arrangement in
which rights to trade are made conditional upon the promotion of labor
standards. There are many different ways of understanding the require-
ment of promoting labor standards. For example, a state might be said to
have failed to promote a labor standard adequately if it (a) actively engages
in practices that diminish the attainment of the standard; (b) fails to
require of agents falling under its jurisdiction that they refrain from prac-
tices that diminish the attainment of the standard; (c) fails to engage in
practices that promote the attainment of the standard; (d) fails to
encourage agents falling under its jurisdiction to engage in practices that
promote the attainment of the standard; (e) fails to require agents falling
under its jurisdiction to engage in practices that promote the attainment of
the standard. Although the specific conception of the requirement that
states promote labor standards is deliberately left open here, we do indi-
cate some features that it must have below.
We now proceed to implement the constructive procedure, by consid-
ering in turn each standard objection.
for India, 41 INDIAN J. OF LABOUR ECON. 1005, 1011 (1998) (contrasting the structural
weakness of the ILO with the WTO's capability for enforcement); Rohini Hensman,
World Trade and Workers' Rights, 33 ANTIPODE 427, 442-46 (2001); ICFTU (1999), supra
note 1, at 53; Harvey et al., supra note 1, §111; ELLIOT & FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 90-92;
Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to Improve Conditions in Cambo-
dia's Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. LJ. 79 (2004).
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A. Response to Objection One: Linkage is self-defeating or
inconsequential
What would be required to show that linkage will hurt those it is
meant to help? To identify whether the statement is true, it is necessary to
do three things. First, we must identify what might be called the focal
group (all of those who are the intended beneficiaries of the reform) and
determine whether or not they would benefit from it.7 9 For the purposes of
this argument we assume that the intended beneficiaries include all mem-
bers of the group that we refer roughly as "less-advantaged persons across
the globe." Second, we must identify the focal variables-those features of
the members of the focal group that are deemed relevant to assessing the
level of their advantage or disadvantage. We assume here that we are con-
cerned with labor standards, employment, real wages, and other factors
that contribute to advantage, broadly understood. Third, insofar as the
focal group ("those whom it is meant to help") is made up of more than one
person, we must invoke some principle that can be used to identify the
overall level of advantage experienced by this group. This is important,
since it is very easy to imagine that some members of the less advantaged
as a group may be made worse off by a reform even while it makes most of
the members of that group much better off. While we do not endorse here
any particular principle specifying how the advantages of different mem-
bers of the focal group should be aggregated for the purposes of assessing a
reform, we do reject that view that showing that some members of this
group (however few) are harmed by a reform is in itself sufficient to show
that it has "harmed those it is meant to help."80
In what follows, we shall argue that a well-designed system of linkage
will not in fact "hurt those it is meant to help" and indeed can help them.
This does not necessarily mean that every single member of the less
advantaged as a group would be made better off were such a system to be
brought into being. Indeed, this is true of few, if any, reforms, including
many that are advocated by fierce opponents of linkage. Take, for instance,
key institutional reforms associated with worldwide trade liberalization,
such as the ending of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 2005. There
are many exporters and countries who benefited from this agreement who
have likely been made worse off by its abolition, even though more coun-
tries (and poor persons) may have benefited from its abolition. It does not
immediately follow from the fact that the abolition of the MFA has hurt
some that this reform "hurts those it is meant to help."
Robert Staiger has presented a powerful economic argument as to why
linkage is unlikely to hurt those it is meant to help, and indeed may help
79. We draw here on the terminology developed in AMARTYA SEN, THE STANDARD OF
LIvING (1987).
80. It does not follow from this rejection, of course, that we are indifferent to the
losses of those in the focal group who do worse under the new system. We favor mea-
sures that minimize these losses.
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them. 8 1 He points out that the rationale of the WTO has been to provide
reliable conditions of mutual market access to countries engaged in inter-
national trade. The binding of tariff rates (i.e., the placing of ceiling on
tariffs) by the WTO has had as its premise that, left to themselves, coun-
tries will engage in a damaging competition to maximize access to markets
of their own producers, which will result in a collectively self-defeating out-
come. Hence, a rule-based multilateral trading system in which countries'
freedom to raise tariffs unilaterally is eliminated is in the interests of all.
Staiger points out that this very argument suggests that a floor on labor
standards is also in the interests of all. The reason is that once tariffs are
bound, countries have available to them only one major instrument for
increasing their own producers' access to markets, namely labor standards.
In particular, by lowering (or failing to raise) their own labor standards,
countries can reduce the costs of their producers and increase these pro-
ducers' competitive advantage. As a result, incentives for a self-defeating
"regulatory chill" which puts downward pressure on labor standards are
created by the prohibition on a self-defeating "beggar-thy-neighbour" pol-
icy of competitive inflation of tariffs. As a result, the gains generated
through a rule-based system of international trade in the form of the WTO
may only be achievable alongside minimal labor standards by extending
the scope of the system to incorporate labor standards, for example by
requiring the promotion of labor standards as a condition for participating
fully in the world trading system-in short, linkage. 82 The force of this
argument will depend on the strength of the incentives that are actually
present for countries to engage in a race to the bottom, which is an empiri-
cal matter about which we do not express a view here. However, Staiger
does present incentive-based reasons to believe that a regulatory chill of
this kind may exist. If it does indeed exist, then a convincing case would
arise for linkage as a means of both enhancing the gains from trade and
improving social outcomes. 83
81. It should be pointed out that Staiger himself resists the description of his argu-
ment as an argument for linkage by attempting to distinguish between the economic
rationale and the moral or political rationale for maintaining a floor for labor standards.
Robert W. Staiger, A Role for the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 273, 277
(Basu et al. eds., 2003). However, it is clear that the argument Staiger provides is an
argument for linkage as we define it (in Proposition L); Josh Ederington, Trade and
Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements, 43 INT'L ECON. REv. 1347, 1361
(2002) (using game theory to show that, at least under certain circumstances, linkage
can increase the ability to enforce the domestic provisions of an international agreement,
in this case higher labor standards).
82. Bagwell and Staiger have presented an alternative way of avoiding such
problems, in which countries are required to abide by specific rules when adjusting their
labor standards but are not required to promote them to any specific extent. Bagwell &
Staiger, supra note 39, at 225-26. We discuss their proposed possible solution in detail
below, presenting reasons that why some of its elements may be beneficially incorpo-
rated into a linkage system.
83. "Race to the bottom" is a widespread but unfortunate name for the more general
concern that competitive pressures will undermine efforts to secure basic labor stan-
dards. It is unfortunate because it suggests that, absent evidence of deterioration of
labor standards over time, competitive pressures that undermine efforts to raise labor
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It has often been assumed that linkage will likely be used as a "fig leaf'
for protectionism in the North that will diminish the effective access of
Southern exporters of goods produced in a labor-intensive manner to
Northern markets. However, this assumption is unwarranted. Indeed,
there are reasons to believe that exactly the opposite may be true.
In particular, linkage is strongly desired by at least some influential
constituencies in the North, and further trade liberalization in the North is
desired by at least some constituencies in the South. As a result, a "trade"
between South and North in which the South accepts linkage and the
North liberalizes access to its markets can potentially benefit each. A sys-
tem of linkage could offer entrants to the system liberalized access to
Northern markets as an initial benefit of membership, along with progres-
sively increased access to the same markets as a reward for meeting their
further obligations under the system.8 4 In this way, a linkage system could
mitigate or even entirely neutralize the adverse effects on the competitive
position of Southern countries that may result from the improvements in
labor standards that they undertake. Indeed, even those developing coun-
tries which fail to promote labor standards may be made better off as a
result of a linkage scheme. Strikingly, this can be true even if limitations
on their rights to trade are imposed! The reason is that such countries will
experience increased demand for their relatively lower cost exports if their
competitors' costs increase due to labor standards improvements. The net
effect of an increase in tariffs faced by the country in Northern markets
and this increase in demand for the exports produced by such a country is
therefore difficult to gauge.
Discussions of linkage have been dominated by the presumption that
they must entail sanctions against developing countries, but this seems an
unduly narrow view of the form that linkage must take. A system of
linkage need not in any way involve sanctions, since it may operate purely
by offering benefits to developing countries that are additional to those that
they are presently guaranteed under the rules of the WTO system. While it
is likely that a plausible system of linkage will allow for the possibility of
limiting rights to trade in extreme cases, it is it is by no means necessary
that it must rely solely on such negative inducements to achieve its aims. It
is on the contrary entirely likely that a plausible system of linkage will need
standards are not present. This conclusion would be false, because even if labor stan-
dards were everywhere improving, it would not follow that the threat of being undercut
by others with lower labor standards was not exerting downward pressure on labor stan-
dards. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with the fact that much more rapid improvements
in labor standards might be obtainable were stronger incentives provided to countries to
do so. In such a case, there would be (to use Staiger's phrase) a "regulatory chill" but
not an observable race to the bottom. The former concept depends on a counterfactual
comparison, while the latter depends on a purely empirical one.
84. Such incentives are already part of the European Union's Generalized System of
Preferences. See Buck, surpa note 4. It is interesting to note that the linkage proposal of
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions calls for "urgent removal of tariffs
and import quotas for least developed countries respecting core labour standards."
ICFTU (1999), supra note 1, at 23.
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to incorporate significant positive incentives in the form of granting devel-
oping countries enhanced access to the markets of developed countries.
This type of liberalized access to markets will bring gains from trade in
the North as well as in the South. Since it leads to a lessening of the bur-
dens that are experienced in the South as a result of improvements in labor
standards, however, it qualifies as a form of burden-sharing under the defi-
nition we have outlined above.
There are reasons to believe that a "policy trade" of the kind we have
outlined, in which developed countries ensure greater access to their mar-
kets by developing countries in return for acceptance of linkage by the
latter, may well succeed.8 5 The resistance of workers in developed coun-
tries to the liberalization of trade will likely lessen if they believe that liber-
alization will be accompanied by improvements in labor standards in
developing countries, since this will marginally reduce the competitive
pressure that they will face in a liberalized environment. As noted above,
these workers also have a stated moral interest in the material advancement
of workers elsewhere. Workers in developing countries are likely to wel-
come a policy trade of this kind, as it ensures them the ability both to
improve labor standards (with all its attendant benefits) and will provide
the additional employment that is created as a result of liberalization of
trade in developed countries.
Owners of fixed capital in import-competing industries in the North
are likely, on the basis of their material interests, to most prefer the policy
combination of linkage without additional trade liberalization. The worst
policy combination from the standpoint of their material interests is likely
to be additional trade liberalization without linkage. The two other policy
combinations (additional trade liberalization with linkage, and no addi-
tional trade liberalization and no linkage) are of intermediate value and are
ambiguously ranked from the standpoint of their material interests. It is
clear, however, that these owners of capital are likely to oppose liberaliza-
tion less if it is accompanied by linkage. Owners of fixed capital in export-
producing industries in the South may, on the basis of their material inter-
ests, most prefer the policy combination of liberalization in the North with-
out linkage. The worst policy combination from the standpoint of their
material interests is likely to be linkage without additional trade liberaliza-
tion. The two other policy combinations (additional trade liberalization
with linkage, and no additional trade liberalization and no linkage) are of
intermediate value and are ambiguously ranked from the standpoint of
85. See also Jenkins, supra note 72, at 3, 5-7 (predicting that India, which has
opposed linkage, might accept it if wealthy countries abide by Uruguay Round agree-
ments that require them to open their markets in certain cases). The Indian Govern-
ment Commission on Labour Standards and International Trade issued a report
expressing an open-minded position on linkage, especially if appropriate supports were
to be offered by developed countries. The chair of the commission, Subramaniam
Swamy, argued in a subsequent book that India could be a net gainer should linkage be
implemented, in part because of the competitive advantages it would gain relative to
countries which would be unlikely to adequately promote labor standards. See generally
Kolben, supra note 72.
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their material interests. It is clear, however, that these owners of capital are
likely to oppose linkage less if it is accompanied by liberalization. The
pattern of interests outlined above gives some reason to believe that addi-
tional liberalization with linkage is a policy "trade" that could realistically
be proposed and sought in international negotiations.
The fear that linkage can become a disguised instrument of protection-
ism takes two specific forms, which we now consider in more detail. The
first is that if individual countries (or groups of countries) have discretion
over whether the labor practices in other countries constitute sufficient
grounds for limiting rights to trade, this will enable them to use that discre-
tion opportunistically.
This fear is well founded with respect to any form of linkage in which
those countries that complain about labor standards non-compliance are
also charged both with determining whether there has been compliance
with these standards, and with deciding whether it is justified to impose a
specific sanction. However, the fear is not well founded if the linkage sys-
tem prevents individual countries from making unilateral determinations
of this kind. In that case such opportunistic use would not be as readily
possible.8 6
86. It is far from clear that the motivation behind linkage is in fact protectionism.
Krueger attempted to examine this assumption by identifying the constituencies whose
representatives supported the Harkin Bill in the U.S. Congress, which proposed the
imposition of specific trade sanctions on countries exporting goods produced with child
labor. He concluded that self-interested material motives were not discernible from the
empirical profile of these constituencies. Alan Krueger, Observations on International
Labor Standards and Trade 13-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
362, 1996) [hereinafter Krueger (1996)]. Krueger's argument is cited in Basu (1999),
supra note 21, at 1092, and criticized in Bhagwati (2004), supra note 21, at 244-45.
Sandra Polaski argues that where trade treaties have contained a labor clause, it has
generally not been misused for protectionist ends. SANDRA POLASKI, TRADE AND LABOR
STANDARDS 14 (2003), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/Polaski
Trade.English.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter POLASKI (2003)]. A similar
finding is presented by Elliott and Freeman, who discuss in detail the existing evidence
on such motivations. ELLIOTr & FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 84. Critics of linkage often
argue as if the mere fact that support for linkage may be due in part to protectionist
concerns rules out the possibility that it is desirable. This is false, since it is possible
that agents may do the right thing for the wrong reasons or from questionable motiva-
tions, just as they may do the wrong thing for the right reasons and from pure motiva-
tions. As Alan Krueger, The Political Economy of Child Labor, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS: HISTORY, THEORIES AND POLICY 251 (Kaushik Basu, et al. eds., 2003) rightly
points out, "[elven if international labor standards were motivated by self-interest, they
nonetheless may raise welfare in less developed nations .... And the converse is also
true: even if international labor standards were motivated by humanitarian concerns
they may hurt those they are intended to help in developing countries." Of course, the
motivations of agents are certainly relevant in forming predictions about how they will
act. It may be quite reasonably feared that if protectionist motives drive at least some of
those who support linkage, any system of linkage that emerges will likely be used for
protectionist purposes. However, even agents with largely self-serving motivations can
be expected to comply with a system of rules if it provides them with the right incentives
to do so. The WTO is built on the premise that situating trade negotiations within a
transparent and negotiated system of rules with a binding and impartial dispute settle-
ment mechanism can promote a fairer world trading system, notwithstanding the often
self-seeking motivations of the states who participate in the system. Indeed, it seems
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A rule-based and impartial system of linkage can incorporate fact-find-
ing and adjudication mechanisms that would prevent such opportunism.
For example, it might be required that countries present their complaints to
a transparently constituted and functioning representative body. Such a
body would interpret, assess, and act on the claims presented to it with
reference to a system of rules. Requirements of various kinds, such as that
the findings and reasoning of the body be presented for public scrutiny,
can help to ensure that it functions in the desired manner. Approaches to
fact-finding and adjudication of this kind are familiar, even if sometimes
difficult to implement fully in practice. They may be found in both domes-
tic and international settings.8 7
Institutions of this kind are intended to function in a transparent, rule-
based, and impartial way. Although they may fall short of these goals, the
existence of such shortfalls would not be a sufficient reason to reject the
existence of the institutions if they improve upon the outcomes that would
arise in their absence. 8 8
A related fear is that even a rule-based and transparent system of fact-
finding and adjudication may indirectly act as a fig leaf for protectionism.
In particular, the system of rules may function in such a way as to privilege
the protectionist interests of rich countries. The interests of rich countries
may be privileged both in the content of the rules and in their implementa-
tion. For example, only countries in whose territory basic labor violations
occur may be made liable for them, attaching no responsibility to countries
whose firms directly or indirectly participate in practices that lead to such
violations.8 9 Alternatively, the decision-making body may be inappropri-
implausible that any system of international trading rules can be created that could
effectively guard entirely against such opportunistic misuse.
87. Examples include the National Labor Relations Board in the United States and
comparable bodies in other countries, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
existing free trade agreements with labor provisions such as the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, and the Canada-
Chile Free Trade Agreement. See POLASKI (2003), supra note 86, at 13-14; Sandra
Polaski, Cambodia Blazes a New Path to Economic Growth and Job Creation 14 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace Paper No. 51, 2004) [hereinafter Polaski (2004)]; Sandra
Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical Guide, 10J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 13, 17-20 (2004) [hereinafter Polaski (2004a)]. See generally Kolben, supra
note 78. Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 168 proposes that an "Admissibility Committee"
comprised of nine members appointed jointly by the ILO and the GATT/WTO and
charged with determining whether complaints with respect to the observance of labor
standards (specified in terms of eight publicly stated criteria) are admissible for consid-
eration by a linkage enforcement scheme. See also ICFTU (1999), supra note 1, at 52-53
(describing how the ILO could report to the WTO on violations of core labor standards);
Harvey et al., supra note 1, §111 (proposing that the ILO interact with independent
monitors of labor violations).
88. Cf. Hensman, supra note 78, at 433. Indeed, many prominent critics of linkage
defend the WTO on similar grounds.
89. It may also be feared that the standard of proof required for establishing that
labor standards violations have taken place may be set so low as to make it easy for rich
countries to establish claims that labor standards have been violated and difficult for
poor countries to deny such claims.
Vol. 39
2006 International Trade and Labor Standards
ately influenced by the interests of rich countries, either due to its compo-
sition or to the incentives offered to its members.
The legitimate concerns raised by these objections can be allayed
though an appropriate institutional design. Specifically, a transparent, par-
ticipatory, and consensual procedure for establishing the linkage system
can significantly diminish the possibility of undue influence being exer-
cised by the rich countries. It is unlikely that such a process would lead to
a system that systematically favors the interests of rich countries in the
manner feared. 90 A transparent, participatory, and consensual process of
negotiation is likely to lead to a system of rules more acceptable to develop-
ing countries. For example, it may be required of developed countries that
they take responsibility for ensuring that their firms do not participate in
labor standards violations. Moreover, demonstration of a very high likeli-
hood that a country has egregiously and systematically failed to comply
with the requirements of the linkage system may be required before a coun-
try's trading opportunities are in any way diminished.9 1 In such a system,
the determination that there are isolated instances of failures to adequately
promote labor standards in a poor country would be insufficient to trigger
limitations on its rights to trade. It is notable that existing adjudication
systems, such as domestic courts and international dispute resolution
mechanisms (such as the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO), often
establish stringent standards of proof in order to meet such concerns.
92
Moreover, the threshold for triggering limitations on rights to trade may be
made context-sensitive, and in particular dependent on a country's level of
development. We see no reason why a system of linkage could not also be
made context-sensitive in this way.
There are two main responses to the objection that the imposition of
labor standards will diminish the income of developing countries by reduc-
ing their gains from trade through interfering with the basis of those
gains-the reallocation of production according to comparative advantage.
First, the basis for the gains from trade is the difference in the costs of
production for particular goods across countries. For instance, goods that
are produced in a labor intensive way are likely to be produced most
cheaply in countries that have a relative abundance of labor. The objection
is grounded in the premise that the cost advantages of developing countries
90. This is consistent with the widely discussed concept of the progressive realiza-
tion of human rights. Existing international treaties do often make allowances for the
level of development of countries. Examples include the Kyoto protocol and the TRIPS
agreement.
91. Indeed, the Ehrenberg, ICFTU, and Harvey, Collingsworth, and Athreya propos-
als cited above all insist on such a requirement.
92. Even the WTO DSB, which has not arisen from a truly transparent and par-
ticipatory process, often makes decisions that are not in the interests of member coun-
tries, including the most powerful. See, e.g., PANEL REPORT, UNITED STATES -
TRANSITIONAL SAFEGUARD MEASURE ON COMBED COTTON YARN FROM PAKISTAN, WT/
DS192/R (May 31, 2001). For a description of the recent ruling on cotton, which Brazil
won against the United States, see U.S. Loses Cotton Fight with Brazil, BBC NEWS, Mar. 3,
2005, available at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4316671.stm (last visited Dec. 13,
2006).
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that presently exist would be substantially undermined if not eliminated
by the introduction of labor standards. Although it is true that the basis of
gains from trade would be reduced by increases in the costs of labor in
developing countries that may arise from the imposition of labor stan-
dards, there is in fact no reason to believe that this impact would be sub-
stantial, especially if labor standards were to be adopted simultaneously in
a large number of developing countries. The price elasticity of demand for
the exports of an individual developing country may be relatively large in
magnitude due to the presence of alternative sources from which the
exports produced by developing countries can be procured. However, the
price elasticity of product demand for the exports of developing countries
taken as a whole is likely to be relatively small in magnitude, as the deci-
sive cost advantage enjoyed by developing countries in the production of
labor intensive items will not disappear as a result of the cost increases that
are likely to be generated by the adoption of labor standards [see Appen-
dix]. 93 In the presence of large North-South cost differentials, the level of
cost increase needed to make uneconomical Southern production of com-
modities that employ labor intensively in their production (i.e., to displace
production from the South to the North rather than from one developing
country to another) would have to be massive indeed, making implausible
the notion that linkage could offer an effective "fig leaf' for Northern
protectionism. 94
Even in the absence of coordination among developing countries, how-
ever, there are other ways in which individual developing countries can
enhance labor standards while continuing to reap the gains from trade. For
example, a country can implement a wage subsidy simultaneously with the
imposition of labor'standards, so as to maintain the costs to employers of
hiring workers at exactly the same level as prior to the introduction of labor
standards. A policy combination of this kind would allow a country to
fully reap the gains from trade, as ingeniously shown in the classic argu-
ment of Bhagwati and Ramaswamy. 9 5 In fact, whether or not developing
countries coordinate among themselves when imposing labor standards, it
can be ensured that there is no loss in the gains from trade by implementing
93. Cf. Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, THE MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 13, 48 (1993).
Alan Krueger emphasizes this point, arguing that for this reason it would be difficult for
developed countries to exploit labor standards to achieve protectionist ends. Krueger
(1996), supra note 86, at 12. See also PO.ASKI (2003), supra note 86, at 13 (stating that
currently competition for manufacturing occurs only among developing countries, since
textile, apparel, footwear, electronics, etc. are produced almost exclusively in low-wage
countries). Basu (1999), supra note 21, at 1114 acknowledges the desirability of collec-
tive coordination of standards. Robert Pollin et al. find that increasing the cost of labor,
by increasing wages or raising labor standards, does not consistently lead to job losses.
Robert Pollin et al., Global Apparel Production and Sweatshop Labour: Can Raising Retail
Prices Finance Living Wages?, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 153, 156-60 (2004).
94. See Krueger (1996), supra note 86, at 12; cf. Grossman & Krueger, supra note 93,
at 48.
95. Jagdish N. Bhagwati & V.K. Ramaswamy, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the
Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. POL. EcoN. 44, 44-50 (1963).
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a policy combination of this kind. In an accompanying technical paper,96
it is shown that the implementation of such wage subsidies can lead to
improvements in labor standards without a change in any country's pat-
tern of production and trade (thereby furthering the interest of all
countries).
One possible objection is that implementing such a "first-best" policy
combination would be infeasible for many developing countries due to lim-
itations on their ability to tax and transfer efficiently. However, developing
countries would not necessarily need to raise all of the relevant resources
internally. Rather, international burden sharing can enable developing
countries wholly to avoid the perceived tradeoff between improving labor
standards and maximizing the gains from trade. Indeed, we have insisted
from the outset that any plausible linkage proposal must incorporate ade-
quate burden sharing.
Further, wage subsidies aimed at neutralizing the cost-raising effect of
labor standards improvements need not necessarily be provided by the
developing country government. In principle, other agents, including buy-
ers and developed country governments, could provide such wage subsi-
dies to the producers in developing countries that improve labor standards.
For example, a large multinational corporation could identify the extent to
which labor standards improvements have caused increases in labor costs
in the factories that supply to it, and directly provide countervailing wage
subsidies to these suppliers. The cost of such wage subsidies could be
borne entirely by the firm, or shared by other stakeholders and the entities
representing them, such as governments. Alternatively, the government of a
developed country which imports goods produced in a developing country
that has improved labor standards could in principle pay wage subsidies
directly to the firms in the developing country which produce these prod-
ucts for export. The objection that the low administrative capacity of devel-
oping countries stands in the way of the provision of countervailing wage
subsidies in these countries is irrelevant if the wage subsidies are provided
in these ways.
Of course, the inherent difficulties of collecting adequate information
concerning the extent of the cost increases that result from labor standards
improvements at individual production sites and of administering the pro-
vision of wage subsidies will be present in the implementation of any of
these schemes. However, the mere existence of such difficulties is not rea-
son alone to dismiss such schemes as infeasible. In what follows we shall
assume for expository simplicity that the entity administering the wage
subsidy is the government of the developing country in which production
occurs.
If it is not possible to neutralize fully the cost-raising impact of labor
standards improvements through the provision of an appropriate wage sub-
sidy, it may still be possible partially to neutralize this impact through
96. See Sanjay G. Reddy, Pareto-Improving International Labor Standards Agreements:
A Simple Model (Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--930113.
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other second-best policies. For example, developed countries which
import goods whose cost of production is increased by the labor standards
improvement can reduce tariffs or implement import subsidies so as to
ensure that the cost of these goods to importers is unchanged. A measure
of this kind would not require that any international resource transfers be
made, and would not depend on the limited administrative capacities of
developing countries. However, such a policy can only partially neutralize
the cost-raising impact of labor standards improvements, because (i) it can-
not reverse the change in relative prices of different factors of production
and the resulting change in the combination of inputs (e.g., capital and
labor) used in the production process - which takes place in the developing
country as a result of the labor standards improvement, and because (ii) it
makes exporting a good to a country in which there is such a subsidy
more attractive than exporting the good to a country which does not have
an equivalent subsidy or selling it at home. In assessing a proposed import
subsidy the distortions introduced by it must be weighed against its possi-
ble benefits.
In principle, the first-best policy combination for a country to adopt if
it wishes to reap the gains from trade and raise labor standards is simulta-
neously to introduce enhanced labor standards, wage subsidies that neu-
tralize the labor cost-raising effects of the introduction of enhanced labor
standards, and the optimal trade policy (e.g., free trade) so as to maximize
the gains from trade. This first-best policy combination can in principle be
adopted unilaterally. Why do countries fail to do so? The reasons are
varied and complex. They likely relate to the incentives faced by govern-
ments, and limitations on their ability to undertake efficient taxation and
transfers. 97 By requiring the provision of additional international transfers
97. Note that free trade with the wage subsidy and enhanced labor standards and
free trade without the wage subsidy or enhanced labor standards are each Pareto supe-
rior to autarky (in principle) but that the two free trade alternatives may not be Pareto
comparable, because some may do strictly better under the former scheme, and others
may do strictly better under the latter scheme, depending on the nature and extent of
the ex-post taxes and transfers that are implemented. The Pareto ranking of free trade
and autarky depend on the (1) existence or absence of a domestic distortion; and (2)
correction of a domestic distortion at the source or failure to correct the domestic distor-
tion at the source. The ranking is as follows (assuming the existence of efficient tax and
transfer instruments and specializing, for simplicity, to the case of production distor-
tions): (1) Without a domestic distortion: free trade is Pareto superior to autarky,
because there are gains from trade which can be redistributed in a lump sum fashion.
This is because each unit produced for export satisfies the condition that the world price
exceeds the true domestic cost of production; (2) With a domestic distortion; (2.1) If the
domestic distortion is corrected at the source then free trade is Pareto superior to
autarky, because there are gains from trade which can be redistributed in a lump sum
fashion. Again, this is because each unit produced for export satisfies the condition that
the world price exceeds the true domestic cost of production. [The correction of the
domestic distortion at source ensures that producers' perceived costs are equal to the
true domestic costs of production]; (2.2) If the domestic distortion is not corrected at
the source, then it is ambiguous whether or not free trade is Pareto superior to autarky,
since it is ambiguous whether there are gains from trade. Whether or not there are gains
from trade will depend on the nature and extent of the distortion. Consider the follow-
ing illustrative example. A country produces an exportable commodity (say oil) with a
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and conditioning rights to trade on the adequate promotion of labor stan-
dards, linkage can create powerful incentives for countries to adopt the
first-best policy combination that fosters labor standards and allows coun-
tries to reap gains from trade.
It is important to note that, from this perspective, proponents and
opponents of linkage can agree fully on the benefit of undistorted free
trade, and indeed both can favor institutional arrangements that give rise
to identical patterns of production and net exports. They need disagree
only on the best international instruments with which to promote appro-
priate domestic policy choices that further the interests of workers.
The argument that the imposition of labor standards through linkage
will have negligible or perverse consequences because of the limited reach
of those standards takes several forms.
The first "negligible or perverse effect because of limited reach" argu-
ment of linkage opponents is that the imposition of labor standards
through linkage will only affect export-producing sectors. There are three
ways to respond to this claim. First and most importantly, a system of
linkage need not and should not restrict itself to requiring that efforts to
promote basic labor standards take place in export-producing sectors. 98
Indeed, the system that we envision would require that basic labor stan-
dards be promoted throughout a country, and would provide the same set
of inducements (whether positive or negative) for governments to ensure
that such efforts are undertaken regardless of the type of production
involved.9 9 Second, even a linkage system that targets only export-produc-
great deal of attendant pollution per unit produced. This externality is not internalized.
[If it were, say through an appropriate Pigouvian tax (case 2.1), then the marginal unit
produced would represent its true domestic (social) cost of production. In that case
there would be gains from trade, since oil would be produced for export if and only if
the world price were greater than or equal to the true domestic cost of production. Since
the externality is not internalized (case 2.2), oil will be exported as long as the world
offer price is greater than or equal to the domestic producer cost. However, since the
marginal domestic producer cost is lower than the true marginal domestic cost, there
will be a social cost created by these units produced for export. At the margin, the
revenue garnered by the sale of these units on the world market will exceed the true
domestic cost of their production. Whether there are gains from trade will depend on
whether, on average, for the additional units sold due to trade opening the average true
domestic cost of their production is higher or lower than the world price. In principle,
whether this is so is ambiguous and depends on the level of the world price and the
nature and extent of the domestic distortion.
98. Rohini Hensman reports that while "[oin the whole, the proposal for a workers'
rights clause in WTO agreements too has been greeted in a positive spirit by informal
sector activists .... Once again, this does not mean that all aspects of the proposal are
accepted without criticism - for example, the suggestion that it will apply only to export
production is seen as a defect - but, rather, that these activists are open to the possibility
of using international pressure to secure rights for workers who have little hope of get-
ting them through purely domestic action." Rohini Hensman, The Impact of Globalisa-
tion on Employment in India and Responses from the Formal and Informal Sectors 21
(CLARA, Working Paper No. 15, 2001).
99. Systems of linkage are often, but need not be, justified on the grounds that fail-
ure to respect basic labor standards gives an "unfair advantage" to some countries that
must be corrected. Instead, linkage can be justified on the ground that the trading sys-
tem provides an effective means of altering the incentives faced by countries, creating an
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ing sectors can benefit indirectly workers in other sectors. For example,
improvements in wages and working conditions in export production will
require employers in other sectors to compete for workers by also offering
improved wages and working conditions. 100 If linkage results in an
increase in workers' collective representation through labor unions, this
may indirectly benefit workers who are not unionized. For example,
unions may help to represent the interests of workers as a whole in the
political process. Moreover, unions may also gain resources with which to
organize workers elsewhere in the economy. 10 Third, it may be argued
that the effect of linkage on working conditions in export sectors is in itself
important, and provides adequate reason to pursue linkage.
The second "negligible or perverse effect because of limited reach"
argument of linkage opponents is that even workers in the export sectors
will be benefited negligibly or indeed harmed. There are three responses to
this claim. First, as Bhagwati and Ramaswami have shown in their classic
paper, there exists a combination of "first-best" policies that will wholly
eliminate the negative impact of labor standards on employment.' 0 2 The
provision of an appropriate wage subsidy to firms can fully counteract any
increase in labor costs that they may face as a result of linkage. This
implies that the country's national income in the presence of this (linkage-
cum-wage-subsidy) policy combination will be identical to that which
would prevail in the absence of all of the elements of the policy combina-
tion (i.e., neither linkage nor wage subsidy). It follows that a country can
afford to implement such a policy combination so long as it has access to
appropriate fiscal (tax and transfer) instruments. If a country does not
have access to appropriate fiscal instruments, then assistance from interna-
tional institutions or donors (as presumed will be present in all plausible
environment that better enables and urges them to promote basic labor standards. By
justifying linkage in terms of "unfair trade," and referring to countries that do not
respect basic standards as "free riders," IFCTU (1999), supra note 1, at 43, proponents
of linkage fail to place enough emphasis on a very important class of persons who are
harmed by these failures, namely the workers in countries that fail to promote basic
labor standards. For this reason, our proposal for linkage (sketched below) differs from
others, such as Ehrenberg's, whose would allow penalties only against countries whose
exports are produced in a way that disrespects basic standards (and only against such
exported goods). See, e.g., Ehrenberg, supra note 1, at 172-73.
100. This must be true if the labor supply curve is upward sloping or entirely inelas-
tic, as typically assumed.
101. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and
Social Processes 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6012, 1997),
available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w602.v5.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2006);
Karl Moene & Michael Wallerstein, Social Democracy as a Development Strategy, GLOBAL-
IZATION AND EGALITARIAN REDISTRIBUTION (P. Bardhan et al. eds., 2005), available at http:/
/discuss.santafe.edu/files/globalization/SFI-dvifigs.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
Note also that the opposite conclusion could result, for example if labor unions
represent a "labor aristocracy" that successfully demands that public resources be put to
purposes other than those that benefit the most disadvantaged.
102. See generally BHAGWATi & RAmWsAY, supra note 95. For discussion, see Arvind
Panagariya, Bhagwati and Ramaswami: Why it is a Classic 13 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at
http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/it/papers/0308/03080O4.pdf (last visited Dec. 13,
2006).
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approaches to linkage) may still ensure that it has adequate resources with
which to implement the first-best policy combination. Second, even if the
first-best policy combination is unavailable, linkage will not necessarily
reduce employment significantly. In order for a reduction in employment
to occur, increases in labor costs must cause a displacement of production
to other countries (developing or developed) or a substitution from a more
labor-intensive to a less labor-intensive production technique. We have sug-
gested above that increases in labor costs alone are unlikely to eliminate
the substantial cost advantage of developing countries over developed
countries in labor-intensive production. We have also noted that the simul-
taneous enhancement of labor standards by many developing countries
will greatly reduce the potentially deleterious effect of linkage on employ-
ment. Finally, the decisive advantage of labor-intensive production tech-
niques in developing countries is unlikely to be eliminated by the increase
in wages entailed by linkage. An analysis of the likely impact of increases
in unit costs based on the existing data on the share of labor costs in the
unit costs of exports from developing countries suggests this. 10 3 Third,
even if the employment losses from linkage are unavoidable and non-negli-
gible, that may not be a sufficient reason to reject linkage. One reason is
that linkage may result in improvements in the wages and working condi-
tions of those who continue to be employed. As a result, improvements in
the welfare of families and workers considered as a group may well occur
even in the presence of employment losses. 10 4
The third "negligible or perverse effect" argument is that linkage will
cause an increase in relative inequality. There are four responses to this
claim. First, it is far from clear that the net effect of linkage, even if it
benefits only some workers, will be to increase inequality. It is clear that
improvements in wages of some workers will increase the gap between
these workers and those who are worse off, but that it will decrease the gap
between these workers and those who are better off. The net effect on "ine-
quality" is ambiguous. Second, the empowerment of some workers (even a
"labor aristocracy") may benefit others, insofar as this empowerment
strengthens the voice of workers' representatives in the political process.
103. See Appendix.
104. Implicit in this proposition is the application of an appropriate social welfare (or
"aggregation") function. An example of an aggregation function to which it clearly
applies is that defined by the total wage bill. See, e.g., Martin Rama, The Consequences of
Doubling the Minimum Wage: The Case of Indonesia (World Bank, Working Paper No.
1643, 1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=604935 (showing that in Indonesia,
a ten percent increase in average wages, induced by an increase in the minimum wage,
was associated with a two percent decrease in wage employment, implying a significant
increase in the overall wage bill as a result of the minimum wage increase). The seminal
detailed empirical research presented by Harrison and Scorse concerning the impact of
"anti-sweatshop" activism on labor market outcomes in Indonesia comes to the conclu-
sion that such activism has had ambiguous results, causing decreases in employment
and wages in some sectors and increases in employment and wages elsewhere (including
some of the firms targeted by activists). See Ann Harrison & Jason Scorse, Moving Up or
Moving Out? Anti-Sweatshop Activists and Labor Market Outcomes 32-35 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10492, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10492.pdf.
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Third, even if the net effect of linkage is to increase relative inequality it
may still be desirable, insofar as it improves the absolute condition of many
individuals. 10 5 Fourth, the state may implement additional policies to
shape the final distribution of advantages as desired.
Finally, it is sometimes alleged that linkage will reduce the well-being
of individuals by impeding them from entering into contracts that enhance
their well-being. There are a number of reasons to reject this argument.
First, it does not follow from the fact that each household is better off by
undertaking a particular action that a general restriction on the ability to
undertake the action makes it worse off. The effect of an action on a house-
hold's welfare depends on the actions of other households. A general prohi-
bition on such actions by all households may transform an action that
increases the welfare of a particular household into one that decreases its
welfare. For example, any particular family's material welfare may be
enhanced by child labor because the child's earnings are necessary to meet
the family's basic needs. In that case, the family might prefer to send a
child to work rather than to school. However, if child labor was proscribed
in general, adult wages might rise due to the resulting constriction of the
labor supply. 10 6 If the household's income were to rise sufficiently as a
result of this increase in adult wages then the basic needs of the household
might be met without a contribution from child labor, in which case the
family might now prefer to send children to school rather than to work. In
cases of this kind, a prohibition on child labor will increase the welfare of
households. 10 7 Second, even if households are made initially worse off as
a result of the restriction they may be made better off by being compen-
sated. A policy consisting of combining the restriction and a compensa-
tion scheme for those adversely affected by the restriction may lead to
superior outcomes for all concerned. 10 8 Indeed, public policies combining
restrictions and compensation in this way are increasingly being imple-
mented in developing countries.' 0 9 Third, the decision-maker within the
household may not adequately take account of the interests of other mem-
bers of the household. For example, the decision to send a child to work
may be made by an adult who does not adequately take note of the impact
105. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OR PRIORITY? (1995).
106. See, e.g., Kaushik Basu & Pham Hoang Van, The Economics of Child Labor, 88
AM. ECON. REv. 412, 413 (1998) [hereinafter Basu & Van (1998)1; Basu (1999), supra
note 21, at 1115 ("[A] large scale withdrawal of child labor can cause adult wages to rise
so much that the working class household is better off."). Similarly, under certain con-
ditions, eliminating the right of workers to enter into bonded labor contracts may benefit
such workers, since the availability of such contracts may prevent more beneficial kinds
of credit contracts from emerging. See Garance Genicot, Bonded Labor and Serfdom: A
Paradox of Voluntary Choice, 67 J. DEV. EcoN. 101, 119-22 (2002).
107. This is true on a subjective preference-based conception of welfare as employed
in Basu & Van (1998), supra note 106, at 36-37. However, the assumption that house-
hold welfare can be conceived of without further disaggregation ought to be questioned.
108. An early example of this approach to child labor is presented in ARTHUR C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 751-53 (4th ed. 1960). An exemplary overview of
existing approaches of this kind is presented in Brown (2003), supra note 68, at 225 -37.
109. E.g., Mexico's Progressa and Brazil's Bolsa Escola programs.
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of this decision on the child's present and future well-being. In such a case,
public policies may enhance the well-being of some individuals although
they harm the interests of other existing and future persons. Distributional
judgments are therefore required in order to assess them. Fourth, an
agent's decisions may not always promote her ultimate best interests, due
to inadequate information, myopia, or questionable subjective
preferences.110
B. Response to Objection Two: Linkage is an inferior means of
promoting the goals it is intended to promote
We focus here on arguments that claim there are means other than
linkage of achieving the goals of linkage and that they can promote these
goals more effectively than linkage. As noted above, such arguments do
not entail a denial that linkage may promote the goals that it is intended to
promote. Rather, they insist that there are other better means of promoting
the same goals. Proposed alternatives either rely solely on moral suasion
or seek to bring about voluntary decentralized action on the part of coun-
tries, consumers, and firms. In either case they are unlikely to be very
effective. Schemes relying on moral suasion are generally ineffectual pri-
marily because they do not provide adequate incentives to raise labor stan-
dards. Schemes relying on voluntary decentralized action are inferior to
other schemes because they appeal to only some agents and are therefore
likely to be relatively ineffectual.
It is sometimes suggested that the ILO should play the leading role in
fostering the improvement of labor standards."1  The ILO has indeed con-
tributed immeasurably and in many important ways to the cause of
improved labor standards. In particular, the ILO has been instrumental in
helping to bring about consensus on the labor standards to be promoted,
and in offering technical assistance to countries wishing to design policies
that have this effect. Regrettably, however, the promise of improved labor
standards remains significantly unfulfilled. One important reason may be
that incentives or disincentives available to the ILO to apply to countries in
order to encourage them to promote labor standards that these countries
110. This could perhaps be recognized by the agent herself under appropriate condi-
tions. To take a rather tired example, although an alcoholic may reveal his preference for
beer over beans, it is far from obvious that this preference reflects his best interests. A
public policy that hinders the ability of the alcoholic to indulge his preference without
restriction may be viewed as enhancing welfare. For discussion of the principles under-
lying judgments of this type, see, e.g., T. M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL.
655, 658 (1975); Amartya Sen, Positional Objectivity, 22 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 126, 134-36
(1993). On the outcomes that can arise under imperfect information, see generally
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century
Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1441 (2000).
111. The 1996 WTO ministerial meeting, for instance, declared that "The Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these stan-
dards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them." World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996).
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have endorsed are limited in their effectiveness. 112
Some opponents of linkage have argued for "strengthening" the
machinery of the ILO as an alternative to linkage. It is clear that there is
significant room for such strengthening. However, it is interesting to note
that efforts to strengthen the supervisory machinery of the ILO in regard to
basic labor standard have typically been resisted. 113 Even if significant
strengthening of the ILO's supervisory machinery were to be achieved,
there is reason to doubt that there would be a marked effect on the out-
comes that are realized in the absence of a substantial enhancement of the
incentives that the ILO can offer to countries (in return for their promotion
of basic labor standards). We do not argue that linkage is the only means
of providing such incentives, but we do argue both that it is one such
means and that it is not obvious that there are other means that are supe-
rior to it in this respect. It should be noted in this regard that linkage is a
form of strengthening the ILO and not an alternative to doing so. Indeed,
in the proposal for a system of linkage sketched below, we envision an
important role for the ILO.
It is widely recognized that arrangements for international coopera-
tion must include adequate incentives and disincentives if they are to be
successful in promoting the behavior that they seek to promote. It is com-
monly held, for instance, that it is not feasible to reduce and eliminate
national control over weapons of mass destruction through a program that
depends solely upon the voluntary cooperation of each and every national
government, due to quite familiar problems of collective action. Without
enforcement through unilateral action or multilateral treaties containing
binding mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement, countries may lack
assurance that reductions in their military power are being matched by
those of their competitors, and each may believe that they benefit by
"defecting" from the system. Indeed, the WTO system is widely viewed as
an advance over its predecessors because it provides disincentives to its
members to violate or infringe one another's rights to trade. This is a fea-
ture of the WTO system that has been a central reason for the praise
bestowed on it by many prominent critics of linkage.
A major reason why linkage is desirable is that it can create strong
incentives for governments and employers to take steps to enhance labor
standards. We have claimed that although they could take such steps even
in the absence of linkage (especially if international burden-sharing mea-
112. There is only one case known to the authors of the ILO having applied penalties
to a country due to violation of labor standards: Myanmar in 1996. See ELLIOTT & FREE-
MAN, supra note 34, at 95.
113. For example at the 1997 International Labor Conference. The ILO remains rela-
tively "toothless" even after the "strengthening" of countries' reporting requirements.
See, e.g., Hensman, supra note 78; ELLIoTr & FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 96-100; Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Belarus Is Once Again Censured by the ILO
(June 14, 2005), available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=9912
21860&Language=en (describing the ILO's inability to punish Belarus's violations of
trade union rights).
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sures are present), they are less likely to do so in the absence of linkage
than in the presence of an appropriate form of linkage.
As we recognize, a world with a system of linkage may be one in which
limitations on rights to trade are never actually enacted, but in which the
prospect that such limitations may occur is sufficient to induce govern-
ments and employers to improve labor standards. This suggests, however,
that there may be superior means of achieving the goals of linkage that do
not involve linkage. In particular, a system of non-trade incentives to
enhance labor standards (such as international financial transfers that are
conditional on improving labor standards) may be superior. Alternative
schemes for providing incentives to improve labor standards are unlikely to
prove superior to a well-designed system of linkage. A system that involves
non-trade (in particular, financial) incentives alone will likely be unattrac-
tive for four reasons.
First, as pointed out by Chang' 1 4 any scheme that involves positive
inducements alone may produce perverse effects insofar as it encourages
countries initially to weaken the standards that it seeks to promote or to
exaggerate the costs of improving standards in anticipation of ultimately
receiving financial inducements to make such improvements. Of course,
both trade and non-trade measures can take the form of either positive or
negative inducements (as judged against an expected status quo). This
does not therefore provide a reason to favor a linkage or over a non-linkage
scheme as such. However, trade measures are likely to provide for greater
flexibility in this regard, since there is a limited range of non-trade incen-
tives which can be applied. Even when such incentives are potentially
applicable their scope of application may be restricted (for example, coun-
tries that are not already recipients of net financial transfers can only be
presented with positive financial inducements).
Second, to achieve the same incentive to promote labor standards that
would arise under a system offering both trade and non-trade incentives
(which we shall refer to as a "mixed regime"), the non-trade incentives that
would have to be offered to poor countries would be necessarily greater. 1 5
In particular, the budgetary cost of these inducements to rich country gov-
ernments would be higher than under a mixed regime. As a result, imple-
menting and sustaining a system to promote labor standards involving non-
trade (in particular, financial) inducements alone would be less likely to be
feasible.
Third, significant and sustainable improvements in labor standards
will likely require action on the part of countries in both the North and the
South, those that are the sites of ownership, registration and management
of firms, as well as those that are the sites of production. Adequate action
by Northern countries is unlikely to result from the non-trade incentives
114. See generally Howard Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 17
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 309 (1997).
115. See, e.g., Giancarlo Spagnolo, Issue Linkage, and International Policy Cooperation,
(FEEM, Working Paper No. 49.96, Mar. 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=163173.
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that would be offered by any scheme to promote labor standards, since
those countries would themselves have to finance such a scheme.
Fourth, trade incentives can be used to express appropriate moral atti-
tudes more flexibly than non-trade (in particular, financial) incentives can
do. For example, it would be unfair to require Northern countries that do
not actively participate in conduct that undermines labor standards to
make net transfers to those that do for the purpose of providing the latter
with incentives to desist from such conduct. Northern countries that do
promote labor standards may quite reasonably ask why they should not
receive rewards for their actions rather than being "punished" by being
required to provide resources to other Northern countries which actively
engage in conduct that undermines labor standards. A system that
requires such net transfers from "good citizens" to "bad citizens," whether
they are located in the North or in the South, seems therefore both unfair
and likely to be infeasible. We would, for example, find it disturbing if a
government were to offer monetary rewards to ex-criminals guilty of vio-
lent crimes for each year that they desisted from committing further violent
crimes, even if this were a very effective system indeed. The analogy is far
from exact, but does starkly capture the contrasting responses that may be
appropriate to expressing moral opprobrium and disopprobrium.116
If the arguments above -to the effect that all feasible and morally legit-
imate schemes involve a mixed incentive regime-are valid, then a new
question arises: what form should be taken by the disincentives that the
system includes? In principle, these disincentives could take many forms.
However, there are relatively few practical instruments available with which
to create effective disincentives for countries without resorting to the use of
force, which seems quite generally inappropriate for the purpose of pro-
moting labor standards. The ability to impose limitations on rights to
trade is one of the most powerful instruments of this kind. Indeed, it has
been widely employed toward this end in the past. There is also evidence
of its past value in encouraging countries to undertake specific actions. 1 7
We may conclude: a well-designed system of linkage is likely to be
more effective in providing incentives to countries to improve labor stan-
dards than alternatives that do not involve linkage.
There also exist a number of proposals to promote labor standards
through voluntary decentralized action on the part of consumers and
firms. These include voluntary codes of corporate conduct and product
labeling ("fair trade" initiatives) and consumer boycotts.11 There is reason
116. For an argument in this direction with respect to trade and environmental stan-
dards, see generally Howard Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the
Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995).
117. For example, it is widely believed that such restrictions played a role in the end
of the apartheid regimes in Southern Africa (i.e. South Africa, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, and
Namibia).
118. See, e.g., S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR CREATING
CODES OF CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003); ELLIOrT & FREEMAN, supra
note 34, at 27-48; Fung et al., supra note 61, at 5-6; KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEvi's CHILDREN:
COMING TO TERMS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2000).
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to believe that some of these proposals can be helpful in promoting labor
standards. However, they are unlikely to achieve as much as systemic poli-
cies such as linkage. One reason to believe this is that voluntary measures
on the part of consumers and firms are unlikely to be universally adopted,
leading to a "patchwork" of solutions containing holes in protection (possi-
bly many and large) that permit poor labor standards to continue to
exist. 119 Another reason is that private agents may adopt standards that
impose undue costs upon the affected parties in developing countries,
without adequate consultation with them. For example, a group of con-
sumers may unilaterally define and impose a set of labor standards that are
insensitive to the context faced by the producers. The burden of fulfilling
labor standards may in a real sense fall disproportionately upon producers.
Moreover, agents in developing countries (firms and workers) may be
unduly coerced into participating in such schemes in order to gain access
to markets. Boycotts and other forceful measures may be as coercive as the
types of linkage rightly rejected by linkage opponents.
These are strong reasons to doubt the claim that the promotion of a
decentralized patchwork alone is the best policy for promoting labor stan-
dards. Indeed, it has been pointed out by Rodrik that this is one reason
why, "we routinely object to labeling as [the sole] solution to similar con-
cerns in the domestic setting."1 2 0 The comparison with domestic policy
strongly suggests that it is possible that labor standards will be better pro-
moted by a systematic policy solution than by a decentralized patchwork of
voluntary initiatives. If such a decentralized patchwork is preferred it must
be for at least one of three reasons. The first reason is that it is more effica-
cious in promoting the goal of promoting labor standards. The second rea-
son is that it is preferable on procedural grounds. The third is that it is
feasible whereas alternative approaches are not. In the previous section
and immediately above we presented arguments against the view that
linkage was consequentially inefficacious compared to its alternatives. In
subsequent sections, we will present arguments against the view that
linkage should be ruled out on procedural grounds or because it is infeasi-
ble. In this way, we will demonstrate that the promotion of a decentralized
patchwork of solutions alone does not constitute the first-best policy for
promoting labor standards.
There also exist a number of proposals to promote labor standards
through voluntary decentralized action on the part of consumers and
firms. These include voluntary codes of corporate conduct and product
119. For evidence on how codes of conduct fail (often due to competitive pressures)
to be fully incorporated into firms' buying practices, see, e.g., OXFAM INTL, TRADING
AWAY OUR RIGHTS: WOMEN WORKING IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 38-39 (2004), available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what -we do/issues/trade/downloads/tradingrights.pdf
(last visited Dec. 13, 2006); HONG KONG CHRISTIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMITTEE, How HASBRO,
McDONALD'S, MATTEL AND DISNEY MANUFACTURE THEIR TOYS 29-31 (2001), available at
http://www.cic.org.hk/download/CIC%20Toy%2OReport%20Web%20eng.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec. 13, 2006); KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTIONS BEYOND BORDERS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND U.S. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (2001).
120. Rodrik (1996), supra note 19, at 61.
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labeling ("fair trade" initiatives) and consumer boycotts. There is reason to
believe that some of these proposals can be helpful in promoting labor
standards. However, they are unlikely to achieve as much as systemic poli-
cies such as linkage. One reason to believe this is that voluntary measures
on the part of consumers and firms are unlikely to be universally adopted,
leading to a "patchwork" of solutions containing holes in protection (possi-
bly many and large) that permit poor labor standards to continue to exist.
Another reason is that private agents may adopt standards that impose
undue costs upon the affected parties in developing countries, without ade-
quate consultation with them. For example, a group of consumers may
unilaterally define and impose a set of labor standards that is insensitive to
the context faced by the producers. The burden of fulfilling labor stan-
dards may in a real sense fall disproportionately upon producers. Moreo-
ver, agents in developing countries (firms and workers) may be unduly
coerced into participating in such schemes in order to gain access to mar-
kets. Boycotts and other forceful measures may be as coercive as the types
of linkage rightly rejected by linkage opponents.
These are strong reasons to doubt the claim that the promotion of a
decentralized patchwork alone is the best policy for promoting labor stan-
dards. Indeed, it has been pointed out by Rodrik that this is one reason
why, "we routinely object to labeling as [the sole] solution to similar con-
cerns in the domestic setting."12 1 The comparison with domestic policy
strongly suggests that it is possible that labor standards will be better pro-
moted by a systematic policy solution than by a decentralized patchwork of
voluntary initiatives. If such a decentralized patchwork is preferred it must
be for at least one of three reasons. The first reason is that it is more effica-
cious in furthering the goal of promoting labor standards. The second rea-
son is that it is preferable on procedural grounds. The third is that it is
feasible whereas alternative approaches are not. In the previous section
and immediately above we presented arguments against the view that
linkage was consequentially inefficacious compared to its alternatives. In
subsequent sections, we will present arguments against the view that
linkage should be ruled out on procedural grounds or because it is infeasi-
ble. In this way, we will demonstrate that the promotion of a decentralized
patchwork of solutions alone does not constitute the first-best policy for
promoting labor standards.
It has been claimed by some critics of linkage that a principle of insti-
tutional design first advanced by Jan Tinbergen (which they refer to as the
"two birds principle" although that was not the name given to it by
Tinbergen) rules out linkage. Does this claim have merit? To examine this
question, it is useful to understand Jan Tinbergen's original argument for
this principle in detail. As recognized by Tinbergen, it is impossible to
discuss the problem of policy choice coherently without making reference
to an overall social preference relation, the greater satisfaction of which we
121. Id.
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may refer to as the "master goal.' 2 2 The appropriate conception of the
master goal will depend upon the normative perspective of the evalu-
ator.1 23 Different social states will be associated with different levels of
achievement of the master goal.
In practice, many desirable characteristics of social states-for exam-
ple, a higher aggregate income or a more even income distribution-can be
promoted only indirectly through the adoption of appropriate policies that
influence these characteristics. For example, higher aggregate income or a
more even income distribution may be achieved through an appropriate
choice of relevant "policy levers" such as trade, tax, and expenditure poli-
cies. Tinbergen refers to the available policy levers as "instruments" and to
the characteristics of the social state that the policy-maker seeks to pro-
mote (in order to enhance the master goal) as the "targets."
The "two birds principle" can be understood as holding that achieving
the desired levels of two distinct targets would in general require at least
two distinct instruments. Where it is true, this is a consequence of the
elementary logic of maximization. Suppose that there were only one
instrument, the setting of which influences the attainment of each of the
targets. For example, tariffs on imported goods may influence both the
level of aggregate income and the income distribution. In general, the set-
ting of the instrument that gives rise to the optimal attainment of one of the
targets will not be the setting that gives rise to the optimal attainment of
the other target. Therefore, sub-optimal attainment of at least one of the
targets will have to be accepted. In contrast, if each of the targets had been
advanced by its own independent instrument, then no such problem need
have arisen; each of the targets could simultaneously have been optimally
attained. For example, if the tariff rate is set to maximize aggregate income
and an adequately efficient system of tax and transfer can be used to
achieve the desired income distribution, then the theoretical impossibility
of simultaneously achieving the desired aggregate income and the desired
income distribution disappears.
This reasoning is not particular to the case of two targets but rather
applies to an arbitrary number. In general, at least as many instruments as
targets are required in order for it not to be impossible simultaneously to
attain the desired levels of all of the targets. However, strictly speaking,
this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient. Rare instances may arise
122. Tinbergen uses the term "general interest" and refers to a "collective ophelimity
function" that represents this general interest "in whatever sense that may be taken" and
which is "the object to be maximised." This entity is apparently "a function of a certain
number of variables which we shall call the target variables," select numerical values of
which are referred to as the targets. The targets are presumed to be chosen so as to
maximize the ophelimity function. In contrast, instruments are "variables under the
command of the government." JAN TINBERGEN, ON THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 1, 7
(1966).
123. Utilitarians, for example, may conceive of this master goal in terms of world
welfare and, moreover, specifically understand welfare in terms of subjective preference
satisfaction or pleasure. In contrast, Rawlsians evaluate social institutions in terms of
the level of social primary goods they engender for their least advantaged participants.
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in which the desired levels of two targets can be attained simultaneously
by using a single instrument appropriately. But a 'fluke' of this type can-
not be relied upon.1 24 Similarly, the availability of as many instruments as
targets does not guarantee that the desired levels of all of the targets can
simultaneously be attained. There may be factors that prevent this. If a
single policy instrument plays a role in determining the level of attainment
of more than one target, then both targets are very unlikely to be maxi-
mized simultaneously. For example, if the effects on income distribution
of the choice of tariff rate can only be imperfectly neutralized (for example,
because efficient tax and transfer instruments are unavailable) then a sin-
gle instrument (the tariff rate) can have an unavoidable effect on more than
one target (namely, the aggregate income and the income distribution). As
a result, it will not generally be possible to attain the desired level of aggre-
gate income and the desired income distribution. 125 In that case, it will be
necessary to sacrifice the attainment of one of the targets to some degree.
Those who rely on the two birds principle to criticize linkage do not
make clear what targets they have in mind (although they refer vaguely to
"the freeing of trade" and to "moral and social agendas"). For the principle
to come into play, we must be faced with a situation in which there are two
or more distinct goals that we are trying to promote. Are the "freeing of
trade" and "moral and social agendas" really distinct goals? At a superficial
level they certainly appear to be, since promoting free trade does not itself
entail anything with respect to the improvement of labor standards. At a
deeper level, however, it is not obvious that they are truly distinct. This is
because proponents of free trade typically defend the promotion of free
trade not as an end in itself, but on the grounds that maximizing world
output through trade can serve a master goal, such as improving the level
of advantage of persons, understood in some way (by, for example, bring-
ing about increases in employment and real wages for workers and
increases in consumption generally).
Advocates of free trade correctly view it as a possibly important instru-
ment in furthering the master goal, through its potentially beneficial effect
on material well-being. Those who are concerned with improving labor
standards do so because they too are concerned with such a master goal.
Indeed, they hold that the raising of labor standards is a target that should
be pursued because it should enter constitutively into the master goal - i.e.,
that it ought directly to influence the ordering of alternative social states of
affairs. It can thus be argued that the contrast between the promotion of
124. See, e.g., Bhagwati (2002), supra note 58.
125. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati & V.K. Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and
the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. POL. EcON. 44 (1963); Jagdish Bhagwati et al.,
Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results, 77
J. POL. ECON. 1005 (1969). Another reason that it may be impossible to attain the level
of multiple targets despite the existence of at least as many instruments as targets is the
existence of possible causal interdependencies amongst the targets themselves (as have
been, for instance widely believed to exist between inflation and unemployment). See,
e.g., TINBERGEN (1966), supra note 122; J. TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND
DESIGN (1967).
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trade and the "moral and social agenda" is not between two goals, but
between one means of promoting a single goal and another means of doing
so. In that case, the case of trade and labor standards is not one in which
the principle has any application, and so it cannot in itself be adduced as a
reason against linkage.
Despite this vagueness in linkage critics' characterization of the targets
being promoted, we shall make an assumption as to what these critics have
in mind in order to assess further their arguments. We shall, for purposes
of exposition, suppose that the two targets with which they are concerned
are the maximization of world output and the promotion of labor stan-
dards (as we have expansively defined them here). The critics of linkage
argue that these two targets must be promoted through at least two distinct
instruments, and therefore that linkage (which on their account charges a
single institution with promoting the two distinct targets) cannot be
optimal.
The "two birds principle" implies that at least two distinct instruments
are generally required to achieve maximally two distinct targets. Critics of
linkage who claim that the two birds principle gives us reason to reject
linkage presume that there exist at least two distinct targets that advocates
of linkage and non-linkage alike wish to achieve, but that proponents of
linkage intend to adopt fewer than this number of instruments in order to
do so. However, this is false. Proponents of linkage can recognize that it is
desirable to wield as many instruments as targets, but nevertheless call for
the use of the distinct instruments to be coordinated appropriately.
The implicit assumption made by critics of linkage that multiple
instruments cannot be wielded by a single institution is unwarranted. The
optimal configuration of instruments may in principle be achieved in many
different ways, and therefore the relationship between the optimal number
of instruments and the optimal number of institutions can in principle
vary. For example, the optimal configuration of instruments might be
implemented by a central planner who has the ability to wield each of the
instruments. Alternatively, the optimal configuration of instruments might
be implemented by decentralized decision makers (independent institu-
tions) acting in coordination with one another. A final possibility is that
the optimal configuration of instruments might be implemented by decen-
tralized decision makers (independent institutions) acting without coordi-
nation in pursuit of individually assigned targets. If there exists an optimal
configuration of instruments, then in principle it is possible to attain it
through any one of these three arrangements. If the optimal configuration
of instruments cannot be achieved through all three of these arrangements,
this must be for empirical reasons, related, for instance, to the incentive
structures and informational flows that affect the ability of different
arrangements to promote the targets effectively.
Critics of linkage seem to believe that the targets that are to be pro-
moted can best be promoted by the third option; decentralized decision
makers independently acting in pursuit of individually assigned targets (in
particular, the maximization of world output through free trade, and the
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raising of labor standards). Specifically, they argue that the best outcomes
will be achieved if the responsibility for the promotion of world trade is left
to a single institution (the WTO) and the responsibility for the promotion
of labor standards is similarly left to a single institution (the ILO). Propo-
nents of linkage argue that targets such as high employment and real
wages, decent working conditions and high world output may best be pro-
moted by a system involving coordination between decision-makers
involved in conferring rights to trade and those concerned with promoting
labor standards. Although it has widely been presumed that linkage
requires a single institution to take responsibility for promoting world
trade and labor standards, this need not be so. Linkage can also be
achieved through appropriate forms of coordination between distinct insti-
tutions. The alternative options for promoting the attainment of targets
must necessarily be compared on empirical grounds. 126
The preceding discussion has shown that a linkage system need not
violate the "two birds principle" (at least as understood by Tinbergen).
126. Jan Tinbergen himself strongly supported an integrated international policy to
deal jointly with employment and growth objectives. Tinbergen identifies six broad
areas in which "tasks should be performed on a world basis, although some may also be
subjected to cooperation on a regional basis, under supervision on a world level." J.
TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 145 (1954). It is evident that
Tinbergen views the areas suitable to be addressed at a centralized (world) level to be
determined wholly on empirical grounds. Foremost among these empirical grounds is
whether the instruments in question have a "supporting" or a "conflicting" role in the
sense that "the use of such an instrument by one country will support the policies of the
other countries" or whether its use by one country "conflicts with the objectives of other
countries' policies." See id. at 98-99. The framers of the post-war institutional scheme
also considered such integration of objectives quite attractive. For example, the Interna-
tional Trade Organization ("ITO") was originally proposed by John Maynard Keynes at
the Bretton Woods Conference to further the expansion of world trade as a means to the
ends of development, adequate wages, labor standards, and full employment. The
Havana Charter, which provided for the creation of the ITO, contained an explicit refer-
ence to "Fair Labour Standards" (in Chapter I, Article 7 of the Charter) providing for the
need to "take fully into account the rights of workers," recognizing that because "unfair
labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in interna-
tional trade, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to
eliminate such conditions within its territory" and requiring that the ITO "consult and
co-operate with the International Labour Organisation" toward this end. However, the
ITO did not come into being because of the failure of the U.S. Senate ultimately to ratify
it. For the history of the ITO, see generally Richard Toye, Developing Multilateralism: The
Havana Charter and the Fight for the International Trade Organization, 1947-48, 25 THE
INT'L HIST. REV. 253 (2003); Daniel Drache, The Short but Significant Life of the Interna-
tional Trade Organization: Lessons for Our Time (Centre for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 62/00, Nov. 2000); THOMAS W. ZEILER, FREE
TRADE AND FREE WORLD: THE ADVENT OF GATT (1999); Howard M. Wachtel, Labor's Stake
in the WTO, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 1998, at 34; Mark Levinson, Global Is as
Global Does?, THE NATION, Dec. 18, 1999, at 42; WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., The End of the ITO,
in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1951); WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, JR., THE UNITED
STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE (1950). On the view of the parties to the
ITO that labor standards concerns must play a role in the organization, see generally
Toye, supra note 126; Drache, supra note 126. For a discussion of the wage-based view
of labor standards endorsed in the early stages of GATT negotiations, see generally
Elissa Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (2001).
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Distinct instruments may be distributed across institutions in different
ways, and the institutions may or may not coordinate the use of these
instruments. The best distribution of rights to use instruments across
institutions and the appropriate form and degree of coordination in the use
of these instruments must necessarily depend on empirical judgments. It
may be thought that it is better to assign the right to use specific instru-
ments to institutions that possess special expertise or capabilities. For
example, it has often been argued that the ILO ought to be responsible for
defining, monitoring, and promoting labor standards because of its special
expertise and institutional capabilities in the area of labor rights. On the
other hand, it may be thought that coordination in the use of distinct
instruments can enhance effectiveness. For example, it has sometimes
been suggested that the ILO is "toothless."12 7 One reason to imagine that
linkage may help to advance labor standards is that the prospect that rights
to trade may be conditioned on the adequate promotion of labor standards
may help to give "teeth" to this otherwise "toothless" institution. Empirical
considerations of this kind must necessarily play a determining role in
assigning instruments to institutions and in establishing the type of coordi-
nation between institutions that is appropriate.
Recent game-theoretic literature on "issue linkage" sheds light on the
det,.iled empirical considerations that play a role in determining whether
linkage is desirable. Agents are typically concerned with outcomes ("issue
areas") of diverse kinds. Moreover each outcome with which an agent is
concerned can be influenced by diverse actions that this agent and others
undertake. When the outcomes realized by each agent are the joint conse-
quence of her conduct and the conduct of others, then it is possible that
decentralized and uncoordinated choices of conduct by agents will lead to
outcomes that are sub-optimal (in the sense that a negotiated agreement to
undertake different conduct could lead to an improved outcome for all).
Often, the same agents face each other in such strategic interactions (in
which negotiated agreements could bring about improvements) in connec-
tion to multiple outcomes. For example, governments may have an interest
in the level of national income they possess as well as in the level of pollu-
tion that their populations experience, and outcomes in each of these
dimensions may be influenced by others' choices as well as their own. In
this example, there are two distinct outcome dimensions, and in each of
them governments may act in isolation or in conjunction with other gov-
ernments (on the basis of negotiated agreements, for example concerning
ceilings on tariffs or on CFC emissions).
Is it possible to identify conditions under which unified negotiation
over multiple issue areas (aimed at producing a single agreement covering
the different issue areas together) is superior to disaggregated negotiations
over multiple issue areas (aimed at producing individual agreements over
the different issue areas)? One way to assess whether a specific approach
to negotiation is superior is to ask whether the outcomes produced by the
127. See, e.g., Hensman, supra note 78; Collingsworth, supra note 65.
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agreement to which these negotiations would give rise would be superior
from the standpoint of all agents. Of course, the outcomes that arise when
all agents obey their obligations under a negotiated agreement may differ
from those that arise when agents fail to obey these obligations. It may
therefore be important to assess a negotiated agreement not only in rela-
tion to the outcomes that would arise if all agents were to abide by their
obligations under the agreement but those that may be likely to arise given
the incentives that agents may possess to deviate from these obligations.
Whether an agreement is self-enforcing (in the sense that agents have an
interest in abiding by their obligations under it when other agents do the
same) is of special interest in the analysis of international agreements,
since there is no supra-national enforcement authority.
Recent game-theoretic literature has included attempts to address this
question. Spagnolo, 12 8 for example, points out that-from the point of
view of enforceability-unified and disaggregated negotiations can be com-
pared with each other in relation to two considerations. The first concerns
how the unification of negotiations can improve the allocation of enforce-
ment power across dimensions (in a sense to be defined below). The sec-
ond concerns how the unification of negotiations influences the valuation
placed by each agent on the threat of the withdrawal of future cooperation
(which is the sole basis for securing cooperation in self-enforcing agree-
ments) relative to the valuation placed on present non-cooperation.
How can the unification of negotiations improve the application of
enforcement powers across dimensions? The unification of negotiations
can enable a superior allocation of enforcement powers across issue areas
by permitting unused enforcement power to be redistributed from one
issue area to another. In particular, the enforcement power available in one
issue area may be in "surplus" in the sense that the punishment for devia-
tion presented by the threat of withdrawal of future cooperation in that
area may be greater than necessary to secure cooperation with the agree-
ment in that area alone (specifically, the value of the benefits of foregone
future cooperation may be greater than the value of the benefits of immedi-
ate non-cooperation). 129 On the other hand, the enforcement power availa-
ble in another issue area may be inadequate in the sense that the threat of
withdrawal of future cooperation in that area may be insufficient to secure
the desired level of cooperation in that area (specifically, the value of the
benefits of foregone future cooperation may be less than the value of the
benefits of immediate non-cooperation). When this is the case, linking
issue areas can increase cooperation in the area in which enforcement
128. See generally Spagnolo, supra note 115; see also Nuno Limbo, Trade Policy, Cross-
border Externalities and Lobbies: Do Linked Agreements Enforce More Cooperative Out-
comes?, 67 J. OF INT'L ECON. 175 (2005).
129. Specific subsets of possible strategies are considered in the formal analyses by
Spagnolo and the other contributors to this emerging body of literature. See also Nancy
Chau & Ravi Kanbur, The Race to the Bottom, from the Bottom, 73 ECONOMICA 193 (2006)
(especially section IV) for a recent example of such a contribution which focuses specifi-
cally on labor and environmental standards, and which attempts to identify conditions
under which international agreements on standards may be sustainable.
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power is inadequate without decreasing cooperation in the area in which
enforcement power is in surplus. Linking issue areas can enable unused
(or "slack") enforcement powers to be used by reallocating them among
issue areas. From this perspective, issue linkage can never diminish the
enforceability of agreements and can often enhance it.
How does the unification of negotiations influence the valuation
placed by each agent on the threat of withdrawal of future cooperation rela-
tive to the valuation placed on the benefit of present non-cooperation? Let
us assume that when there is issue linkage and cooperation is withdrawn
as a punishment for non-cooperation, it is withdrawn in all issue areas
simultaneously, and when cooperation takes place it takes place in all
issue areas simultaneously. Let us further assume that when issues are not
linked and cooperation is withdrawn as a punishment for non-cooperation
in a given issue area, it is withdrawn in that issue area alone. The central
question then becomes that of whether the relative benefits of future coop-
eration and present non-cooperation change when issue linkage takes
place. It can be shown that this depends on how the agents value different
combinations of attainments in the distinct issue areas and on the specific
causal interconnections between issue areas. 130
It has been suggested that economic theory precludes linkage for
another reason. Panagariya, for example, has argued that ". . . the targeting
literature, pioneered by Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati
(1971) tells us that when an economy is in a sub-optimal equilibrium, the
130. Spagnolo, supra note 115 focuses on the implications of the agents' valuations of
different combinations of attainments whereas Limdo, supra note 128 focuses on the
implications of the causal interconnections between distinct issue areas. According to
Spagnolo, there are two kinds of cases to consider. The first is that in which the out-
comes are substitutes in the sense that increases in the level of achievement in one out-
come dimension are valued less when the level of achievement in the other outcome
dimension is higher. The second is that in which the outcomes are complements in the
sense that increases in the level of achievement in one outcome dimension are valued
more when the level of achievement in the other outcome dimension is higher. When the
outcomes are substitutes, then the threat of withdrawal of future cooperation in one
issue area alone may be relatively ineffective because cooperation in the other issue area
may secure rest of the advantages that would have been achieved had there been cooper-
ation in the two issue areas together. When the outcomes are complements, then the
threat of withdrawal of cooperation in one issue area alone may be relatively effective,
because when cooperation in the second issue area is taking place, then the threat of
withdrawal of cooperation entails a significant loss of benefit. Paradoxically, the with-
drawal of future cooperation in both issue areas together may not be as effective because
the value attached to cooperation in each area diminishes when cooperation in the other
issue area does not take place. From the above analysis, it follows that when the issue
areas are substitutes, linking them will be advantageous with respect to both of the
aspects of enforcement. When the issue areas are complements, whether linking them
will be advantageous from the standpoint of enforcement depends on the empirical
question of whether the gains from improved allocation of slack enforcement power are
greater than the losses from lessened effectiveness of the threat of withdrawal of future
cooperation. Therefore, there is no general reason to prefer disaggregated negotiations to
linked negotiations from the standpoint of enforcement. For discussion of related issues,
see generally P. Conconi and C. Perroni, Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-In in Multilateral
Negotiations, 57 J. OF INT'L ECON. 423 (2002); Josh Edderington, Trade and Domestic Pol-
icy Linkage in International Agreements, 43 INT'L ECON. R. 1347 (2002).
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first best policy is to correct the underlying distortion at its source. Once
this is done, there is no reason to intervene elsewhere in the economy.
Thus, if the market happens to produce suboptimal labour standards, we
should correct this distortion directly rather than through an indirect
instrument such as trade sanctions. Under the direct approach, once
labour standards have been set at the optimal level, free trade remains the
optimal trade policy in the traditional sense. Purely from an efficiency
standpoint, a case cannot be made for linking trade and labour
standards."131
The theorem referred to here concerns distortions in the economic
sense, i.e. instances in which the true social cost of an act of production or
consumption diverges from the private cost experienced by those responsi-
ble for making a production or consumption decision, or in which the true
social benefit of an act of production or consumption diverges from the
private benefit of those responsible for making a production or consump-
tion decision. How might this conception of a "domestic distortion" apply
to the case of "sub-optimal" labor standards? In order to apply the "eco-
nomic" framework in this way it would be necessary to think of acts of
production in which labor standards are inadequately high as being ones
in which the true "social cost" of the act of production is greater than its
perceived private cost.' 32 For this to be true, however, the increment
between private cost and true social cost would have to be a cost exper-
ienced by someone other than those involved in the production process
itself who are parties to the wage labor transaction, or a cost attributed to
those persons but not perceived by them. If one of the parties to the wage
labor transaction (worker or employer) perceived the cost, then it would be
fully 'internalized' within the contracting decision and a 'distortion' would
not exist. Who might these others who experienced the social costs gener-
ated by production with poor labor standards be? They could only be
other individuals in the country concerned, or indeed individuals in other
countries.
In either case, a "correction of the domestic distortion at the source"
in the form of a tax meant to bring the perceived private cost of production
into line with the true social costs of production would indeed be a possi-
ble correction to the domestic distortion, and one which would potentially
increase domestic welfare (if the 'externality' is suffered by other individu-
als within the country) or world welfare (if the 'externality' is suffered by
individuals in other countries). 13 3 Although this is indeed an instance of
the theory of the correction of a domestic distortion at the source, it is by
131. Arvind Panagariya, Trade-Labour Link: A Post-Seattle Analysis, in GLOBALISATION
UNDER THREAT: THE STABILITY OF TRADE POLICY AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS 101, 104
(Zdenek Drabek ed., 2001).
132. This narrowly welfarist normative framework is clearly insufficient for capturing
the normative significance of labor standards. However, we cannot further address this
issue in this section.
133. Other conditions are required, such as the existence of efficient tax and transfer
instruments. In the absence of such instruments, there is no guarantee that redistribu-
tion of the gains from trade can produce a Pareto improvement.
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no means obvious why the implementation of such a solution is inconsis-
tent with linkage, contrary to assertions made in the literature. The theory
recommends that domestic policies be used to correct domestic distortions
and stresses that the existence of a domestic distortion fails to affect the
optimal choice of trade policy. Indeed, linkage is a specific means of ensur-
ing that countries adopt appropriate domestic policies and does not
require that countries adopt any particular trade policy. It leaves countries
free to choose the optimal trade policies that they would otherwise choose.
What of the claim that an appropriate system of international trading
rules can be designed that does not incorporate linkage, leaving countries
free to choose the level of labor standards appropriate to them (and achiev-
ing the objectives of linkage) while similarly fully reaping the gains from
international trade?
Bagwell and Staiger (see the earlier presentation of their argument)
present a scheme for eliminating the strategic incentive to depress labor
standards in order to enhance domestic producers' market access. It incor-
porates a requirement to undertake Kemp-Wan adjustments, which require
that when a country raises (or lowers) its labor standards it must corre-
spondingly raise (or lower) its import tariffs so as to maintain the prices
received by foreign producers. However, the game-theoretic insight which
they present and exploit is more widely applicable than they seem to recog-
nize. In particular, whereas they assume that the maximand that ought to
be pursued is also that which is pursued by governments, these two ideas
should in general be distinguished. The value of enhancing labor stan-
dards may not be fully recognized in the "objective function" of the govern-
ment. In the terms of Bagwell and Staiger, the social valuation, A, which is
placed on higher labor standards by the government may not correspond
to the normatively appropriate valuation of these higher standards. This
may be true for two distinct reasons. It may be thought that the appropri-
ate normative valuation on labor standards is that which corresponds to an
aggregate of the subjective preferences of the country's population. 13 4 In
that case, it is necessary to ensure that the government's valuation of
higher labor standards corresponds to that of the population. However,
there is no guarantee that the aggregation function used by the government
appropriately reflects the subjective preferences of the population it repre-
sents. For example, the government may attribute overriding importance
to satisfying the preferences of wealthier and more politically influential
citizens, while comparatively neglecting the preferences of workers and the
poor. This is a pedestrian "political economy" insight of a kind that is
familiar to trade economists, who often express concern that protectionist
interest groups that engage in "rent seeking" or "directly unproductive
activities" undermine the propensity of the state to pursue the public
good. 13 5 Second, it may be thought appropriate to assign a normative valu-
134. See, e.g., T.N. Srinivasan, Comment, in SocIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY
236 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000) .
135. SeeJagdish N. Bhagwati, Lobbying and Welfare, 14 J. PUB. ECON. 355 (1980); see
also Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive: Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90 J. POL.
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ation to labor standards in which the valuation placed on higher labor
standards is not based merely on the subjective preferences of the popula-
tion. However, there is no assurance that the government of every country
will value higher labor standards to an appropriate degree.
Hence, even a system incorporating adjustments of the kind recom-
mended by Bagwell and Staiger may not lead to the socially optimal level of
labor standards (i.e., that level which corresponds to the normative valua-
tions or labor standards and other ends). Additional incentives may be
required in order to encourage countries to raise their labor standards to
the socially optimal level in each country (recognizing fully that this social
optimum may depend on the country's present stage of development and
other relevant conditions). A system of linkage incorporating burden shar-
ing can provide these additional incentives. Ultimately, linkage is in its
very essence a system for providing incentives for countries to choose freely
to improve labor standards to a larger degree than they might otherwise.
No inherent conflict exists between the idea that the world trading
system should incorporate linkage and the idea that it should require
Kemp-Wan adjustments of the kind proposed by Bagwell and Staiger.
Indeed, it may be desirable jointly to incorporate both linkage and the
requirement for such adjustments. Consider the following example. There
are two countries, A and B, which possess some initial levels of labor stan-
dards. Now, suppose that country A's labor standards are below the level
minimally demanded of it by the linkage scheme (determined in light of its
present circumstances) and that country B's labor standards are above the
level minimally demanded of it by the linkage scheme (determined in light
of its present circumstances). The linkage scheme provides incentives for
country A to raise its labor standards but does not provide incentives for
country B to do so. Moreover, country B may have an incentive to lower its
labor standards in order to confer greater market access to its domestic
producers, for the reasons suggested by Bagwell and Staiger. The result
that arises from the strategic interaction between countries will be subop-
timal, because of the externality pointed to by Bagwell and Staiger: world
gains from trade will be lower than otherwise. In order to eliminate the
incentive of country B to lower its labor standards, and ensure an optimal
outcome, the rule system could incorporate the requirement of Kemp-Wan
adjustments in addition to linkage. In that case, county B could not lower
its labor standards without correspondingly lowering its import tariffs. As
a result, the incentive for country B to lower its labor standards purely to
increase the market access of domestic producers of import competing
goods would be eliminated. Similarly, the increase in labor standards in
country A could be accompanied by a decrease in foreign tariffs on the
items exported by country A (so as to maintain undiminished or indeed to
enhance the level of access to foreign markets by the country's exporters)
as we recommend.
ECON. 988 (1982); Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64
AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
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We may imagine a range of labor standards-related considerations
being incorporated into the world trading system. The linkage scheme
could require that countries promote labor standards to a minimally ade-
quate extent, as determined in light of the country's level of development
and other relevant considerations. The scheme would require that the
trading partners of countries that make improvements to labor standards
in accordance with the requirements of the scheme lower their import tar-
iffs for good from the country, apply import subsidies, or offer other incen-
tives which offset any cost these improvements may generate for the
country. The rules of the trading system might also require that Kemp-Wan
adjustments be undertaken by countries with labor standards above the
level minimally required of them by the linkage scheme, in the event that
they seek to lower these labor standards. This would be a means of dis-
couraging countries from using reductions in labor standards as a means
of seeking increased market access for their domestic producers as recom-
mended by Bagwell and Staiger. Finally, the rules of the trading system
might permit such countries to raise their labor standards further still
without any such adjustments. The resulting world trading system, incor-
porating both linkage and an asymmetrical requirement for Kemp-Wan
adjustments, would possess the attractive feature that it would be likely to
encourage countries to improve their labor standards while ensuring high
and stable levels of mutual market access. This is only a sketch of one
possible form that a world trading system incorporating linkage could
desirably take.
What of the claim that a linkage scheme is likely to reflect the precon-
ceptions and priorities of external actors and will thus push developing
countries to put in place labor standards that are inappropriate (or inap-
propriately high)? A linkage scheme need not reflect the preconceptions
and priorities of external actors. Indeed, any unimposed scheme must
appeal to some constituents within a country for it to be entered into by
that country. As a consequence such a scheme is likely to allow for the
level of labor standards promotion expected of individual countries to vary
with the level of development of the country and other relevant features of
the national context. Indeed (as argued further below) such context-appro-
priate application is called for in order to meet other standard objections to
linkage. The labor standards identified as worthy of promotion in any
plausible linkage scheme ought to reflect the priorities of domestic activists
and stakeholders. There is simply no guarantee that those domestic con-
stituencies that best represent the interests of less advantaged persons will
be able to influence policy sufficiently to achieve concrete measures to pro-
mote labor standards. By drawing on the experience of domestic actors
that promote the interests of the less advantaged in identifying relevant
standards, by strengthening their hand relative to other groups with differ-
ent priorities, and by avoiding the cost in foregone trade and investment
that would have been borne by countries which attempt to promote labor
standards unilaterally, a linkage scheme will likely give rise to efforts to
promote labor standards that are ultimately more beneficial to the less
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advantaged than those which could be achieved through domestic activism
alone.
In all of this we have assumed that labor standards are a good worthy
in themselves of being promoted. If measures to improve labor standards
are not worthy in themselves of being promoted but are only a means to an
end (e.g., utility) then there may be other better ways of enhancing that
ultimate end, viz. avoiding the labor supply "distortion" (and attendant
deadweight loss) caused by labor standards improvements (which may be
viewed as making working at certain jobs "artificially" attractive, thereby
influencing both the labor-leisure decision and occupational choices) and
undertaking instead ex-post redistributions of income. We reject this utili-
tarian framework which assumes that all harms suffered can be compen-
sated ex-post. We also note that this approaches presumes the existence of
adequately efficient tax and transfer instruments, adequate information
with which to identify beneficiaries, and the actual use of the available
instruments. The realism of each of these assumptions may be questioned.
Further, the standard international trade models typically appealed to by
linkage opponents feature fixed endowments of labor. Under this assump-
tion, the concern that improved labor standards will distort the labor-lei-
sure decision does not arise.
C. Response to Objection Three: Linkage creates an unfair distribution
of burdens
It is argued by linkage critics that linkage is likely to most harm per-
sons who are least advantaged. However, we have already shown, in
addressing above the objection that linkage is self-defeating or inconse-
quential, that this argument is unconvincing. A linkage system can be
designed in a way that minimizes or eliminates its possible adverse effects
and ensures that it becomes an effective instrument on behalf of less
advantaged persons.
Second, it is argued by linkage critics that it unfairly (because arbitrar-
ily) affects only some persons, sectors, and firms. It is important to note
that an agent has obligations to undertake certain actions (or avoid others)
irrespective of what other agents are doing. For example, a husband's com-
plaint that it is unfair to prevent him from beating his wife because others
are not being prevented from beating their wives is illegitimate. It may be
argued that an agent's obligations to promote at least some basic labor
standards are independent of whether other agents fail similarly to pro-
mote them. 136 It is also argued by linkage critics that a linkage system will
136. There are plausible exceptions to the idea that the conduct of an agent ought to
be evaluated independently of others' conduct. For example, there is a long tradition of
argument that has emphasized that the obligation of agents to refrain from armament or
attack depends on whether they have assurance that other agents abide by correspond-
ing obligations. But cases of this kind appear to involve special conditions, for example,
that those whose well-being is put at risk by the agent's failure to meet the requirement
themselves reciprocally put the agent at risk through their failures to abide by this same
requirement.
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unfairly affect only those countries that are the physical sites of export
production. However, there is no reason that a linkage system must take
note of the failure adequately to promote labor standards only in those
countries which are the physical sites of production. It seems likely that an
effective and fair system of linkage will encourage appropriate actions by
all countries involved in any stage of the production process, including
those that are sites of registration, ownership and management. 13 7
Third, critics of linkage claim that linkage would unfairly penalize
individuals for failing to promote specified labor standards, even where
doing so is morally justified because of the consequences that are realized,
or the agent-relative moral ends that are thereby furthered. However, the
mere fact that an individual's choice can be given a plausible rationale does
not make costs that may be imposed on such an individual to discourage a
particular choice unfair. Policies may rightly be designed so as to give
greater weight to certain interests (e.g., those of workers) as compared to
others (e.g., those of factory owners). Moreover, many of the hard choices
that are faced in an environment in which incentives to promote basic labor
standards are weak may disappear in an environment in which such incen-
tives are present. If public policies discourage child labor, for example, a
factory owner may no longer be forced to employ child labor in order to
compete successfully with other firms. International burden sharing can
also mitigate these costs and distribute them more fairly. The concern of
critics of linkage that it will penalize individuals in poor countries for fail-
ing to promote labor standards can be side-stepped if international burden
sharing adequately diminishes the necessity for poorer countries to be inat-
tentive to poor labor standards if they are to pursue other valued ends.
The fourth claim of linkage critics is that it makes the citizens of one
country bear the cost of satisfying the preferences of those of another coun-
try. In response, it should first be noted that the desirability of promoting
basic labor standards arises not merely from the value of satisfying a pref-
erence (in this case the "tastes" of the well-off) but rather arises from the
moral value of promoting them. 138 Second, the premise of this objection to
linkage is that poor countries will necessarily bear the cost of fulfilling the
moral obligation to promote basic labor standards. However, this premise
need not be true. As argued above, the costs to developing countries
entailed by linkage may be small, especially if sufficient numbers of (other-
wise competing) developing countries participate in the linkage system.
Indeed, the remaining developing countries (those which do not undertake
labor standards improvements) may experience increases in demand for
137. Other proposals for linkage have failed to take adequate account of the responsi-
bilities of countries that are the sites of registration, ownership or management of firms,
directly or indirectly linked to violations of basic labor standards. A linkage system that
fails to broaden its jurisdiction in this way inappropriately focuses on the punishment of
developing countries by developed countries. Thus, it will lack legitimacy and
effectiveness.
138. There is indeed a wide consensus that this is the case, as the widespread refer-
ence in the debate to ILO conventions and other international legal documents specify-
ing international norms makes clear.
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their exports as a result of the efforts of other countries to improve labor
standards (which will make goods produced in the former countries rela-
tively cost-competitive). Further, as argued above, all plausible approaches
to linkage must include adequate burden sharing in which developed coun-
tries transfer resources to developing countries. Finally, as described
above, a plausible system of linkage will require actions to promote labor
standards of all countries, not only those that are sites of production in
which basic labor standards are not adequately promoted.
The fifth claim of critics is that linkage illegitimately abridges funda-
mental freedoms. It is claimed that individuals should be free to enter into
contracts with one another, and that rights to trade internationally without
impediment are grounded in this principle. However, this proposition is
exceedingly difficult to sustain-some contractual arrangements, although
voluntary, may be unduly coercive or exploitative (and therefore illegiti-
mate) because of the background conditions in which they are entered into.
In such cases, it may be morally required either that the stronger party
refrain from entering into the contract or that the contracts entered into
guarantee terms that are superior to those that would merely suffice to
entice the weaker party to enter the contract. 1
3 9
Proponents of linkage need not deny that there are rights to trade, or
that these rights are important. Rather, they need only contest the nature
and priority of rights to trade as understood by critics of linkage who
emphasize these rights. 140 Few would argue that there is a comparable
status to rights to trade within a domestic economy, where it is generally
thought reasonable to forbid the trade of goods produced with stolen prop-
erty, produced by employing slave labor or child labor, or that impose a
serious risk of harm on intermediaries and consumers. The scope of
rights to trade should be determined in light of their contribution to the
fulfillment of valuable ends, which may plausibly include basic labor
standards.
D. Response to Objection Four: Linkage is context-blind and politically
imperialistic
Let us first address the claim that linkage is context-blind because it is
insensitive to a country's level of development. It can be responded that
the requirement that countries promote basic labor standards need not be
applied in a context-independent way. Rather, countries may be required
to respect a few fundamental requirements (for example, to outlaw slave
labor and child prostitution) regardless of their level of development,
139. See, e.g., G.A. COHEN, HISTORY, LABOUR, AND FREEDOM 209-38 (1988); ALAN
WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 207-46 (1996).
140. It is common to all rights that they may be asserted without insisting on their
absolute priority or unconditionality. This is also recognized in law. Famously, assert-
ing that there is a right to free speech does not establish that people can everywhere and
anywhere say what they want. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(holding that the most stringent protection of free speech rights will not protect a man
who falsely shouts fire in a theater and causes a panic).
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whereas they may be required to respect other requirements only if their
level of development is sufficiently high.14 1 Further, it must be recognized
that it takes time and resources to achieve even basic standards. Limita-
tions on rights to trade ought to be avoided and imposed only when abso-
lutely necessary to deter the most egregious and persistent violations of
basic norms (such as the prohibition of slave labor). Explicit allowance
can and should be given to countries to demonstrate good faith efforts to
promote standards to an extent and in a manner appropriate to their level
of development. The obligation to promote labor standards can also be
made contingent not only on the level of development of the country but
on the pertinent facts, including the nature of the affected industry.
Although increased costs may not greatly affect the competitiveness of
"infra-marginal" industries which enjoy significant cost advantages with
respect to competing sources of the same goods and services, they may
have large adverse effects on the competitiveness of "marginal" industries
in which production within a country (or in the developing countries con-
sidered as a group) is barely viable. The empirical facts concerning an
industry can and should be taken account of in determining the extent to
which cost increases resulting from labor standards improvements can be
reasonably absorbed.
Moreover, financial and technical assistance (made possible through
international burden sharing) should be provided to countries to enable
them to realize the improvements in labor standards that are feasible for
them to achieve at their level of development. Although countries may rea-
sonably plead that the costs of ensuring even basic labor standards are
prohibitively high at their current level of development, they cannot make
this plea if they are provided external assistance (material and technical)
sufficient to reduce substantially or eliminate the costs that they would
face in promoting these standards. The burden-sharing element in plausi-
ble proposals for linkage ensures that developing countries will face dimin-
ished costs when enhancing labor standards.
For a linkage proposal to be context sensitive, it is important that the
aims and procedures of the linkage system (including the basic standards
to be promoted and the criteria for determining compliance) be defined
through a process of fair negotiation, which (as noted above) is a require-
ment of all plausible systems of linkage.
Let us now consider the claim that inattention to basic labor standards
is a necessary condition for development. This is an empirical claim and,
as such, it may be questioned on empirical grounds. It is far from obvious
that development requires (or even permits) that any (let alone all) basic
labor standards be neglected. It is necessary to distinguish between the
instrumental and the intrinsic relevance of basic labor standards to devel-
opment. The attainment of at least some basic labor standards must be
understood as constitutive of development; promoting these standards is a
141. See Penny Abeywardena, Interview with Jagdish Bhagwati, RIGHTS NEWS, Fall
2004, at 2-3.
607
Cornell International Law Journal
form of promoting development itself.14 2 Further, labor standards may be
instrumentally valuable because they facilitate other aspects of develop-
ment. For example, the elimination of child labor may help to bring about
universal basic education which may in turn help to foster economic
growth, or higher wages may foster increased productivity. 1 43 Indeed,
countries often further certain basic labor standards without apparent
impediment to their development. 144 Finally, even if the neglect of basic
labor standards were causally relevant to the rapid development of specific
countries in the past (for instance, during the British industrial revolution)
it would not follow that this is so today, since economic and technological
conditions have changed. For example, there now exist richer countries
which can provide transfers to developing countries that can diminish the
costs that would otherwise be entailed by the promotion of basic labor
standards. The element of burden sharing that must be incorporated into
all plausible linkage proposals can ensure that such diminution will take
place.
If a system of linkage is legitimate, then the obligations that it ascribes
to those who are party to it are ones that morally bind them. For a system
to create moral obligations for those who are party to it, two conditions
must hold. First, the country must have chosen to enter into the system
voluntarily-it must not have been unduly coerced into joining it. This
may be called the criterion of "external legitimacy." Second, its decision to
join the system must have resulted from a process that took adequate
account of the interests and perspectives of its citizens.1 45 This may be
called the criterion of "internal legitimacy." Processes can take adequate
account of the interests of citizens in various ways. They may do so by
allowing citizens and their representatives a direct say over such decisions
through referenda or other democratic mechanisms, by providing them
with opportunities to present their views in open public discussion in a
manner that influences decisions, or by being otherwise systematically
142. See, e.g., Arnartya Sen, Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,
82 J. PHIL. 169 (1985) on consequentialist theories directly valuing rights fulfillment.
143. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta & Debraj Ray, Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutri-
tion and Unemployment: Policy, 97 ECON. J. 177 (1987); Ross Levine & David Renelt, A
Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 942 (1992);
HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1957); Michael
J. Piore, International Labor Standards and Business Strategies, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYM-
POSIUM 21(1994); Moene & Wallerstein, supra note 101.
144. See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
MAKING OPENNESS WORK (1999). It has been argued that governmental enforcement of
labor standards has created incentives for technological and organizational innovation
and thereby enhanced economic growth in Europe and the United States. See generally
Moene & Wallerstein, supra note 101 (studying European cases); Piore, supra note 143
(studying the nineteenth-century U.S. textile industry); Kenneth D. Boyer, Deregulation
of the Trucking Sector: Specialization, Concentration, Entry, and Financial Distress, S.
ECON J. 481 (1993).
145. We apply this concept broadly here, so as potentially to encompass those who
may not hold formal citizenship rights, such as legal residents or long-term residents.
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responsive to them.
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The tests of internal and external legitimacy must be satisfied in order
for a system of linkage to be legitimate. 14 7 It must be underlined, however,
that these criteria of moral legitimacy do not directly provide instructions
for institutional design. A system of linkage may permit states to join it in
the way that they have historically joined many international treaties-
through governments becoming signatories-or it might require something
more stringent, such as ratification by a popular assembly, as also
demanded for certain existing international treaties. In either case, the
moral assessment of the resulting system must take note not merely of
whether the legal requirements of entry into the system were satisfied, but
of whether the system satisfies criteria of internal and external legitimacy,
thus resulting in legal obligations of membership which are also morally
binding.
Let us now consider the specific claim that linkage represents a form
of cultural imperialism. To rebut this charge it is not necessary to demon-
strate that there exist specific universally applicable standards that bind all
societies regardless of whether they endorse them. It need only be shown
that a system of linkage can be designed to safeguard against the possibility
of cultural imperialism. This can be done in three ways.
First, the standards that the system promotes must be identified in a
manner that avoids the charge of cultural imperialism. The standards
must be specified abstractly enough that they permit appropriate context-
specific variation in their interpretation and application. Only standards
specified in this way are likely to be a subject of the broad consensus that is
required in order for a linkage system to enjoy wide acceptance. Standards
that emerge from a process that takes due account of opinions within
states as well as between states, and that seeks to reasonably accommodate
variation in the specification of the standards to the direction of opinion
that is present, will be more likely to be the subject of this type of broad
consensus. 148 Thus, requiring that the standards promoted through the
linkage system emerge from such a process is a means of avoiding the
charge of cultural imperialism.
Second, the linkage system must be applied in a manner that avoids the
charge of cultural imperialism. This may be partially assured by the
requirements that the linkage system be impartial and rule-based. There is,
of course, a danger that the rules for applying the standards (as distin-
guished by the standards themselves) will be improperly culturally spe-
cific. One way of guarding against this prospect is to require that
146. Rawls' concept of a "decent consultation hierarchy" is a concept of the latter
kind. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED 71
(1999). Whether it is sufficient for regimes to be of this kind or whether regimes must
have democratic characteristics in order to guarantee the (internal) moral legitimacy of
the linkage scheme which they join is a question which we do not directly address here.
147. We leave open the question of whether these necessary conditions for legitimacy
are also sufficient.
148. The tripartite model of decision-making in the ILO offers a suggestive instance
of such a process, which has led to notable consensus of this kind.
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participation by states in the system of linkage not be unduly coerced.
Such a safeguard against cultural imperialism may not suffice if states fail
to adequately represent the range of interests of the diverse groups within
them. For this reason it is important also to require that the linkage system
have two additional safeguards, relating respectively to the process by
which the scheme is instituted and the process by which it functions on an
ongoing basis.
First, to avoid the danger that states unfairly privilege the interests or
perspectives of some, the linkage scheme must not only derive from a pro-
cess of fair negotiation among states, but also derive from a process that
ensures that appropriate account is taken of viewpoints within states.
Requiring that states engage in adequate internal consultation as a condi-
tion of entering into and participating in the linkage system is one way of
ensuring this. Referenda or other means of direct democratic endorsement
are forms that such consultation can take. However, it has been histori-
cally rare for such stringent mechanisms of gaining popular consent to pre-
cede the entry of states into international treaties. Many such treaties are
widely held to be legitimate, including those that impinge on sensitive cul-
tural issues (for example, international treaties concerning human rights),
despite failing to receive explicit prior popular endorsement. The legiti-
macy of such treaties is often thought to rest on the fact that over time they
have won wide retrospective endorsement by individuals throughout the
world, despite their having failed to receive explicit prior popular endorse-
ment. When states fail to engage in direct internal consultations prior to
becoming signatories of an international treaty, their decisions may never-
theless reflect or come to reflect the opinions of a populace. This kind of
responsiveness is often all that is demanded in order for an international
treaty to be deemed (adequately) legitimate. Governments of countries
with democratic institutions are typically presumed to reflect popular con-
sent when they enter into international obligations. Insofar as they do not,
governments in democracies open themselves to possible sanction, and the
possibility that withdrawal from the obligations may occur under succes-
sor governments. For these reasons, although prior popular endorsement
of international agreements is desirable to avoid the charge of cultural
imperialism, it is not always deemed strictly necessary.
Second, the system of linkage must incorporate measures that ensure
that appropriate account is taken in an ongoing manner of viewpoints
within states. Since non-democratic regimes may neither engage in explicit
internal consultation nor be adequately responsive to the views of their
populations, it cannot be guaranteed that a non-democratic regime will
reflect the legitimate interests of its population. Further, regimes of all
kinds may fail to give adequate weight to the legitimate interests of minori-
ties. A safeguard against both of these possibilities is to create rule-based
mechanisms within the linkage system by which complaints about either
the content or the application of its standards can be heard. A system of
linkage that incorporates these safeguards will fairly take account of view-
points within states.
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Although it is true that there are diverse and conflicting perspectives
in the world concerning what is demanded by morality and justice, it does
not follow from this fact (of moral and cultural diversity) that agreement on
institutions that promote specified ends will be impossible. 14 9 Whether or
not we can succeed in coming to agreement on the standards to be pro-
moted and the means of promoting them is an empirical question.
It is important to note that cultural imperialism can flourish even in
the absence of linkage. Indeed, in choosing which labor standards to
uphold and to what extent, states often express the conceptions and inter-
ests of specific groups and deny those of other groups. In this context, a
linkage system may even prove to be an important means of combating cul-
tural imperialism. Further, though cultural imperialism is one evil to be
avoided, it is not the only evil. The evils attendant the neglect of basic
labor standards must be weighed against the concern that linkage will be
culturally imperialistic. To minimize the risk of cultural imperialism, a sys-
tem of linkage may permit the conception of the basic labor standards that
are to be promoted to reflect cultural specificities to an appropriate degree.
What of the allegation that linkage is a form of political imperialism?
There are two responses to this allegation. First, the kind of system of
linkage that we envision would not violate state sovereignty because it
could only be brought about through the agreement of states which have
not been unduly coerced. Once adopted, such a system would of course
place constraints on domestic institutions and policies, but this is true of
any other significant international agreements. Indeed, one of the features
of state sovereignty is that sovereign states are at liberty to join or withdraw
from agreements that selectively limit their freedoms.
It is fruitful here to distinguish between "proceduralist" and "substan-
tivist" understandings of the criteria to be used to determine when con-
tracts are freely entered. A "proceduralist" understanding holds that
contracts into which agents enter are freely entered as long as agents (in
this case countries) are procedurally free to choose not to enter the con-
tract. On this understanding, the outcomes arising from either choosing to
enter the contract or not choosing to do so are irrelevant to determining
whether or not the contract is freely entered into. A "substantivist" under-
standing asserts that whether a contract is freely entered into can depend
not only on the existence of procedural freedom but also on the outcomes
forseeably arising from choosing to enter the contract or not to do so,
which together with the choices themselves comprise the structure of the
choice system. 150 In particular, in the presence of specific kinds of
"adverse background conditions" which make the decision not to enter into
a contract extremely costly, we may have reason to conclude that a contract
was not freely entered into. On a proceduralist understanding, the exis-
tence of the procedural freedom of action of countries to join an interna-
149. See generally JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN GRAY, Two FACES OF
LIBERALISM (2000).
150. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 139.
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tional agreement or not to do so is sufficient to determine that these
contractual obligations, once entered into, morally bind them. On a sub-
stantivist understanding in contrast, information about the procedural
freedom of action which countries enjoy in regard to whether to join an
international agreement must be supplemented by information about the
structure of the choice situation in order to determine whether these con-
tractual obligations, once entered into, morally bind them. 15 1 An appropri-
ately designed system of linkage can give to countries an adequate degree
of freedom of choice (such that their entry into the system may be viewed
as not unduly coerced) under the substantivist as well as the proceduralist
understandings. We defer a fuller discussion of this idea to the section on
feasibility considerations below.
This response, however, will not address the concerns of those who
hold that international agreements (including the WTO) are objectionable
not because they infringe upon state sovereignty but because they infringe
upon popular sovereignty.' 5 2 The concern of those who hold such views
is that international treaties can limit the capability of a country's populace
to exercise its prerogatives to govern itself in an ongoing way. For example,
the WTO regime limits the freedom of governments to introduce certain
domestic policies subsequent to joining the organization, even if they have
widespread popular support. In response, it must be pointed out that, at
least in this respect, international agreements are not altogether dissimilar
from constitutions, which also limit the freedom of a populace to exercise
its collective will. Whether the limits thus set can be viewed as legitimate is
typically thought to depend on the content of the constitution as well as its
origins (e.g., in a fair prior process of collective choice). Similarly, the
acceptability of international treaty obligations in a democratic society
depends on the extent to which these obligations help to express and pro-
mote ends that are viewed as valuable, and the extent to which they derive
from a fair prior process of collective choice.
International agreements need not always limit the ongoing exercise of
popular sovereignty, even in the most immediate sense; some treaties may
strengthen the likelihood that hitherto excluded persons and groups will
have a role in decision-making. Linkage may have such an impact, insofar
as it enhances the associational freedoms of workers and strengthens their
capacity to engage in collective bargaining, and insofar as it lessens the
material constraints they face in doing so.
151. Not all legally binding contracts are morally binding. See David Singh Grewal
Network Power and Globalization, 17 ETHics & INT'L AFF. 89, 92-93; see also COHEN,
supra note 139. We will not address these important concerns at much greater length
here, as they seem not to be raised in present discussions of linkage. To the extent they
apply to the linkage proposal we make here they would certainly seem also to apply to
assessments of whether the entry of countries into the WTO and many other interna-
tional treaty bodies is unduly coerced.
152. See JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 18 (1998).
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E. Response to Objection Five: Linkage is infeasible
It is sometimes objected that a linkage scheme would be infeasible
because it would violate the existing rules of the international trading sys-
tem. In particular, it is claimed that the rules of the WTO system preclude
linkage. For example, it is suggested that a principle central to the WTO
(and previous to it the GATT) is the 'most favored nation principle' (which
requires that all exporting countries' goods be treated identically by an
importing country) and that this principle precludes linkage since linkage
potentially requires different treatment of exports from different coun-
tries. 15 3 To demonstrate that a proposal is infeasible, it must be shown
that the changes to existing rules envisioned by it would be exceedingly
difficult, or indeed impossible, to introduce or sustain. It is true that
widely accepted rules may be difficult to overturn. For example, it may be
necessary to convince many people of the merit of changing rules in order
to change them, and they may have already made plans that are predicated
on the existing rules. However, the objection that a proposal to change a
system of rules is infeasible simply because the change would legitimate
actions prohibited by the rules already in place is not in itself a sustainable
objection.
It is far from obvious, in any case, that linkage need violate the
existing rules of the international trading system. For example, exceptions
to the MFN principle already exist. For instance, developed countries have
long been permitted in the GATT and WTO to offer special and differential
treatment to exports from developing countries. Further, under the Genera-
lized System of Preferences, exports from some developing countries have
received favorable treatment relative to exports from others. While the
merits of these practices have been questioned, they have until recently
been accepted.
The existing legal framework of the world trading system (and in par-
ticular the WTO) is open to interpretation and may be more flexible than
commonly thought. For example, it can be plausibly argued that existing
WTO rules demand that countries offer each other a specified level of mar-
ket access without requiring that this market access be achieved through
any specific combination of measures (such as tariff "bindings" or ceil-
ings). Indeed, they can be interpreted as prohibiting countries from
attempting to increase the access of their producers to foreign markets and
to decrease the access of foreign producers to domestic markets by any
means, including the lowering of labor standards. 15 4 Finally, it can be
plausibly argued that GATT article XX permits a country to promote legiti-
mate objectives (such as environmental or social goals) by using the level of
market access it offers to other countries as an incentive to take actions
which promote these ends (as long as this use does not constitute "a dis-
153. Personal conversation with Kamal Malhotra.
154. For a discussion of the issues of legal interpretation involved, see, e.g., Kyle
Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of Market Access, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (2002).
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guised restriction on international trade" or "a means of arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable discrimination between countries").' 5 5 We will not deal further
with the objection that linkage is infeasible because it is not permitted by
the existing rules of the world trading system, which we conclude is uncon-
vincing. We now turn to the deeper objections that may be offered con-
cerning the infeasibility of linkage.
It is alleged by linkage opponents that linkage is infeasible in two
ways. First, an acceptable linkage system will be exceedingly difficult (or
indeed impossible) to introduce. Second, a linkage system will be exceed-
ingly difficult (or indeed impossible) to sustain.
For a system of linkage to be deemed feasible, it must be shown that
there exists a feasible transition path to it, and that if it is brought into
being, it would survive, i.e. that it is stable. In order to defend a proposal
against the charge that it is infeasible it is not necessary to demonstrate
that efforts to implement it will succeed. It is sufficient to show that the
likelihood that efforts to bring it about and maintain it will fail is less than
some relevant threshold, which we may refer to as P. We will attempt to
show that linkage is feasible in this sense. Any such demonstration will
require empirical conjectures about which there may be reasonable disa-
greement. There may also be reasonable disagreement about the threshold
of likelihood P that is relevant for determining feasibility in a given context.
We cannot and do not therefore offer a definitive argument in favor of the
feasibility of the kind of linkage scheme that we envision. Rather, we seek
to show that the arguments that critics of linkage have presented to show
that such schemes are infeasible are unconvincing. To do so, we will iden-
tify conditions under which linkage of an appropriate form could be imple-
mented that could plausibly arise or be brought about through the actions
of agents. That successfully implementing the proposal may require pro-
longed political agitation is not in itself an embarrassment. History is
replete with examples of institutional innovations which seemed at first
infeasible, either because their coming about appeared to require political
conditions that were deemed highly improbable or because it was thought
that they would, if brought about, be unsustainable. For example, the pros-
pect for the emergence and sustenance of public support for the poor of a
kind that is now widespread in advanced societies was once widely viewed
as being very small. 156
A central issue in determining the feasibility of the proposal concerns
the motives that can realistically be attributed to agents (individuals, firms
or states). It is clear that some proposals will be feasible if moral agents are
assumed to be significantly motivated by other-regarding moral principles
155. See generally Chang, supra note 116; Chang, supra note 114.
156. See generally THos ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULA-
TION (1798) and DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(1821) for a highly skeptical view of these prospects, based on the perspective that pub-
lic supports for the poor would generate perverse effects (of sufficient magnitude to
undermine the impact of the supports themselves) on population growth and work
effort.
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but infeasible if the same agents are assumed to be significantly motivated
by narrowly self-seeking concerns. There is considerable uncertainty
about what motives agents actually have. It seems clear that agents are
generally motivated neither purely by other-regarding concerns and com-
mitments to moral principles nor purely by narrowly self-seeking con-
cerns.1 57 We take this minimal and unspecific claim as our starting point.
We hope to show that on this reasonable understanding of agents' motiva-
tions, there is reason to believe that a normatively legitimate system of
linkage can be brought about and maintained.
It is interesting to note that agents, including states, often affirm that
moral ends inform their actions. Correspondingly, opponents of linkage
sometimes argue that states should oppose linkage precisely for the reason
that they do possess such concerns. 15 8 Although the motives that agents
hold at present are certainly relevant to our judgments about feasibility, the
possibility that agents' motives may change with the context (including
institutional arrangements) that they inhabit must also be considered
when seeking to determine what is feasible. 159
To show that an international institutional arrangement is feasible, it
is not necessary to prove that all countries would participate in the system,
or would always comply with its rules. No existing or past international
institutional arrangement of note satisfies this demand. On the other
hand, it is clear that a sufficient degree of participation and compliance is
necessary for us to deem that a 'system' exists. 160 We leave open the pre-
cise degree of participation and compliance required to deem that a system
of linkage exists, and aim merely to show that the normatively legitimate
scheme can be designed in such a way as to secure an adequately high
degree of participation and compliance.
For a system of linkage to be feasible it must secure the participation
and compliance of countries to an adequate degree. In particular, the sys-
tem must be incentive-compatible in the sense that an adequate number of
countries must find that their aims (however conceived) are more fully
advanced by participating in the system and complying with its require-
ments than not. This requires that the system be designed so as to achieve
its objectives by presenting an adequate number of countries with incen-
tives of this kind. This problem of mechanism design may or may not be
solvable.
We seek to identify whether a morally legitimate system of linkage is
feasible. This requirement poses no significant challenge under a
proceduralist conception of the conditions under which contracts are
freely entered. According to such a conception, the system is legitimate as
157. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); AMARTYA K. SEN, ON ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS (1988).
158. See, e.g., TWIN-SAL, supra note 18.
159. See, e.g., RAWLS (1971), supra note 7.
160. Indeed, it is the norm in international treaties to deem that they have come into
force when there have been a sufficient number of signatories or ratifications.
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long as countries are procedurally free to choose whether or not to join it,
which may be straightforwardly ensured through appropriate design of the
rules of entry. However, under the contrasting substantivist conception it
may be difficult to design a system of linkage that is both feasible and mor-
ally legitimate: establishing the set of incentives and disincentives neces-
sary to make the system incentive-compatible may make non-membership
so costly as to raise legitimate concerns as to whether membership in the
system was freely entered into. If the substantivist conception is held to,
the system of linkage should be designed so that countries (specifically
those facing adverse background conditions) are not presented with incen-
tives and disincentives of a kind and magnitude which gives rise to the
concern that their decisions to participate and comply can plausibly be
viewed as unduly coerced.
Consider, for example, two alternative designs for a system of linkage,
each of which is aimed at creating a structure of incentives that will
encourage participation (in the system and compliance with its rules). In
the first design, member countries of the linkage system present a poor
country ("Haitiopia") with the following choice: participate in the system
of linkage or face an economic sanction. In the second design, member
countries of the linkage system present Haitiopia with the following choice:
participate in the system of linkage and receive a benefit that it would not
otherwise receive. Given a sufficient magnitude of sanction or benefit,
both systems would meet the incentive- compatibility requirement that they
create strong incentives for countries to participate in the linkage system.
However, they may not both meet the requirement of moral legitimacy. In
both cases, Haitopia is procedurally free to choose whether or not to
become a member. Hence, the linkage system satisfies the proceduralist
test of legitimacy irrespective of the magnitude of the benefit or sanction.
On the other hand, from a substantivist point of view, sanctions (and even
offers) can be unduly coercive. If the sanction would result in highly
adverse conditions (such as widespread impoverishment and a breakdown
of public security), for example, then it appears that Haitopia may be
unduly coerced by the threat of such a sanction. Similarly, where adverse
background conditions severely limit the options available, it may not be
possible for Haitopians to consider seriously any action other than that
which elicits the benefit, and to offer such a benefit may be unduly coer-
cive. A substantivist perspective on choice and legitimacy requires that we
consider the details of the background circumstances of Haitopians and of
the choices they are offered before a judgment can be formed as to whether
they are unduly coerced to enter the system. In order for a system of
linkage to be deemed legitimate from a substantivist perspective, it may
have to be carefully designed. If it is not believed that all existing interna-
tional agreements are illegitimate, then it seems plausible that it is possible
to design a system of linkage that satisfies these requirements of
legitimacy.
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We will now sketch two possible approaches to creating and maintain-
ing a system of linkage. 16 1
The first approach we will consider involves the incorporation of
linkage into the "single undertaking" which members of a trade agreement
(e.g., the WTO) provide to one another. The second approach we will con-
sider involves treating linkage as a "special undertaking" which may be
entered into optionally by countries participating in the trade agreements.
For simplicity, we refer to the WTO rather than to trade agreements in
general in what follows.
It is important to note that some considerations regarding feasibility
apply in both of these cases. For example, in discussing whether linkage is
indeed "self-defeating or inconsequential" we have argued above that a pol-
icy "trade," in which developing countries offer to promote labor standards
in return for additional trade liberalization, aid, or other concessions by
developed countries, may be in the interest of both developed and develop-
ing countries. As a result, there is reason to reject the claim that linkage is
clearly infeasible. However, let us explore the problem of feasibility more
fully.
Let us first assess the approach of incorporating linkage into the "sin-
gle undertaking" provided by WTO members to one another. The single
undertaking refers to the idea that each WTO member has a single set of
obligations that must be abided by in toto rather than "a la carte." Con-
sider the stability properties of a system in which linkage is incorporated
into the single undertaking of WTO members. A system, once it exists, can
effectively collapse either due to the exit of participants from the system or
due to the widespread failure to act in accordance with the rules of the
system. A WTO system incorporating linkage as part of the single under-
taking is likely to be stable in each of these respects. This is because the
benefits to be gained by membership in the linkage system arise as part of
a complete package of benefits provided by WTO membership, which is
widely viewed as very attractive. Similarly, compliance with the rules of
the system is made more likely by the fact that non-compliance may result
in a wide range of consequences, including the possible loss of the range of
benefits that would otherwise be gained from WTO membership, and
which can only be gained through acceptance of the linkage system. Con-
sider now the feasibility of transition to such a system. Changes or exten-
sions to WTO rules have in the past been instigated by coalitions
consisting of a sufficiently large and influential number of countries, typi-
cally including some influential rich countries and some influential devel-
oping countries. Linkage could come about similarly. Why would
countries find linkage to be in their interest and thus join such a coalition?
Some developing countries would wish to join an initial coalition for a
number of reasons, of which we will mention four. First, as mentioned,
linkage could (insofar as it is in the interest of developed countries) pro-
vide a useful bargaining chip with which to gain benefits of diverse kinds,
161. We recognize that additional approaches may also exist.
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including further liberalization of trade, investment, and resource trans-
fers. 162 Second, it could help to protect workers in developing countries by
diminishing the propensity of all countries to engage in a damaging "regu-
latory chill" or "race to the bottom" in labor standards. 163 Third, it could
help to promote-the interests of some influential groups in developing
countries. Workers stand to benefit from the promotion of labor stan-
dards. Capitalists may also benefit, although this is less obvious. 16 4
Fourth, there may be a moral motive for joining. Such considerations may
be of different importance in different developing countries, depending on
individual circumstances (including transitory political factors). We have
not tried to show that these factors would operate decisively in favor of
linkage in any one developing country, but rather to argue that they would
create reason for a sufficient number of developing countries to view
linkage favorably.
There are also reasons why developed countries might wish to join an
initial coalition, of which we will mention four. The first reason is that
workers in developed countries may have an interest in linkage insofar as it
marginally diminishes the competition they face from developing countries
which have lower labor costs. Lower labor costs in developing countries
may influence employment and wages in developed countries either
directly through the reallocation of production (as anticipated in the stan-
dard Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek international trade theory) or through indi-
rect "threat effects." More importantly, linkage may diminish the
propensity of all countries (developed and developing) to engage in a dam-
aging "regulatory chill" or "race to the bottom" in labor standards. It is
important to note that from the standpoint of the feasibility concern, it is
sufficient that workers perceive that there is such downward pressure on
labor standards; it is not necessary that it actually exist. However, as noted
above, Bagwell and Staiger have presented a powerful economic argument
as to why such downward pressure is indeed likely to occur in the present
WTO system, and as to why minimal labor standards can be achieved in
162. This suggests that proponents of trade liberalization who are critical of its cur-
rent pace should favor linkage. In the present political climate, it is far from obvious
that adopting linkage will bring about a lesser degree of trade liberalization than would
otherwise take place. See, e.g., Polaski (2004), supra note 87.
163. There is considerable evidence of such competitive pressures among developing
countries, most recently as a result of the end of the Multi Fiber Arrangement. Unsur-
prisingly in this context, there is, contrary to popular impression, considerable evidence
of support for linkage by developing country labor unions. See, e.g., Griffin et al., supra
note 74. There is archival evidence that strong support for the labor standards provi-
sions in the proposed post-war ITO was provided at the post-war Havana Conference by
representatives of developing countries (in particular, Cuba and India). The authors
were alerted to this evidence through conversations with Mark Levinson.
164. The literature on efficiency wages suggests that there may be productivity gains
to be achieved as a result of higher wages, although whether this will result from general,
as opposed to firm-specific or industry-specific, wage increases depends on the specific
mechanism by which it is assumed that wages enhance productivity. Collective action
problems among employers can lead to the failure to realize these gains in the absence of
determined coordination (as emphasized, for instance, in the literature on the nutrition-
productivity relationship).
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this system only by extending its scope to in some way incorporate labor
standards. The second reason is that capitalists in developed countries
may have an interest in linkage. This may be for a variety of reasons. For
instance, as a group they may stand to benefit from improved labor stan-
dards in developing countries for much the same reason that capitalists in
developing countries may do so. The promotion of basic labor standards
may improve the quality and reliability of the developing country labor
force that is available to developed country capitalists to make use of
directly through investment and indirectly through trade. 165 Further,
some capitalists in developed countries (in particular, those who operate
domestic labor-intensive, import-competing industries) may marginally
benefit from measures that reduce the cost advantages of producers
abroad. Yet another reason why some capitalists in developed countries
may have an interest in linkage is that it would enable them to avoid the
public scrutiny and prejudice that often accompanies the perception that
they disregard basic labor standards. In particular, those firms that
already take steps to protect themselves from this charge may have little to
lose and much to gain from a system of linkage, as it may make it less
necessary than at present for them to undertake costly private efforts to
police the practices of their subsidiaries and suppliers, and diminish the
competition that they face from firms that do not promote labor standards.
Of course, some individual firms that produce or source goods in develop-
ing countries and that rely on a reputation (contrasting with that pos-
sessed by other firms) for promoting labor standards as a central means of
generating demand for their products, may conceivably prefer to maintain
the status quo. 166 The third reason is that countries that become initial
members of a pro-linkage coalition may gain a reputational advantage,
which may increase the demand for products produced by firms owned or
managed in the country, or otherwise benefit them. 16 7 A fourth reason is
that they may be motivated to support linkage for specifically moral
reasons.
Would this "single undertaking" approach to implementing linkage be
morally legitimate? In particular, would it avoid being unduly coercive?
There are two kinds of concerns which may be raised about the legitimacy
of introducing linkage in this way. A first concern may be raised by those
who believe that the WTO is already unduly coercive and therefore morally
illegitimate. It may be argued that a modified system involving linkage,
incorporating it into the single undertaking, will also be unduly coercive, a
fortiori. A second concern may be raised by those who believe that the
WTO is at present a morally legitimate system, but who may think that
165. The possible collective action problem among employers may otherwise prevent
productivity-enhancing investments in the labor force.
166. Of course, on the other side, there is the risk to firms that linkage will reduce the
ability of firms to threaten workers in developed countries with relocation as a means of
gaining concessions. Such relocation threats may be a determinant of profits in indus-
tries in which rent-sharing takes place.
167. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Low Cost and Sweatshop-Free, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2005, at Cl.
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linkage will deprive it of its legitimacy because undue coercion will be
required to implement and sustain it once linkage is incorporated into the
single undertaking.
Amongst those who share the first concern (that the existing WTO is
already unduly coercive) there are those who believe that a modified WTO
system (perhaps significantly different from that which exists at present)
incorporating the single undertaking is feasible and would be morally legit-
imate, and those who believe that all feasible WTO systems incorporating
the single undertaking would be morally illegitimate. It can be argued in
response to the first group that a revised WTO system that met the require-
ments of legitimacy would likely remain legitimate if it were to incorporate
linkage. It is not clear why the incorporation of an appropriate form of
linkage would disturb the legitimacy of such a system. Those who believe
this to be likely must explain why. Indeed, the incorporation of linkage
may be among the revisions to the WTO system, which are required in
order for it to become legitimate. The second group cannot, by definition,
be convinced that even a radically revised WTO system incorporating a
single undertaking could be morally legitimate. However, we will present
reasons below why these critics may have reason to accept the legitimacy
and feasibility of a linkage system based on a separate undertaking.
Those who possess the second concern (i.e., who believe that the
WTO is at present a morally legitimate system but who fear that linkage
will deprive it of its legitimacy because it will require undue coercion to
implement and sustain) should be reassured by the set of principles that
we have identified above, which would protect a system of linkage against
the charge of moral illegitimacy. Unless these critics can present reasons
why these principles are insufficient to guarantee the legitimacy of a
linkage system, their concerns appear unfounded. Based on these consid-
erations, we reject the view that a morally legitimate system of linkage
based on a single undertaking is evidently infeasible to bring about and
sustain.
Let us now consider the second approach, in which linkage is adopted
as a "separate undertaking" entered into optionally by some countries as a
set of commitments that is additional to other trade-related commitments
they may already have. We address the transition to the linkage system
first. Why would a country participate in such a system of linkage? A
developing country might wish to participate for at least six reasons, each
of which has been discussed in detail above. First, the linkage system
offers participants the possibility of gaining a quid-pro-quo in the form of
market access, investment or resources. Second, a participant may benefit
from the reputation effects associated with participating in the system.
Consumers may wish to purchase preferentially goods produced in mem-
ber countries, and socially responsible investors may wish to locate there.
Firms concerned about consumer disapproval of labor standards viola-
tions will find it advantageous to locate in such countries. Third, it is in
the interest of workers in a country for it to participate in the system. The
reputation effects mentioned above only strengthen our earlier reasoning.
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Fourth, it may be in the interest of capitalists in the country for it to partici-
pate in the system. Again, reputation effects strengthen the reasoning
presented above in relation to the single undertaking. Fifth, participating
in the system is a way of solidifying ties with the other countries that are
members, which may serve expressive ends or have instrumental benefits.
Sixth, there may be specifically moral motivations for participating in the
system.
A developed country might wish to participate for at least five reasons,
each of which has again been discussed in detail above, in relation to the
single undertaking. First, it may benefit from the reputation effects associ-
ated with joining the system. A developed country that participates in the
system gains the benefit of "appearing to be a moral leader and a friend of
workers' interests." Second, it is in the interest of workers in the country
for it to participate in the system, for the reasons outlined above, including
diminishing the propensity of all countries to engage in a damaging "regu-
latory chill" or "race to the bottom" in labor standards. Third, it may be in
the interest of capitalists in the country for it to participate in the system,
for the reasons outlined above. Fourth, participation in the system is a way
of solidifying ties with the other countries that are members, which may
serve expressive ends or have instrumental benefits. Fifth, there may be
specifically moral motivations for participating in the system.
Let us now consider the stability properties of a system of linkage
involving a separate undertaking. A system, once it exists, can effectively
collapse either due to exit from the system or due to the widespread failure
to act in accordance with its rules. There is reason to believe that at least
some countries would have incentives to join the system. These reasons
would also provide incentives to stay in the system. The reputation effects
of joining, for example, may be more than undone by withdrawing from the
system. There is no reason for us to think that the reasons why countries
joined the system would disappear over time, even if the system sometimes
results in individual rulings that are not in their interest.
Compliance with the rules of the system of linkage can be promoted
by designing the system of linkage in a manner that gives countries com-
pelling incentives. The role of the rule-based mechanism in governing the
system, and in defining the consequences of non-compliance will play an
important role here. Since large sanctions for non-compliance may trigger
withdrawal from a linkage system based on a separate undertaking, posi-
tive incentives, public pressure and moral suasion will likely need to play a
significant role. Ultimately, compliance results from the fact that the coun-
tries that participate are self-selecting. In joining the system they have
affirmed their willingness to comply with its requirements.
Finally, let us consider the moral legitimacy of the separate undertak-
ing approach. As before, we may consider the legitimacy of the system
from proceduralist and substantivist perspectives. The procedural legiti-
macy of this approach is as strong as in the single undertaking model,
since countries are free not to participate. From a substantivist perspec-
tive, the legitimacy of this approach is if anything stronger than in the case
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of the single undertaking approach since the costs of non-participation are
lower. Based on these considerations, we reject the view that a morally
legitimate system of linkage based on a separate undertaking is evidently
infeasible to bring about and sustain.
We have argued that there exist two plausible approaches to creating
and maintaining a system of linkage that are morally legitimate. Critics of
linkage may contend that although our arguments are sufficient to show
that efforts to achieve linkage may not necessarily fail, they are not suffi-
cient to show that they will fail with likelihood less than the threshold
required, P, and that this turns the argument in their favor. Those who
argue in this way must show two things: they must justify their chosen
threshold P, and they must argue convincingly that we have not shown
above that the likelihood of failing to achieve linkage is less than this level.
There are thus two types of disagreements that can arise with respect
to feasibility: disagreements about whether the threshold is met and dis-
agreements about what the threshold should be. Disagreements about
whether the threshold is met are empirical in nature, for example relating
to divergent estimates of the power of different agents to change the world
through specified actions. Disagreements about what the threshold should
be are ultimately normative in nature (though they are influenced by
empirical facts). This is because the charge that a proposal is infeasible (in
the sense that efforts to achieve it are likely to fail with likelihood P) is
intended to dissuade efforts to bring it about. The mere fact that efforts to
achieve a desirable outcome are likely to fail is not reason enough to neg-
lect those efforts, unless there is a cost (including an opportunity cost) to
doing so for which we ought to account. Whether such costs are sufficient
that they ought to dissuade us from striving to achieve the desirable out-
come will depend on their nature and magnitude, and the normative signif-
icance that we attach to them. The appropriate threshold P, which
determines linkage's feasibility, cannot be specified without reference to
broader judgments, concerning for instance the value to be attached to
attaining the ends of the scheme and the disvalue to be attached to failing
to attain these ends, the availability of alternative means of achieving the
same ends and the likelihood that these alternative means will fail or suc-
ceed. It is necessary to take note of the actions that are available, the out-
comes which these actions could result in, the likelihoods associated with
each of the outcomes, and the value to be attached to distinct potential
outcomes in order to make well-founded decisions. Thus, the identifica-
tion of the threshold of likelihood according to which infeasibility is to be
judged demands addressing a problem of decision making under uncer-
tainty, requiring attention to a range of relevant normative and empirical
considerations.
F. Outcome of the Constructive Procedure
We have identified features of a linkage system which, appropriately
understood, are sufficient for it to withstand the standard objections to
linkage. We saw earlier that in order for proposition L to be satisfied, the
Vol. 39
2006 International Trade and Labor Standards
system of linkage to which it refers must at the least be unimposed, be trans-
parent and rule-based, and involve adequate burden sharing. The construc-
tive procedure has once again highlighted these requirements and has led
to the identification of two additional requirements, which are that a
linkage system must incorporate measures that ensure that adequate
account is taken of viewpoints within states, and be applied in a context-
sensitive manner. Therefore, for Proposition L to hold, it is sufficient that
the linkage system to which it refers satisfy the following requirements, as
defined above: it should be unimposed, transparent and rule-based, involve
adequate burden sharing, incorporate measures that ensure that appropriate
account is taken of viewpoints within states, and be applied in a context-sensi-
tive manner. We have noted that a fair and effective system of linkage will
likely demand action to promote labor standards not only from countries
that are the sites of production, but also by countries in which firms
involved in the process of producing or marketing goods are located,
owned or managed. We have argued that there is reason to believe that
systems of this kind can be brought about and maintained. Therefore Pro-
position L is satisfied.
VII. Step Five: A Sketch of a Linkage System
We have identified above a class of linkage systems that withstands the
standard objections that are made to such systems. In order to provide a
more concrete starting point for discussion, we offer below a detailed
description of a member of this class.
Any system of linkage will require administration. Who should be
responsible for this administration? In order to answer this question we
should take note of some relevant facts. First, there are existing institu-
tions (in particular the WTO) that govern rights to trade. If a system of
linkage is put in place, these institutions will either have to cede some of
their responsibilities or incorporate the principles of linkage into their
activities. Suppose that the members of a linkage system also belong to a
trade agreement which guarantees them a right to trade with one another.
Since the linkage system makes their right to trade with one another condi-
tional upon promotion of labor standards, but the trade agreement does
not, the rights guaranteed by the two systems conflict. Second, there are
existing institutions (in particular the ILO) that have authority to define,
monitor, and promote labor standards.
One way to maintain the mandates and relevance of existing institu-
tions (such as the ILO and the WTO) while introducing linkage is to make
them jointly responsible for its administration. We emphasize that by
doing this we do not thereby assume either the legitimacy or the desirabil-
ity of the current form of these institutions. It is possible that both institu-
tions should be substantially reformed in order to play a legitimate role in
the system of linkage sketched below. 16 8 One means of deferring to the
168. It is hardly difficult to find flaws in these institutions.
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expertise of the ILO in matters of labor standards and the WTO in matters
of trade is to propose an Agency for Trade and Labor Standards (ATLAS)
jointly governed by the WTO and ILO, to administer linkage. We sketch
the elements of such a proposal below. Many features of the proposed sys-
tem are already part of the ILO's approach to labor standards promotion
even in the absence of linkage. 169
A. Activities of the Agency
The Agency will undertake two different types of activity. The first is
developmental, while the second is adjudicative. In its developmental role,
the agency will help countries to identify and execute measures that pro-
mote adherence to labor standards. In its adjudicative role, the agency will
determine whether serious neglect of labor standards has occurred, and if
so what steps ought to be taken by the country to remedy this neglect.
Neither of these activities will alone suffice to address a complex global
problem such as inadequate promotion of labor standards. Neglect of
adjudicative activities may both undermine the rule-based nature of the
regime and lead to inadequate incentives for countries to conform to their
obligations under the system, whereas neglect of developmental activities
may lead to an inadequate focus on constructive measures that can help to
promote labor standards.
B. Instruments of the Agency
1. The Secretariat:
The primary function of the secretariat is to provide administrative
support.
Every country will be invited periodically (for example, every two
years) to submit a "labor standards progress report" to the secretariat out-
lining the extent to which it is meeting its obligations under the system to
promote labor standards at home and abroad. These obligations include
those to share the burdens generated by efforts to promote labor standards
abroad and promoting good practices by firms registered or managed in
the country or owned by its citizens. The report will identify priorities for
action. The requirement to submit such a report is one that will bind all
member countries, whether rich or poor. A country's repeated failures
minimally to meet its agreed obligations to share burdens and to foster
sound practices on the part of its firms may expose it to censure or with-
drawal of preferences, just as a country's repeated failure minimally to
ensure that basic labor standards are adequately promoted on its territory
may similarly expose it.
The secretariat will make publicly available the labor standards pro-
gress report submitted by each country and related documents resulting
from the scrutiny of this progress report by a peer-and-partner-review com-
169. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 8 (providing for periodic
self-reporting by countries, reviews of those reports by experts, and the provision of
technical assistance in response to needs identified in these reports).
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mittee (introduced below). The secretariat will provide aid and technical
assistance to countries to formulate and implement their action plans,
whenever requested. It will maintain and develop required expertise inter-
nally and maintain strong links with organizations and individuals who
possess relevant expertise.
The secretariat will manage a multilateral burden-sharing fund, col-
lecting contributions from countries and disbursing them to countries to
support their action plans. These funds will be disbursed according to
various criteria, and will be triggered by the recommendation of a peer-
and-review committee (introduced below), the recommendation of the
linkage system's adjudicative body (introduced below), or the request of
countries themselves.
The secretariat will actively provide information to the worldwide pub-
lic concerning member countries' current obligations under the system of
linkage and the procedures for expressing concern or initiating an
investigation.
The staff of the secretariat will be selected on the basis of open compe-
tition according to merit-based criteria. The performance of the secretariat
will periodically be reviewed by a governing council consisting of repre-
sentatives of the ILO, the WTO and member countries and by a visiting
committee of experts. The reports of the governing council and the visiting
committee will be publicly distributed. The governing council will have
final authority over the organization and operation of the secretariat. Its
individual members will be elected for single terms without possibility of
re-election.
2. Peer and Partner Review Committees:
The governing council of the Agency will periodically constitute a
"peer-and-partner review" committee (PPRC) to assess each country's pro-
gress, according to transparent criteria established by the linkage agree-
ment. The PPRC's membership will be chosen to be broadly
representative, and include members from geographically diverse devel-
oped and developing countries. Its members will include representatives
of states and non-state organizations, including workers' organizations.
The PPRC will assess each country's labor standards progress report. It
may supplement public sources and submissions with its own research
concerning practices of a country's firms and conditions prevailing in the
country. The PPRC may conduct site visits and public consultations in any
member country, or otherwise gather evidence. For example, a PPRC may
examine conditions at production sites in countries other than the country
being reviewed if firms owned or registered in the country being reviewed
operate there.
The secretariat will provide advice and technical assistance to the
PPRC as requested. The PPRC will recommend actions that the country
can take to enhance its compliance with the requirements of the system.
The country will then be invited to respond to these recommendations
through the provision of an action plan for promoting agreed labor stan-
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dards, including explicit goals, time-bound schedules, and verifiable
targets. The PPRC will respond formally to the country's action plan. It
may make public recommendations as to how a country should modify its
action plan. It may recommend the disbursement of funds from the multi-
lateral burden-sharing fund to support the action plan as a whole or spe-
cific components of it. If a country is deemed to be in serious breach of its
obligations under the system then the PPRC may thus inform the advo-
cate's office, for its possible action.
3. The Advocate's Office:
The advocate's office will investigate potentially egregious violations of
agreed labor standards and determine whether or not formally to initiate a
complaint in the adjudicative body. It may do so on its own initiative or as
the result of a notice brought to it by a PPRC, a country or a member of the
public. In addition to filing complaints itself, it will provide information
and assistance to potential complainants who wish to submit grievances to
the adjudicative tribunal.
4. The Adjudicative Tribunal:
The adjudicative tribunal will decide on the merits of concerns
brought to its attention and identify actions that are feasible and desirable
for countries to undertake. Any person, organization, or country may sub-
mit a complaint to the adjudicative body. The tribunal will decide which
concerns to consider (on the basis of established criteria). The tribunal
may commission studies and research that it finds pertinent to the investi-
gation of concerns registered with it. Upon completing their study of an
issue, the tribunal has one of a number of options. It may determine that a
concern has no merit and prescribe no actions. Alternatively, it may rule
that the concern is substantiated and call for one of a number of actions.
These may include: recommending that technical and financial assistance
be disbursed to a country from the burden-sharing fund to help it promote
agreed labor standards; requiring that a country formulate an action plan
to promote agreed standards and report back in due course on the actions
that it has taken; and, as a last resort, recommending that other countries
(perhaps all of them) withdraw trade preferences or other supports
accorded to a country in a commensurate manner and to an appropriate
degree. The members of the tribunal will be elected by an appropriate
super-majority of the governing council on the basis of their qualifications,
including technical expertise and contribution to geographical and social
diversity.
5. Participation in the System of Linkage
WTO rules must be made consistent with the rules of the system of
linkage. It does not follow from this, however, that all WTO members
must be bound by the rules of the linkage system. Indeed, at an early stage
in the introduction of a system of linkage it seems more likely that it would
form part of a "separate undertaking" (i.e., a system which WTO members
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join by choice) rather than a part of the "single undertaking" of WTO
membership (that binds all WTO members). At least some countries are
likely to find benefits in joining a linkage system. Moreover, the voluntary
character of such a system would defuse fears that it constitutes 'an attempt
to impose the agenda of developed countries.' Over time as confidence in
the system of linkage increases, it is possible that it will develop into a
system that all countries enter.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that there exists a class of proposals for linkage
that would withstand the standard objections that are advanced against
such proposals. Indeed, we have argued that there are systems of linkage
that would help to promote a goal of both linkage opponents and advocates
(improved living standards of workers in poorer countries and the well-
being of the globally less advantaged) to a larger extent than would any
proposals for the governance of international trade that do not include
linkage, without notably detracting from other goals that they have.
Proposals for linkage have been criticized on the ground that they
allegedly reflect the priorities of developed countries, and are likely to
harm the interests of those they are meant to help. However, it has been
shown above that this conclusion rests on a narrow interpretation of the
form that linkage must take. An appropriately designed system of linkage
may in fact become a powerful aid to the interests of poorer countries by
decreasing the costs that they face at present when pursuing policies to
enhance labor standards. Further, such a system may powerfully aid the
interests of less advantaged persons in poorer countries by creating incen-
tives for governments to implement policies that benefit them. A linkage
system can extend the range of considerations to which transparent rules
are applied in the governance of international trade, and embody a com-
pact between countries through which they advance shared moral aims and
equitably distribute the burdens that arise in pursuing these aims. 170
The debate on linkage has been overly narrow due to a lack of institu-
tional imagination. The assumptions of its participants regarding the form
that linkage must take have led to a widespread conclusion that it is evi-
dent that linkage in undesirable. We have challenged this assumption. We
have not argued that bringing about linkage should be the most important
priority for action. We have simply claimed that the possible benefits of a
linkage system of the type we have described are sufficient to warrant fur-
170. The present Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, has noted that there is at
present an "imbalance of our international legal order" and has argued that it is there-
fore desirable to develop an understanding of WTO law as complementing and support-
ing other international legal orders which focus on non-trade concerns, as well as to
strengthen these other legal orders. See Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, The
Place and Role of the WTO (WTO Law) in the International Legal Order, Address before
the European Society of International Law (May 19, 2006) available at http://www.wto.
org/english/newse/spple/sppl26_e.htm. Our proposal appears not to be at odds with
an emerging interpretation of WTO jurisprudence.
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ther intellectual and practical exploration. Whether linkage should be a
priority for action cannot be determined in advance of such exploration.
This is true not only of proposals for linkage but of all policies and institu-
tional changes that may be proposed and which have yet to be brought
about. There are of course other competing priorities for action, the choice
among which ought to depend upon the probable long-term effects of pur-
suing them. The proposal for linkage advanced above is only one of many
possible means of increasing the extent to which global economic institu-
tions and rules better serve the interests of globally less advantaged work-
ers specifically and of globally less advantaged persons generally.
Should linkage of the kind we have described turn out to be infeasible
because certain influential agents remain implacably opposed to it (per-
haps for no other reason than that it would somewhat erode the privileges
they enjoy at present), this would show not that linkage is undesirable but
that reforms that would make international institutions more just are being
resisted by those who do not prioritize the goal of justice. At the least, this
finding would help us better to ascribe moral responsibilities for the inade-
quacies of the world in which we live. Whether linkage is infeasible for this
or any other reason can only be determined in the crucible of experience.
At the heart of the reasoning we have adopted is the idea that worthy
institutional reforms must bring about desirable consequences, involve
legitimate processes, and be possible to implement and sustain. Through
reasoning we have tried to free the imagination. This is but a beginning.
Practical knowledge and worldly experiment can make the imagined real.
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APPENDIX: Empirical Evidence on the Likely Effects of Improvements in
Labor Standards
We have shown above that the arguments from economic theory that
are most often adduced against linkage not only fail to demonstrate that
linkage is undesirable, but suggest instead that the opposite may be true.
In this appendix, we consider the empirical evidence concerning the likely
effects of improvements in labor standards in developing countries.
It is widely feared that enhanced labor standards will diminish the
comparative advantage possessed by countries with relatively low labor
costs, and thus impede their ability to export relatively labor-intensive
goods to developed countries. It is argued that the incentive to invest in
such countries in order to export to developed countries will thereby also
be diminished. This will in turn, it is suggested, damage the development
of currently poorer countries.
Does current evidence offer support for these fears? At least two types
of evidence are relevant to examining this question.
Estimating the Impact of Labor Increases: Accounting Exercises
The first type of evidence concerns the share of total (direct and indi-
rect) labor costs embodied in the unit production costs of goods which are
exported from developing countries to developed countries. If this share
(which we will refer to henceforth as the "share of labor costs in unit
costs") is low, then the argument that increases in labor costs will signifi-
cantly erode the relative advantages which poor countries possess in pro-
ducing labor intensive products may be implausible. 171 For example, if the
share of labor costs in unit costs is twenty percent, then a doubling of labor
costs would in turn result in a twenty percent increase in production costs.
If the initial cost advantage associated with producing the good in poor
countries is large enough then this increase would not be sufficient to elim-
inate the cost advantage of poor countries in the production of the good.
Existing evidence suggests that the cost advantages associated with pro-
ducing goods that employ labor intensively in their production in develop-
ing countries rather than developed countries are indeed significant. 172
171. We use the phrase "labor intensive products" to denote goods that could be the
subject of export-oriented production in labor abundant countries because their produc-
tion in all countries involves the relatively intensive use of labor as compared to other
factors of production. There are of course technical problems which are involved in
presenting this definition, which following the custom we sidestep.
172. The question may quite reasonably be raised as to why a good is produced at all
in developed countries if there are large cost disadvantages associated with production
of the good in developed countries. One answer may be that the figures compared refer
to variable costs. Developed country production of labor-intensive goods, which would
otherwise be uneconomical, may occur due to the existence of prior investments in plant
and fixed capital. Developed country production may also take place due to other
advantages it may have, for instance proximity to markets (making it possible, for
instance, to meet "just-in-time" production demands). See FREDERICK H. ABERNATHY ET
AL., A STITCH IN TIME: LEAN RETAILING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MANUFACTURING 269
(1999). Finally, there may be less developed country production of the same goods as
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What is the evidence on the share of labor costs in unit costs? Evi-
dence from individual industries and countries suggests that the share of
direct labor costs in unit costs is relatively low. Of course, these figures
may significantly understate the share of labor costs in unit costs, as they
do not account for the labor costs indirectly embodied in the cost of other
inputs to the production process.
Table 1: Some evidence on the share of direct labor costs in unit costs
"Most knowledgeable experts agree that in-country production costs in these
[developing] countries rarely exceed 10 percent of the end-user prices of these products
in MNC major markets, which are usually in industrially advanced countries. It is
estimated that direct labor costs range from 2 to 5 percent of the ex-factory cost of the
product."
1 7 3
"A well-known brand of sneakers may retail for $75 in the United States and contain
less than $2 in direct labor costs in Vietnam, China or other overseas locations." 1 7 4
"A typical branded men's polo shirt retails for between $30 and $50 in the United
States, whereas the direct labor cost of manufacturing this shirt in a developing country
is less than $1."1 7 5
"Tang Yang Indonesia ... gets around $13 for every pair of shoes it makes for Reebok,
paying only $1 for labor . . . The shoes typically sell for $60 to $70 a pair.' '1 7 6
The average share of direct labor costs in the retail price of toys produced in southern
mainland China is very low (mean across types of toys: 2.50 percent and the standard
deviation across types of toys: 1.34 percent). 1 7 7
The share of labor costs of non-supervisory workers in unit costs of men's casual shirts
produced in Mexico is 11.2 percent.
1 7 8
The share of wages in total production costs for a television manufacturer in Tijuana,
Mexico is 10 percent.'
7 9
In order to advance beyond the existing (largely anecdotal) evidence,
we have undertaken a calculation of our own, based on the UNIDO indus-
trial statistics database.' 8 ° From this database, we have calculated for the
year 2000 the share of direct labor costs (wages and salaries) in total input
are produced in developing countries than is at first suggested by the generally available
data, which covers highly aggregative categories of goods. Specific goods even within
labor intensive production (especially those which require higher skills and specialized
knowledge to produce) may still be most economical to produce in developed countries,
whereas other goods may be wholly uneconomical to produce in developed countries at
prevailing wage rates. Although the mass production of T-shirts is quite likely to take
place in a developing country, the production of an expensive dress shirt in a small
batch that follows the pattern of a fashion designer in a metropolitan capital is far less
likely to be undertaken in a developing country.
173. SETHI, supra note 118, at 58.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 59.
177. See HONG KONG CHRISTIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 119, table 2.
178. See Pollin et al., supra note 93, table 5.
179. See Ian Carson, The Tijuana Triangle: Mexico's Northern Border Is Modern
Manufacturing on the Move, THE EcONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at S3.
180. U.N. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS DATABASE AT
THE 3-DIGIT LEVEL OF ISIC (INDSTAT3 Rev. 2) (2004) [hereinafter UNIDO].
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costs and in the total (ex-factory) value of output for enterprises producing
manufactured goods of any kind in all the countries for which sufficient
data existed (about forty in total, with some variance in this number across
industries). Direct labor costs as a share of total input cost were calculated
by dividing the reported "wages and salaries of employees" by total input
costs (conceived based on the definitions in the UNIDO database as the
value of output minus value added plus wages and salaries). Direct labor
costs as a share of the total ex-factory value of output were calculated by
dividing the reported "wages and salaries of employees" by the value of
output. The results of this calculation for distinct income-based country
classes and the highly aggregative "total manufactures" category of goods
are reported in Table 2 below. Results for all specific industries at the 3-
digit level are available online. 1 8 ' The labor costs included refer to all
wages and salaries, including those of managerial workers.
As may be seen from Table 2, the average share of direct labor costs in
the total input costs for "total manufactures" is 9.9 percent for the low
income countries and 12 percent for the lower middle income countries.
As may also be seen from the table, the average share of direct labor costs
in the total ex-factory value of output for "total manufactures" is 7 percent
for the low income countries and 8.5 percent for the lower middle income
countries in the sample. These results do not account for the difference
(arising from marketing, transportation and markups) between the ex-fac-
tory value of output and its retail value, and therefore substantially over-
state (perhaps by a factor of ten, as suggested by Table 1) the share of direct
labor costs in final retail costs. On the other hand, the data is based on all
manufacturing enterprises (not just those producing goods for export). If
manufactured goods produced for export are more labor intensive than
those produced at home for home consumption, then the figures reported
below will understate the share of labor costs in total costs and in the value
of output of exported manufactures. It is necessary to study exported
items specifically before coming to firmer conclusions. Unfortunately,
there is no data source that makes this straightforward to do.
181. See Summary of Data on the Share of Direct Labor Costs in the Total Costs of
Surveyed Manufacturing Enterprises (by industry and income level of country), available
at http://www.alternatefutures.org.
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Table 2: Wages and Salaries as a Share of Input Costs and the Value of
Output 1 32
"TOTAL MANUFACTURES"
WAGES AND SALARIES IN 2000 AS:
SHARE OF TOTAL
SHARE OF TOTAL EX-FACTORY VALUE
INPUT COST OF OUTPUT
AVERAGE (HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES) 0.165 0.135
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.046 0.045
AVERAGE (UPPER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES) 0.12 0.093
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.04 0.031
AVERAGE (LOWER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES) 0.12 0.085
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.029 0.02
AVERAGE (LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME 0.116 0.086
COUNTRIES)
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.034 0.025
AVERAGE (LOW INCOME COUNTRIES) 0.099 0.07
STANDARD DEVIATION 0.03 0.012
It would be right to object that these figures may be relatively unin-
formative for the present purpose, as a general improvement in labor stan-
dards would raise the indirect as well as the direct labor costs of
production, and thereby have a much larger impact than these figures sug-
gest on final costs of production in developing countries. Unfortunately,
we have not been able to identify any studies that calculate these indirect
costs for industries of interest in developing countries. Such a study would
have to identify the labor costs incurred at each stage of a (possibly quite
complex) domestic and international production chain culminating in the
production of a final good for export.
We have attempted to address this concern through an analysis based
on the empirical data reported above and some simplifying assumptions.
Using a simple arithmetical model we can calculate the total (direct and
indirect) labor costs that would arise under various assumptions. 18 3 We
allow the number of stages of the process leading to the production of a
good in the "South" to vary between two and five. We also allow the share
of direct labor costs in the total costs specific to each stage either to be a
constant or to vary in an increasing or decreasing arithmetic progres-
sion. 18 4 We constrain the share of direct labor costs in total costs at the
182. Sources: UNIDO, supra note 180; see World Bank Country Classification,
available at http://worldbank.org/data/countryclass.html.
183. An Excel spreadsheet containing the arithmetical model is available at http://
www.alternatefutures.org.
184. Which assumptions are appropriate is far from obvious. There is some reason to
believe that in developing countries, the stages of production antecedent to the final one
may be more labor-intensive, but also that they may employ workers at lower wages. The
net impact on the share of labor costs in total costs is ambiguous.
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final stage to correspond to that observed in the UNIDO data. On the
basis of these assumptions, it is straightforward to calculate the share of
total (direct and indirect) labor costs in the unit costs of manufactured
goods in the South (0). Total labor costs are much higher than direct labor
costs alone and increase with the number of stages of the production pro-
cess that are assumed. Finally, by assuming a certain ratio of the unit cost
of production of the good in the North as compared to the South (A), 1 85 it
is possible to calculate the multiple by which wages in the South would
have to increase in order to eliminate the cost advantage of production in
the South. We refer to this multiple (a) as the "indifference ratio." It is
defined by the requirement that aO + (1 - 0) = A. I.e., a = (A + 0 - 1)/0.
Implicit in the calculation of an indifference ratio is constancy of the pro-
duction technique (and hence, of the labor and non-labor inputs employed
to produce a unit of output). Of course, if adjustments to the production
technique as a result of increases in labor costs are permitted, this will only
increase the extent to which wage increases in the South may be absorbed
without eliminating the cost advantage of Southern production, since any
adjustments made by producers can only decrease their costs. Moreover, if
improvements in labor productivity result from the increase in wages or
labor standards (for any of a range of reasons, such as the existence of
nutrition-productivity linkages) this too will increase the extent to which
wage increases in the South may be absorbed without eliminating the cost
advantage of Southern production. As well, since the Southern labor costs
estimated in the data refer to all wages and salaries, including those of
managerial workers, the multiple by which labor costs of line workers may
be increased without eliminating the cost advantage of Southern produc-
tion may be significantly underestimated by these figures. From these
standpoints, the estimates provided of indifference ratios are conservative.
Since the ratio of the unit cost of production of goods in the North as
compared to the South is in general unknown, we calculate indifference
ratios for various scenarios (ranging from a cost differential of 2:1 to a cost
differential of 10:1).186 We present results for a benchmark scenario in
185. Of course, in practice the good may not be economical to produce in the North.
In that case, this ratio is best interpreted as that which would prevail if the good were to
be produced in the North (at the prevailing factor prices, using cost-minimizing
technique).
186. This ratio is known for specific goods and countries. In 1997, the unit cost to
retailers of a casual men's shirt produced in the U.S. was estimated $7.58 and the unit
cost to retailers of a casual men's shirt produced in Mexico $4.45. Unit costs of produc-
ing clothing items in other developing countries have been deemed comparable to those
in Mexico. See ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 172, at 223-42; see also Pollin et al., supra
note 93. In 2001, the unit cost to retailers ("unit price realization") of a men's shirt was
$4.21 in Bangladesh and $4.02 in China. See GopalJoshi, Overview of Competitiveness,
Productivity, and Job Quality in South Asian Garment Industry, in GARMENT INDUSTRY IN
SOUTH ASIA: RAGS OR RICHES? 8 (Gopal Joshi ed., 2002). In 2003, the average export
price for trousers, underwear, woven shirts and knit shirts was $1.84 in China, $7.63 in
the U.S., and $4.42 in other exporting countries. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF TEXTILE ORGS.,
ANALYSIS SHOWS CHINESE APPAREL PRICES 76% BELOW U.S. PRICES AND 58% BELOW REST OF
WORLD'S PRICES (Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://www.ncto.org/newsroom/pr200414.
asp. In December 2004, with the assistance of the UNITE union, the authors inter-
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which the share of direct labor costs in unit costs is assumed to be constant
across stages of production, and equal at each stage to that reported in the
empirical (UNIDO) data for 2000. In Table 3, we present these results for
"Total manufactures" and selected industries. The full range of tables is
available from the authors, but may also be constructed by the reader
employing her own preferred scenario (using the provided spreadsheet and
UNIDO data). It may be observed that the multiple by which labor costs
must be increased across the board to eliminate the cost advantage of
Southern production is usually very large, and is at least three even under a
highly conservative assumption (that the unit cost of manufacturing a
good in the North is only twice the unit cost of manufacturing the same
good in the South). In short, there is room to at least triple real wages of
workers in the South without there arising any possibility of the cost
advantage of Southern production being lost. Of course the possibility of
substitution occurring among Southern producers is not considered in this
counterfactual. However, the likelihood of such substitution may be less
than is widely believed. There is evidence to suggest that labor costs are a
less important determinant of decisions concerning which developing
country to locate production and investment in than are infrastructure
quality, reliability of suppliers and other considerations. 18 7
A related but distinct question concerns the impact of higher Southern
labor costs on final retail prices and thereby on consumer demand. As
already argued, the ratio of costs of production to final retail prices of most
Southern exports sold in northern markets is small, as a result of which
these sales effects may be minor. This case is made very ably in the context
of global apparel production by Pollin, Burns and Heintz, who demonstrate
that a doubling of wages of non-supervisory production level workers in
the garment industry in Mexico would result in increases in final retail
prices of garments exported to the U.S. of between one and three
percent. 188
viewed New York manufacturers of girls' specialty dresses engaged in global subcontract-
ing of garment production. We were told that costs of production in Mexico are roughly
one-third those in the U.S. and costs of production in China and Sri Lanka are roughly
one-fifth of those in the U.S. The assumption of a ratio of unit costs of about two seems,
in light of these reports, to be wholly reasonable.
187. See, e.g., George Wehrfritz & Alexandra Seno, Succeeding at Sewing, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 10, 2005, at 38 ("According to AT Kearney, labor for a shirt made in Bangladesh
runs just $1.52, compared with $2.28 in China, but after factoring in materials and
transportation, the total cost of the Chinese shirt is $11.15-almost a dollar cheaper.").
Labor costs in the garment industry are lower in Bangladesh than in China but overall
production costs are lower in China than in Bangladesh: Keith Bradsher, Bangladesh Sur-
vives to Export Again: Competition Means Learning to Offer More Than Just Low Wages,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Cl. The relative unimportance of labor costs as compared
to other considerations that play a role in the decision to source garments in one devel-
oping country rather than another is forcefully emphasized in a recent guide for gar-
ment industry buyers. DAVID BIRNBAUM, BIRNBAUM'S GLOBAL GUIDE TO WINNING THE
GREAT GARMENT WAR (2000).
188. See Pollin et al., supra note 93, table 7.
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Estimating the Impact of Labor Standards Improvements: Cross-Country
Comparisons
The second type of evidence concerns the apparent impact of labor
standards on export performance and foreign direct investment, as re-
vealed through cross-country comparisons. A number of such studies,
most adopting regression analysis, have been conducted recently. Such
studies are difficult to interpret for a variety of reasons. For example, com-
monly used measures of the enforcement of labor standards (such as ratifi-
cation of ILO conventions) may not signify actual enforcement. More
importantly, the association of labor standards enforcement with eco-
nomic outcomes (export performance or intake of foreign investment) may
be informative with regard to the impact of unilateral improvements in
labor standards, but may be entirely uninformative with regard to the
potential impact of coordinated improvements in labor standards. Such
coordinated improvements are likely to diminish the revenue and employ-
ment impact of increases in each country's labor costs, by reducing the
possibilities for substituting for imports from a given country with imports
from a lower cost producer elsewhere. Such coordination reduces the mag-
nitude of the elasticity of product demand faced by each country for its
exports when increases in price are driven by improvements in labor
standards.
Despite the methodological difficulties just highlighted, it is worth-
while to examine the results of recent studies based on inter-country com-
parisons of the apparent impact of labor standards on export performance
and foreign direct investment. Dehejia and Samy offer a thoughtful survey
of this literature. They find, based on their own work and that of others
that, "there is no clear-cut link, either in theory or in practice, between the
level of stringency of labor standards and a country's comparative advan-
tage, whether it is measured by its terms of trade (in the theoretical model)
or the extent to which it affects export performance (in the empirical
work)."'189 Whereas Mah found that ratification of ILO conventions was
associated with inferior export performance, "OECD found no evidence
that countries with low labour standards achieved a better export perform-
ance than countries with high labour standards."'190 Mah did not control
for "natural determinants of comparative advantage," thereby justifying
some skepticism. Rodrik found that "labor standards are significant deter-
minants of labor costs when one controls for productivity; but they are not
important determinants of comparative advantage, the latter being deter-
mined mostly by factor endowments."'19 1 Dehejia and Samy find in their
cross-country regressions that when "realistic" indicators of labor stan-
dards are used, there is no significant association between labor standards
and export performance.1 92 However, when less informative indicators (in
189. Dehejia & Samy, supra note 23, at 32.
190. Jai S. Mah, Core Labour Standards and Export Performance in Developing Coun-
tries, 20 WORLD ECON. 773 (1997).
191. Dehejia & Samy, supra note 23, at 15; see Rodrik (1996), supra note 19, at 52-59.
192. Dehejia & Samy supra note 23, at 21.
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particular possibly unenforced ILO ratifications) are used, then lower labor
standards are associated with a higher level of export performance. The
authors conclude that, "we obtain rather weak evidence (especially given
that we do not put too much faith in conventions ratified as realistic indica-
tors) supporting the view that countries characterized by low labor stan-
dards have a comparative advantage in trade."'1 9 3 It is also interesting to
note that in their time-series analysis of Canada-U.S. trade, Dehejia and
Samy find that two of three measures of labor standards "indicate that
higher labor standards have led to an improvement in export
performance." 194
Singh and Zammit also present an illuminating survey of the evidence.
They report that "[The UK Department for International Development] has
recently reviewed evidence on core labor standards and competitiveness...
However, these studies find no evidence of a negative relationship
between higher labor standards and the FDI that a country receives."'
1 95
They report that "other studies indicate that higher labour standards tend
to reduce labour-intensive manufactured exports .... Although there are
very few economy-wide or comparative international studies of the effects
of labour standards on economic development, there is considerable
research which investigates the micro-level effects of standards on both
firms and workers in developing countries .... In general, these indicate
both negative and positive outcomes, and suggest that the effect of labour
standards in developing countries is likely to be complex, depending on
country- and industry-specific factors."' 196
The fear that increased labor standards will diminish the comparative
advantage possessed by countries with relatively low labor costs, and thus
impede their ability to export relatively labor-intensive goods to developed
countries has thus far received little empirical support.
193. Id. at 23.
194. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
195. See generally Singh & Zammit, supra note 32.
196. See id. at 94.
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Table 3: Indifference Ratios for Total Manufactures and Sample
Industries1 9 7
SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N Theta
0.099 0 2 0.240
3 0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N Theta
0.066 0 2 0.240
3 0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
FOOD PRODUCTS
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
ASSUMED
RATIO OF
UNIT COSTS
(NORTH/SOUTH)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
2 8.83 6.40 5.18 4.46
3 16.67 11.80 9.37 7.92
4 24.50 17.20 13.55 11.37
5 32.34 22.60 17.74 14.83
10 71.51 49.59 38.66 32.12
197. "Beta" is the average share (for low-income countries) of direct labor costs in
unit costs at the final stage of the production process. "Delta" is the increment by which
the share of direct labor costs in unit costs is assumed sequentially to increase (i.e., in
arithmetic progression) at each stage of production prior to the final stage. "Theta" is
the share in unit costs of the total labor costs incurred directly and indirectly over the
entire production process. "N" is the number of stages in the production process.
TOTAL MANUFACTURES
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
ASSUMED 2 6.31 4.72 3.93 3.46
RATIO OF 3 11.63 8.45 6.87 5.92
UNIT COSTS 4 16.94 12.17 9.80 8.39
(NORTH/SOUTH) 5 22.25 15.89 12.73 10.85
10 48.82 34.51 27.39 23.16
Cornell International Law Journal
SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N Theta
0.128 0 2 0.240
3 0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
ASSUMED
RATIO OF
UNIT COSTS
(NORTH/SOUTH)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
2 5.17 3.97 3.37 3.02
3 9.35 6.94 5.74 5.03
4 13.52 9.90 8.11 7.05
5 17.69 12.87 10.48 9.07
10 38.56 27.71 22.34 19.15
SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N
0.108 0 2
3
Theta
0.240
0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N Theta
0.125 0 2 0.240
3 0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
ASSUMED
RATIO OF
UNIT COSTS
(NORTH/SOUTH)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
2 5.27 4.03 3.42 3.05
3 9.53 7.06 5.83 5.11
4 13.80 10.09 8.25 7.16
5 18.07 13.12 10.67 9.21
10 39.40 28.27 22.75 19.48
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LEATHER PRODUCTS
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
PLASTIC PRODUCTS
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
ASSUMED 2 5.89 4.45 3.73 3.30
RATIO OF 3 10.79 7.89 6.45 5.59
UNIT COSTS 4 15.68 11.34 9.18 7.89
(NORTH/SOUTH) 5 20.58 14.78 11.90 10.19
10 45.05 32.01 25.53 21.68
RUBBER PRODUCTS
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
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SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N Theta
0.147 0 2 0.240
3 0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR
COSTS IN UNIT COSTS
(SOUTH)
Beta Delta N Theta
.250 0 2 0.240
3 0.337
4 0.422
5 0.496
TEXTILES
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
ASSUMED 2 4.67 3.64 3.13 2.82
RATIO OF 3 8.34 6.27 5.25 4.65
UNIT COSTS 4 12.01 8.91 7.38 6.47
(NORTH/SOUTH) 5 15.68 11.54 9.50 8.29
10 34.04 24.72 20.13 17.41
WEARING APPAREL
INDIFFERENCE RATIOS:
(ALPHA)
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION
STAGES
2 3 4 5
ASSUMED 2 3.29 2.73 2.46 2.31
RATIO OF 3 5.57 4.46 3.93 3.62
UNIT COSTS 4 7.86 6.19 5.39 4.93
(NORTH/SOUTH) 5 10.14 7.92 6.85 6.24
10 21.57 16.57 14.17 12.80

